


NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA



THESIS



**INTEGRATED STABILITY:
NORTHEAST ASIAN SECURITY FOR THE NEW
MILLENNIUM**

by

Michael R. Erickson

December 1994

Thesis Advisor:

Claude A. Buss

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NORTHEAST ASIAN SECURITY
FOR THE NEW MILLENIUM**

by

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Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
B.A., St. Olaf College, 1982

Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the


**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
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


Michael R. Erickson


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ABSTRACT

With the end of the Cold War alignment paradigm, Asian states have lost, or perceive the threat of losing their political patrons. In lieu of traditional alliances, many states are embracing multilateral security arrangements. Placing an increased emphasis on economic security instead of military security, these states appear to be ranking economic development ahead of traditional security concerns. By focusing on economic growth, both domestically and abroad via highly cultivated international economic associations, these nations would seem to be subordinating military security as a matter of foreign policy. To this end, nations in the region are increasingly viewing multilateral arrangements (both governmental and non-governmental) as a means to effect cooperative ventures.

The Cold War strategies of nuclear deterrence, military predominance, and cooperation within the U.N. and bilateral alliances no longer adequately address America's national interests. In the rapidly evolving security environment, the United States is called upon to reaffirm these interests and to formulate additional policies to meet the challenge of a rapidly changing international environment. The need for a nuclear deterrent continues. The end of the Cold War and the budgetary restraints of the United States calls for a limited down-sizing of American military capabilities. But the increasing importance of economic factors in the security equation, particularly the proliferation of trans-national organizations, shows clearly the need for a greater degree of multilateralization--both in political and economic activities. The United States watches closely the proliferation of multilateral institutions in North America, Europe, and Southeast Asia. It finds none completely acceptable as a role model for cooperative engagement in the East Asia-Pacific Region, but it stands ready to experiment with any as a forum for discussion of multilateral approaches to peace and prosperity.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As the Soviet Bloc faded from global power in the late 1980s and the weaknesses of communist ideology were exposed, a new era in international relations began in the East Asia/Pacific region. The security arrangements of the Cold War largely disappeared. Although some disputes were apparently resolved, others re-emerged. The threat of global war was removed from the Korean Peninsula, but border conflicts, ethnic hatreds and religious rivalries flared anew to challenge the stability and peace of Russia and the frontiers of China. Perceptions of security acquired new parameters. The fate of nations and peoples no longer depended on their military might alone--it would now be determined by their tenuous control over such factors as environmental pollution and global climatic change, the insidious dangers of terrorism, and the wildly dynamic explosion of heretofore dormant economic markets. No longer would the recognition of national sovereignty be an adequate guarantor of security. As economics became equally important with military factors as determinants of peace and prosperity, a transnational or multilateral approach loomed as a necessity in seeking a new world order of peace, justice, equality of status, and prosperity.

This thesis examines first the traditional methods pursued by the major nations in Northeast Asia in protecting their national interests during the Cold War period, and subsequently the policies adopted by those nations in the contemporary period following Tian-an-men and the collapse of the Berlin Wall. The trend towards multilateralism is unmistakable.

Following the hostilities of the Korean War, the United States emerged as the Free World's superpower. With its allies, it squared off against the communists and managed to preserve a condition of precarious peace. With nuclear deterrence, an incomparable military power, a national will to maintain regional stability and a system of bilateral alliances, the world was spared what might have been a global holocaust.

For four decades, the powers with their territorial base in Northeast Asia--China, Japan, the Soviet Union and the two halves of Korea--lived on the edge of a strategic and diplomatic

volcano as they asserted their respective national interests. China insisted upon its Five Principles of Coexistence as it strove to redress its grievances against the history of the nineteenth century and to achieve its rightful place in the family of nations. It disclaimed any aggressive ambitions as it struggled to redefine its ideological dogma and to modernize its antiquated political and social system. China perceived the United States as its implacable enemy.

Japan, after the tragedy of World War II, acquiesced to its new role as the ally of the United States. Under the protection of the nuclear umbrella, Japan became the economic giant of the East Asia/Pacific region. Japan quietly and carefully reestablished its position in Southeast Asia and patched its fences in China. It played both ends against the middle in China and with the sponsorship of the United States, created the Self Defense Forces, primarily with the objective of protecting its homeland against possible aggression from the Soviet Union.

The Soviet superpower provided the supplementary muscle for its off-again, on-again ally China and supplied the armaments and weapons for the Leninist states, North Korea and Vietnam. Its armed forces on the China border, its nuclear capability, its ICBMs with the potential of reaching the United States and its respectable navy kept the entire East Asia/Pacific region in a state of supreme nervousness.

Nowhere was the threat of the Soviet Union more influential than on the Korean Peninsula. The North was backed by China and the Soviet Union, the South was backed by the United States. Time and time again such incidents as the capture of the Pueblo and the ax murders in the Neutral Zone took both sides to the brink of war. It was primarily the symbolism of the Neutral Zone and the framework of the Armistice Commission that gave any assurance at all of the continuance of peace.

There was no doubt that the armed might of the United States, and the willingness of the American public to carry the burdens of containment served to preserve the peace in Northeast Asia for forty years. Japan, Korea, and Taiwan benefitted from their American

alliances, while their prosperity and economic development flourished because of the American commitment.

The whole scene changed with the end of the Cold War. China renewed its old bonds of understanding with Japan and came to terms with Russia. China entered into border and trade agreements with Russia, and entered into new negotiations over troops, missiles, and arms sales. China and Russia normalized their relations with South Korea and used their influence to reduce the bellicosity of North Korea. Most of all China adopted a platform for peace and stability, and 'defanged' its communist ideology. China proclaimed its need for cooperation abroad in order to achieve a better standard of living for its own people.

In contrast with China's priority for economic advancement, Russia opted for democracy first and a rising standard of living second. The old communist authoritarian style government continued in China, but Russia lost itself politically in a chaos of disorder. The former Soviet Union was broken apart. Some of its component states leaned towards the West in Europe, but the member states of the C.I.S. found themselves fragmented and in obvious danger of the rebirth of ancient Russian imperialism. In any case, the Warsaw bloc and the threat of the former Soviet Union disappeared, giving the world a new chance to create a world order rich with promise of peace.

The challenge is greatest for the United States, the sole remaining superpower and the best hope as the benign stabilizer in the quest for a balance of power in Northeast Asia. The commitments of the United States as an Asia-Pacific power remains stronger than ever. Its military machine remains preeminent in the Pacific Basin, and its economic power--although less dominant than it was during the Cold War-- is still stronger than any of its potential rivals. Its alliances remain firm, and it still operates in consonance with the United Nations in peace-keeping operations. The United States since the Cold War has defined its contemporary policy as cooperative engagement.

To cope with the demands of the new security situation in East Asia and the Pacific, the United States has gradually expanded its diplomatic horizons and fallen in line with current

trends towards multilateralism. Noting the success of NATO and the CSCE (Council for Security Cooperation in Europe) it has explored the possibility of creating a political system in Northeast Asian in which all nations, both communist and anti-communist might participate. The negative factors have militated against such a structure in Northeast Asia. Other models have been explored based on the experiences of Southeast Asia. ASEAN, the Post Ministerial Conferences (PMC), and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), have been analyzed as possible formats for security discussion in Northeast Asia. As yet nothing acceptable has been found in the final category of economic organizations--such as GATT or WTO on a global scale, or APEC, NAFTA, or EAEC on a more limited regional scale. There is still hope that features can be found that will lead to fair and freer transnational trade, thus reducing the tensions that always contain within themselves the seeds of conflict.

I. INTRODUCTION; HYPOTHESES AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

My hypothesis throughout this study is that it is in the national interest of the United States (U.S.) to participate fully in and give support to the multilateral arrangements which Northeast Asian states turn to as their primary means of ensuring regional stability and security.

With the demise in the late 1980's of the Soviet Bloc and the exposure of the weaknesses of communism, a new geo-political era was ushered in. Traditional security paradigms including those effecting the Asia-Pacific region were drastically altered. Despite the passing of the predominantly bipolar world, however, some pre-Cold War issues re-emerged with a new-found urgency. In that the traditional security frameworks of the past four decades are no longer as relevant, new concepts and institutions of security are needed to cope with these problems.

The smaller states have lost, or are threatened with losing their political patrons. Some have begun to court new advocates, others have adopted ambitious new agendas, while still others appear totally uncertain about their futures.

The time has arrived to redefine the "national interest" by placing an increased emphasis on economic aspects of security, placing military concerns on the "back burner." It is no longer enough to guarantee national survival, it is equally important to take advantage of every opportunity to provide for national development.

Although external relations between most nations in the East Asia-Pacific (EA/P) region have traditionally been on a bilateral basis, multilateral arrangements (both governmental and non-governmental) are increasingly subjects of consideration. Northeast Asia is patently influenced by such extra-regional developments as the CSCE (Council for

Security and Cooperation in Europe) and the expanding security ambitions of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). Within the cooperative economic organizations (i.e.: ASEAN, APEC), member nations already have established networks for productive communication, built ties for constructive interaction, and formed extensive alliances for mutual benefit.

As the world navigates in the post-Cold War milieu, the major problem which has emerged in the EA/P region is the search for a system by which ideologically disparate states can best provide for their national goals. From nations with traditional bilateral ties to the U.S., to non-aligned nations, to former communist states, to transitional Leninist states, all will be ready to fall in line with whatever system emerges. The special challenge to the U.S. is to create its own optimum role in such a new world order. The problem for the United States is how to reconcile its existing collective security systems, grounded as they are in the Realist/Balance of Power tradition, with this currently popular trend towards multilateralism. A multilateral arrangement in Northeast Asia, which could be extended to the entire EA/P region, and which in turn could be integrated into an acceptable global system, would clearly be in the interest of the United States.

This thesis examines the trend towards multilateral security arrangements encompassing the Northeast Asian region, addresses the varied roles that regional states are playing in these arrangements, and examines the effects of the various proposed relations on the national interest of the United States. With the dramatic evolution from a military to an economic security model, and the passing of the Cold War, redefinition of the traditional national interests is inevitable. In the new and developing era, the United States is likewise called upon to generate policies to meet the challenges of a rapidly changing international environment. The following questions pertain:

- 1) What is, and what will be, the effect of this trend towards Multilateralism on US perceptions of Northeast Asian security?
- 2) Economic and security blocs begin with sub-regional development, what

problems are to be encountered when sub-regional organizations expand their scope region-wide?

3) What will be the role of the United Nations?

4) Will heretofore extant *economic* arrangements (forums, organizations, etc.) develop into multilateral *security* arrangements integrating not just Northeast Asia, but the entire Asian-Pacific Rim?

The national interests (**political, economic, and territorial**) of the Northeast Asian states including the United States were apparently adequately served by Cold War security arrangements. At least global confrontation was avoided. It is now relevant to examine whether the previous system is suitable and effective for the current post-Cold War situation.

If the nature of the respective national interests have been modified or changed as a result of the ending of the Cold War, it is reasonable to assume that the arrangements to protect those interests can likewise be modified. Specifically from the viewpoint of the United States, the former system based on bilateral agreements should be advantageously expanded to include multilateral participation.

II. CONFLICTS OF NATIONAL INTEREST IN NORTHEAST ASIA; COLD WAR ERA

A. OVERVIEW

Northeast Asian security arrangements may be divided into two periods: the first covering the Cold War era prior to the Soviet Union's breakup; and the second, the contemporary period, roughly since 1989. In the first period, the confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States, and their respective allies, dominated international relations throughout the region of Northeast Asia. The direct conflict between the ideologies and the military potential of the two superpowers were the principle factors determining the alliances formed and the balance of power struggles that waged during the Cold War. In the second period the adequacy of the old security arrangements has been brought into question, and a growing tendency is noted towards exploring the value of adding a multilateral dimension to the traditional bilateral agreements.

At the very outset, I shall profile the national interests of the Northeast Asian states (China, Japan, the Russian Far East, the Korean Peninsula, and the United States) and the degree to which the bipolar system addressed these interests during the Cold War. "National interests" are conceived as those critical *political, economic, and territorial* "activities" that have shaped each nation's foreign relations.

B. CHINA

With Mao Zedong and his Communist Party's victory over the Nationalists on the mainland in 1949, and subsequent alliance with the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China (PRC) was established and was perceived as a tangible ideological threat to U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific. The ascendancy of the two communist powers set the stage for international relations for the duration of the Cold War. Notwithstanding the Western perception of a monolithic communist bloc in Northeast Asia, the first thirty years of the PRC were marked by turbulence and critical internal change.¹ These tumultuous internal changes, in their various political and economic aspects, lasted throughout the era. In spite of China's internal upheavals, it pursued its foreign policy goals with unswerving direction and relentless ardor.

Whereas Mao and the Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA) ushered in the modern era for China, bringing order to a state "...on the edge of anarchy,"² the resultant growing pains were many and harsh. From the disastrous Great Leap Forward in the 1950s to the chaotic Cultural Revolution of the 1960s, from turbulent internal succession issues to repeated international confrontation and ideological battles, the Chinese establishment confronted the U.S. in Korea, the Taiwan Straits, and Vietnam. It also confronted the Soviets in

¹ See Ralph H. Clough, "Recent Trends in Chinese Foreign Policy," National Security Interests in the Pacific Basin, ed. Claude A. Buss, (Stanford: Hoover Press, 1985), pp.295-307.

² Vivienne Shue adroitly argues that the communist revolution was more successful at state building than at orchestrating socialism. Indeed: "...military victory by the revolutionists in 1949 put an end at last to China's prolonged national nightmare at the edge of anarchy. Against the sorry backdrop of a century's dynastic decline, civil war, and social decay, the victory of the (PLA) finally swept from the stage all the frowsy remnants of the old regime. The Communists' victory brought peace at last, national reunification, and a mandate to govern. The social catharsis of a brutal and prolonged revolution cleared the way, in short, for the winning party to rebuild the state." From: "Powers of State, Paradoxes of Dominion: China 1949-1979," Perspectives on Modern China, Four Anniversaries, ed. Kenneth Lieberthal, et al (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1991), p.205.

Zhenbaodao. With India, and again in Vietnam, China's perceptions of its national interests were badly bandied-about during the Cold War period.

China's policies to promote its international political interests during the Cold War period may be characterized as a type of *tripolar* Great-Power "dance" with the Soviet Union and the U.S., sometimes as partners or allies, and sometimes as adversaries or enemies. Emerging from its civil war as a divided state, China soon faced international scrutiny regarding the legitimacy of the PRC. For example, Taiwan claimed the right to the "China" seat on the United Nations Security Council. The lack of a solution to their internal troubles brought down the wrath of the West. This, coupled with their heritage as members in good standing of the Comintern (1922-1943) and unashamedly pro-Soviet stance won the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) the open ill will of the U.S., a doubtful and wary acceptance among smaller western powers, and the approval of the Soviet-Union.³

The bilateral alliances with the Soviet Union was an all-important factor in carrying out the PRC's initial agenda. In concluding his relationship with Moscow, "Mao desired to borrow strength from the USSR for China's use in both foreign and domestic affairs during its period of weakness."⁴ By March, 1950, the two nations were bound together by a treaty of military and political alliance as well as by subsidiary economic agreements.

With this support of the Soviet Union, China was able to carry out the business of rebuilding an economy, a state, and the beginnings of a niche in the modern global community. This overwhelming task fell upon the "able leadership of CCP organizers and administrators" who, alternating with the charismatic but less capable leadership of Mao Zedong, carried out a multifaceted development and reshaping of the very fabric from which

³ C.P. Fitzgerald, "Chinese History up to 1966," The Far East and Australasian Almanac 1994 25th ed., (London: Europa Publications, Ltd., 1994), p.186.

⁴ O. Edmund Clubb, 20th Century China 3rd ed., (New York: Columbia University, 1978), p.316.

China was made.⁵ The Communist leaders first consolidated political control (1949-1953), and then created their so-called socialist or collectivized economic system (1954-1957). Followed by the Great Leap Forward from 1958 through Mao's death in 1976, the agricultural and industrial workers were organized into a disastrous system of production resulting in economic ruin and the deaths of an estimated twenty-three to thirty-seven million Chinese.⁶

Not one to admit he was ruining the economy, Mao kept up the unrelenting pace of change and set out to restore what he perceived to be a decline in the revolutionary ethos in the PRC. By the end of the "lost years," China had virtually destroyed itself through the excesses of the Gang of Four and the Cultural Revolution; in Deng Xiaoping's words:

Their supporters often cited (Mao's) slogan 'To rebel is justified.' This was used as an excuse for mass violence. 'To rebel is justified,' they said, means that you can beat people up, smash their houses, and loot their possessions. Thus what the Gang of Four preached was literally anarchy. Before they finished they did incalculable harm to the social fabric and economic system of China.⁷

The revolution that had begun compellingly enough had undercut itself and hamstrung the nation. With Mao's death in 1976, the door was symbolically closed on a regime that could be considered as the most influential and destructive dynasty in the history of China. Mao's eventual successor, Deng Xiaoping (perhaps China's most prolific 'on again-off again' politician), has proven to be no less influential, albeit in an entirely different manner.

⁵ Fairbank, p.343.

⁶ Michael Yahuda, "China: Recent History," The Far East and Australasian Almanac 1994 25th ed., (London: Europa Publications, Ltd., 1994), p.188.

⁷ Deng Xiaoping, as interviewed by Frank Gibney in The Pacific Century: America and Asia in a Changing World, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1992), p.298.

The cogency of this review of the PRC's internal restructuring is to emphasize the balance between domestic affairs and foreign relations in China during at least the first twenty years of the Cold War. Whereas Great Powers US and USSR were exhausting each other in a global balance of power, China without fanfare pursued a cold-blooded course in foreign policy, adhering closely to its alliance with the USSR as the key to its security against enemies in Northeast Asia.

Although primarily preoccupied with its ties to the Soviet Union, and with bilateral agreements with North Korea, China during this period conducted a plethora of party to party relations with fellow communists around the world. China was at the same time engaged in war against the United Nations in Korea. Later it was deprived of participation in all the UN international organizations because the "China seat" in that organization was occupied by Taiwan rather than by the PRC. China also took advantage of every opportunity to show its interest in the Third World or to show its concern with ordinary developments in Europe and Africa. Although Communist China was regarded as a pariah by its anti-communist adversaries, it amply demonstrated its determination not to be isolated or shut off from the majority of nations of the free world.

China's national interests and their role in shaping the nation's foreign relations are most apparent through its participation in international organizations and relationships. Participation in these organizations can be seen as an important measure of a nation's prestige (or ambitions to that end!) as well as a means by which a country may influence other states, access aid programs, and facilitate trade, information, and technology flow.

China was predominantly excluded from most *mainstream* international organizations for the first twenty years of its existence.⁸ Taking their isolation even further, China was

⁸ It may be argued, however, that the alliance itself with the Soviet Union had multilateral characteristics, based on the supposition that alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Treaty Organization are multilateral international

repeatedly denied admission to the United Nations until 1971. In 1960, a long-simmering quarrel with the Soviets over ideology had developed into disputes over national interests (security and economic development), culminating in the withdrawal of technical aid and expertise. A tremendous set-back to the still nascent Chinese industrialization, it marked the beginning of a Sino-Soviet split that would last, for better and for worse, for almost thirty years. In retrospect, the major ideological, military, and economic reasons for the Sino-Soviet split were essentially the same for both sides. Specifically for the PRC's leadership, the strong desire to achieve self-reliance and independence of action outweighed the benefits Beijing received as Moscow's subordinate.

China's ideological and political break with the Soviets was exacerbated by territorial issues dating back to the Unequal Treaties. Culminating in 1969 with violent battles along their borders, these boundary disputes (specifically Zhenbao or Damanskiy Island) continue to be an issue even to this day. During the Cultural Revolution, China's growing radicalism and xenophobia had severe political repercussions for Sino-Soviet relations. Thus competition for influence in the Third World, extreme and irreconcilable ideological differences, and ongoing territorial disputes drove a deep wedge between the two powers.

In an attempt to counterweigh the threat from Moscow, the PRC adopted a somewhat more moderate course and sought rapprochement with the US. Despite the extreme hostilities between the two nations as a result of the Korean War, the United States-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty, and the Vietnam War, China began to think of the Soviet Union and its "social imperialism" in Czechoslovakia and Hungary to be the greater threat to China's interests. Starting with Nixon's visit and the subsequent Shanghai Communiqué, the two nations set about normalizing relations, albeit slowly. While the two states warmed to each

organizations. The tangible benefits China gleaned from membership in Moscow - based international organizations were in this instance, negligible. In addition, membership in the WTO, or the COMINTERN, hardly put the member nation at parity with the epicenter of international communism, Moscow.

other at a moderate pace, "People's Diplomacy," exchange of liaison offices, and bilateral trade all contributed to a growing interaction. This tended to take the brakes off the limited relations which China had conducted with such US allies as Japan and the United Kingdom.

More importantly, China's detente with the United States gained it powerful and respected friends and facilitated its access to the United Nations. In 1971 Taipei's representatives were expelled from the Security Council and replaced by Beijing's. After becoming a member of the UN, the PRC made use of its position and joined most of the affiliated agencies including (by the 1980s) the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. By the end of the 1980s China displayed an overt willingness to open-up to the world, to accept economic and technical assistance, and was making a break from its heritage of self reliance and autonomy. China's membership by this time in several hundred international and regional organizations represented an acknowledgement of its value in cultivating global interrelationships.⁹ In addition to providing Beijing with a variety of forum within which it could express its views to the world, membership in these increasing numbers of international groups gave Chinese foreign affairs personnel new knowledge and invaluable international experience.

With Deng Xiaoping leading the PRC after 1976, the state again entered a period of remarkable transition. This cycle was first observable in the Third Plenum of 1978. A major turn in the history of the People's Republic occurred with reforms which brought about a

⁹ China's membership in myriad international organizations were intended primarily to facilitate internal development and promote international opportunities. Assistance from agencies such as the UN Development Program were a marked divergence from previous inclinations towards insular autonomy. Intent on attaining status as a global player, China sought and attained membership in such organizations as the International Atomic Energy Agency, the World Intellectual Property Organization, and the International Olympic Committee. Eager to cultivate international knowledge and experience during the 1970s and 1980s, China accumulated memberships in the very spectrum of international organizations, from the mundane and esoteric (acrobatics and the study of seaweed for instance) to those of global importance.

fundamentally new political and economic order. It was this "Fourth Revolution" which dramatically marked the beginning of a new international role for the People's Republic. The new direction was made all the more clear with the fall of the Soviet communist order. The first period during which China had by necessity remained a adjunct player to the bipolar alliance system came to an end. Its traditional inclination towards autonomy and self sufficiency took on a new complexion when it broke out of its shell and took whatever initiatives it determined to be useful in protecting and promoting its national interests.

In its reincarnation, China took on great power affiliations and participated in third world multilateral forums. China still put primary emphasis on domestic economic development in this new period through cooperation with the outside world for the better promotion of peace and stability. These same trends will be noted in recent conduct of China's foreign policy after the end of the Cold War.

C. JAPAN

Throughout the Cold War Japanese national interests and their foreign policy activities were a manifestation of its bilateral political and military ties to the United States. In contrast to Japan's pre-World War II aggressive militarism and embodiment of the *bushido* code, the nation emerged from the crushing Pacific defeat chastened and refocused, and dependent upon the United States. First during the occupation, and later throughout the Cold War era, Japanese pursuit of its national interest was to a great extent a result of the country's relationship with America.

Prior to World War II however, Japanese national security and interests were pursued by quite different means. From the blossoming of the Meiji Restoration beginning in the late 1860s through its imperialistic Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere of the 1930s and '40s, modernization of all sectors was the underlying theme of Japanese national interest. Highest priority was given to military development, with as much as one-third of the national budget accounted for by defense expenditures in the late nineteenth century. This powerful military machine projected Japanese power throughout the region, reflecting the national consensus that national security depended upon expansion, not merely strong defense. Coupled with single-minded foreign policy objectives of enhancing Japan's stature as a world power, the lasting effects remain clear to this day.

A series of successful wars and imperialist campaigns indelibly highlight Japan's militarist legacy. A punitive expedition to Taiwan in 1874 and a succession of fruitful ventures against Korea, China, and Russia all served to secure by military means the raw materials and strategic territories Japan believed necessary for the development and protection of the nation. Moving far beyond regional limits, Japan's military achieved the state a significant global recognition (although replete with limitations on the extent of military expansion, patently ignored) during the 1921-22 Washington Naval Conference, and through alliances such as the Tripartite Act (1940) partnership of Germany and Italy.

Instrumental in the rise of Japanese militarism, and perhaps most damaging to the international image, was Japan's army in Manchuria--the so-called Kwantung Army. A hotbed of extreme nationalism and militarist ideas, the Kwantung favored a divided, weakened, and accessible China.¹⁰ Ultimately the Kwantung Army's rogue actions in northern China resulted in a rapid series of conservative and ultra-nationalist illegal activities aimed at control of the state. The results were severe: after 1932 the national governments were controlled by the military and a bureaucratic elite. Political parties existed, but had no role in decision-making. Big-business cooperated cozily with the militarist government. Public opposition was negligible in that Japan had become virtually a police state. While the actions of the Kwantung spread to all of Manchuria and the Japanese puppet-state of Manchukuo, the effort severely damaged Japan's standing in the international community. Because of vocal Western protest over actions in Manchuria, and pressed to restore its political status, Japan walked out of the League of Nations (1933) and continued penetration of China.

Because of the peasant roots shared by most of the junior officers and the conscripts, a close and sympathetic relationship ultimately developed between the military establishment and the civilian population. Coupled with the consummate control the military exercised over the political and industrial machines, in time most people came to look to the military commanders for guidance on military and political matters rather than to their political leaders. This unreined ultra-nationalist--militarist element in control of Japan's destiny is indisputably responsible for its involvement in World War II:

...the majority of Japanese also felt victimized by their own military for having dragged them into a war that rationally could only end in tragedy, and for conducting that war without regard for the suffering that was inflicted on the Japanese people. Consequently the military

¹⁰ The Kwantung's links to the Japanese *Zaibatsu* industrialists is well known. These *Zaibatsu* had enormous interest in Manchurian raw resources, any unification or cooperation between China and Manchuria was seen as threatening to Japanese industrial interests. Ultimately the threat was seen as great enough that the Kwantung independently engineered the Mukden incident in an effort to eliminate Chiang Kai-shek.

was seen as innately inclined to take matters into its own hands, and hostile towards human rights and democracy. The profound Japanese distrust of its own military has been reflected in the...debate over defense and security throughout the postwar era.¹¹

Rather than reviewing the historical proceedings of the War in the Pacific, suffice it to say that the United States aerial bombardment, virtual elimination of merchant and battle fleets, and subsequent atomic attacks destroyed the power of Japan. With the surrender of the general staff and acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, Japan experienced the only major military defeat in the country's history. The public was compelled to review their national interests. Japan's national ruin had a profound and lasting effect on national attitudes towards war, the armed forces, and in particular, military involvement in politics. The subsequent disarmament and demobilization of the military, and excision of all its leaders from positions of power in the state stand as mute testimony to the changed national consciousness.

Thus the trauma of defeat allowed strong pacifist sentiments to arise, as was most clearly manifest in the United States-fostered 1947 Constitution. "Forever renounce(ing) war as an instrument for settling international disputes..." (Article 9), the constitution specifically declares that Japan will never again maintain "land, sea, or air forces or other war potential." Although later cabinets interpreted the constitution as allowing the state the right of self defense (ultimately the various Self Defense Forces), anti-militarist public opinion remains a force to be reckoned with on any defense related issue.

The dawning of a new strategic era for Japan was foretold in the United States occupation. Japan came under an Allied occupation, with the United States predominantly assuming the task of demilitarizing and democratizing the state. Major changes were instituted in Japan's political, social, and economic foundations. For seven years Japan had virtually no control over its foreign relations and became, in effect, a ward of the United

¹¹ Thomas U. Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism," *International Security* Vol.17, No.4 (Spring 1993), p.136.

States. When Japan regained its sovereignty and entered the international community again, it was as virtually an emasculated nation with neither the means nor barely the inclination to defend itself. The world Japan now existed in was dominated by the Soviet--US Cold War. It was a world in which countries either sided with one camp or the other. National security was measured by closeness of alliance with a country's chosen superpower. In Japan's case the Treaty of Peace (signed September 8, 1951 in San Francisco; effective April 28, 1952) ending its war with most of the Allied powers except the Soviet Union and China, and the Mutual Security Assistance Pact with the United States (signed the same day) assured Japan's military security, and its status as a dependent ally, for the next forty years.

The clearest evidence of Japan's new security policy and revisionist pursuit of national interests during this era is seen primarily in the so-called Yoshida Doctrine. Clearly representative of Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru's Centrist party inclinations away from militarism and towards reconstruction, the "Yoshida Doctrine" itself was the generic terminology used to describe Japan's postwar rebuilding efforts. The guiding principles of the Doctrine were very real, and very clear in Japan's close cooperation with the United States for both security and economic reasons.¹² Other notable manifestations of the Doctrine were seen in promotion of a free trade system beneficial to Japan's entrance into the United Nations (1956.)

With its national military security assured by the protective "shield" and nuclear umbrella of the United States, Japan was able to focus narrowly on reestablishing economic viability, and on trying to establish credibility as a *peaceful* member of the world community.

¹² The United States placed intense pressure on Japan to play a more visible role in regional security, desiring an alliance similar to NATO in Europe involving a rearmed and militarily active Japanese presence. See John Welfield, "An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Post-War Alliance System" (London: Athlone Press, 1988), and John Dower, "Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878--1954" (Cambridge, Mass: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University Press, 1979), both as cited in Berger, pp.134--140.

The latter goal represented a diplomatic challenge in that Japan had to placate the suspicions and intense resentments of its Asian neighbors. The victims of Japan's brutal colonial rule and ruthless imperial aggression were forever fearful of a resurgence of Japan's international aspirations. They were now subject to a "reborn" Japan: low-key, conciliatory, and non-assertive. Japan avoided political issues and was essentially free to concentrate on its economic goals. It promoted friendly ties with virtually all nations, sought to keep economics and international politics as separate bedfellows, and attempted to maintain a neutral stance on East-West Cold War issues.

For the duration then of the Cold War, Japan was subject to an evolving redefinition of national security. National security was now increasingly defined not only in terms of defending against military threats, but more broadly embraced a variety of goals. From enhancing the now-concrete relations with the United States to improving relations with its neighbors the Soviet Union, China, and the Southeast Asian nations; from ensuring Japan's energy security to guaranteeing its food and raw materials supplies, Japan's myriad goals were now perceived as vital to overall national security. Japanese national security became viewed in comprehensive terms.

Despite the recurring domestic debate regarding the growth and utility of the Self Defense Force(s), incremental escalation in force size, technology, and international utilization occurred (in time). While some argued this to be a rearming of the nation and a rebirth of the *Bushido* culture (all the while denouncing the militarist past and ultimately claiming a *pacifist* historical tradition), the fundamental pillar in Japan's pursuit remained its bilateral military-security dependency with the United States.

Japan's deferment of the bulk of its military security requirements to the United States constitutes just one aspect of its dependency. While the post war strategic indefensibility of Japan in the Northeast Asian region, and the consuming fear of communist hegemony made

close defense ties with the U.S. attractive and imminently practical during the Cold War era, both structural impediments and political considerations made these ties irreversible.

Japan's structural limitations are threefold: the post-war constitution (specifically Article 9); the post-war subjugation of the military to civilian control; and the bilateral security ties to the United States. The first two limitations are, whatever the internal political dynamics behind their origins, still subject to powerful public memories of World War II and to a general acknowledgement of the futility of Japan attempting to solely defend itself. The combined effects of fear-of-history, and the mammoth costs involved in staging adequate defense for the essentially indefensible Japan have served as motivation enough for the public to eschew both a rewritten constitution and a restructured government.

Public attitudes favor a passive over an active stance, alignment with the United States over a policy of equidistance between the United States and the Soviet Union, political dependence over autonomy, and minimal over extensive military spending.¹³

While "...public opinion has come to accept grudgingly the existence of the SDF and the necessity of a modest national defense,"¹⁴ the populace views Japan's ties to the United States as essential and integral to the pursuit of the national interests.

In combination with the United States, Japan has throughout the Cold War emphasized the smooth and effective operation of the bilateral system. To this end Washington and Tokyo established four forums for discussion of security issues: the Security Consultative Committee, the Security Subcommittee, the Security Consultative Group, and the Japan - U.S. Joint Committee. Working jointly in these forums the two countries have been called upon to conduct studies to ensure the effect attainment of the objectives of the Security Treaty and related arrangements. The range of topics is

¹³ Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, "Japan's National Security," *International Security* Vol.17, No.4, (Spring 1993), p.101.

¹⁴ Katzenstein and Okawara, p.100.

impressive and highly topical: joint defense planning, sea - lane defense, the Japan - U.S. defense coordination center, exchange on intelligence, common operational preparations, interoperability, and specific issues dealing with Japanese facilities assistance to U.S. forces in the case of situations in EA/P outside Japan directly effecting state security.¹⁵

On a purely operational level, U.S. - Japanese security cooperation has been extensive. Including most visibly joint military training and technology exchange, the United States has since the early 1980s conducted joint command post and communications exercises with the GSDF. The most protracted cooperative training has been included the MSDF which has participated in joint antisubmarine and mine-sweeping exercises since 1955 and RIMPAC exercises since 1980.

While episodes such as the AFX dispute and the Toshiba - Soviet machine tool case raise flags on possibly troubled bilateral techno-cooperation, the relationship has a long (albeit predominantly one - sided) history. Since the 1954 Mutual Defense Assistance (MDA) Agreement, Japan has been the recipient of U.S. grant aid (terminated in 1964) and co-production of U.S. developed weapons systems. Some of these include the P-3C, the F-15, and the Patriot missile. More recently (1983), Japan was prompted to drop a prohibition on export or transfer of dual use technology. By 1988 Tokyo had approved the transfer to the United States of SAM - related technologies and naval vessel construction/modification technologies. By the mid - 1980s Japan and the U.S. concluded an "Agreement on Japan's Participation in the (Strategic Defense Initiative) SDI Research," and established a new framework for further bilateral cooperation.

With military and defense security issues comfortably accounted for by the United States, Japan had by the end of the Cold War diversified its economic interests and

¹⁵ See Japan: A Country Study, pp. 319, 376-377 and International Military and Defense Encyclopedia Vol.3, ed., Col. Trevor N. Dupuy, USA (Ret.), (Washington: Brassey's (US), Inc., 1993), p.1373.

integrated inextricably with virtually all of its Northeast Asian neighbors. Coupled with Japan's flexible characterization of national security as a comprehensive concept, encompassing political, economic as well as military factors, this regional integration has led Japan to expand, if only economically, through an interest in multinational/multilateral organizations. The next Chapter will address Japan's most recent interest in these regional organizations, and the degree to which they are compatible with the nation's security agreements with the United States.

D. THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST

The history of Russia's involvement in the Asia-Pacific region dates to the late sixteenth century with intense and relevant interaction primarily in the last one-hundred years. Involved in the region yes, but always perceived as aliens, as non-Asians. With a primarily European point of historical reference, Russians do not generally perceive themselves as Asian. As Skak suggests: "...the oft mentioned Russian xenophobia is, perhaps, above all xenophobia towards Asians. Today, Moscow taxi drivers are more than willing to blame everything on the *zholye*, although the "yellows they have in mind are the Muslims of Central Asia rather than the classical "yellow peril" of Northeast Asia."¹⁶ Again the point is emphasized: even in this post Soviet era, when not preoccupied by political intrigue in Moscow, Russians by and large have a difficult time seeing past the turmoil in Central Asia. While Euro-Russia is consumed with events closer to home, the Russian Far East, by virtue of proximity and gross resource potential alone would do well to capitalize on events in its own back yard.

Russian involvement in Northeast Asia does have a lengthy history, albeit an unfulfilled one. The European impact on the Pacific developed slowly, however the lure of the Orient was certain and pursued from every possible angle. While northern routes were dominated by the north European powers: Russia, Britain, and to a lesser degree France, Russia was the only one to come by land across Eurasia.

Following in the wake of the Mongol Golden Horde, the explorer Yermak was dispatched by Tsar Ivan IV ('The Terrible') in 1582 to impose control over the independent northern Asian khanates. Spearheading the first major Russian expedition across Eurasia, Yermak's main interest was commercial. As with North America's

¹⁶ Mette Skak, "Post-Soviet Foreign Policy: The Emerging Relationship Between Russia and Northeast Asia", The Journal of East Asian Affairs Vol.VII, No.1, (Winter/Spring 1993), p.153.

Hudson Bay Company, the Russian adventurers were after furs. Unlike the unbroken North American continent though, Eurasia had already been "tamed" via the previous incursions of the Mongols. Encountering only small bands of primitive tribesmen, swift passage and settlement was thus assured. In their drive to further exploit the mineral resources (salt) and establish firm military control, the Russians followed a pattern of colonial expansionism and established numerous settlements.

Although economic motives were primary in drawing the Russians across to the Pacific, the vast majority of the settlers were military personnel (Cossacks of European descent).¹⁷ Based along a chain of Russian forts reaching all the way to Okhotsk, the military became the means for supporting trading posts, and provided the infrastructure for administration and tax bases for the collection of tribute.

Despite premonitory tsarist concerns regarding the loss of control of revenues from the far flung fur trade, as early as 1639 Ivan Moskvitin had taken his tsar's empire to the Sea of Okhotsk. Russia's first Pacific port, Okhotsk, was established by 1647. Indeed, Russian expansion was such that by the close of the seventeenth century they had explored Kamchatka, explored the length of the Kuriles, named the Bering Straits, and had "discovered" North America. Virtually one-third of total Russian state revenue at this time came from their Far East fur trade.¹⁸ During the reign of Peter the Great, Russia had become obsessed with sea power, and strove to establish not just a European, but a Pacific naval presence as well.

Whereas the Russians had to this point been virtually unrestricted in their eastward expansion, by 1683 the Chinese had recovered enough autonomy following their Mongol

¹⁷ Gerald Segal, *The Soviet Union and the Pacific*, (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990), p.16.

¹⁸ Stuart Kirby, "The USSR in Asia," *Australasian Yearbook*, (London: Europa Publications, 1988), p.1016.

humiliation so that the Manzhou/Qing dynasty was able to halt the Russians in their tracks at the Amur River. Resulting in the Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689), Russia had for the first time come face to face with a significant Asian power and "lost face" in the process. Losing the present-day Maritime and Amur provinces, the southern half of Khabarovsk, and Sakhalin (and consequently all of their potential warm water ports), Russia learned an essential lesson regarding colonization without an adequate support system. "The early lesson for Russia in the Pacific was the need to establish a firm economic base before taking on better-placed rivals."¹⁹

Partially recouping their losses in the Kiakhta treaty (1727), Russia increased her regional strength in part through a new system of Sino-Russian caravan trade and through missionary links with China.²⁰ As though nothing was learned at Nerchinsk, the eighteenth century was most significantly marked by Russian expansionism throughout the Pacific. Extending their imperial tentacles as far as today's Northern California,²¹ Russia risked conflict with Britain in Canada, Spain in California, and the emergent United States everywhere else on the continent. Clearly an overextension of the Russian "power projection" capacity, their California trading settlements were soon abandoned, and ultimately (1867) Alaska was sold to the U.S. in the Empire's effort to retrench and refocus attention on Siberia and the Far East.²²

Despite the extensive Pacific exploration executed during the eighteenth century and

¹⁹ Segal, p.17.

²⁰ This new system of Sino-Russian trade by 1760 accounted for 60 percent of all Russian trade in the Pacific--7 percent of Russia's total trade. See Victor Mote, "The Communications Infrastructure," *Siberia and The Soviet Far East*, ed. Roger Swearingen, (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1987).

²¹ Fort Ross, near San Francisco.

²² Kirby, p.1016.

Russia's not inconsequential contributions,²³ any lasting impressions she made on the face of the Pacific Rim were purely accidental.

Britain was by this time the dominant empire in the world. Despite their small island base, and in contrast to the Russians, the British managed eventually to create and then leave a number of successful independent states with close cultural links to their European home. Russian imperialism left few settlers, although huge areas were incorporated into the homeland.²⁴

With China's nineteenth century decline, Russia was able to combine her superior relative strength and capitalize upon modernization efforts to regain virtually all of her geographic losses of the previous two centuries. Between repossessing the Amur lands and the Beijing treaty (1860) Russia regained over 430,000 sq km of her previous territories, in addition to Sakhalin and the Maritime province.²⁵

The disgraceful losses to the Japanese in 1905 (Manchuria) and subsequent Treaty of Portsmouth dividing all of the Russian Far East into spheres of influence were the latest chapter in an extensive lesson which this time she would not soon forget:

...defeat by the Japanese was a major blow to the Russians and lowered their prestige in the eyes of their neighbors in the Pacific. Russia, thus humiliated, was forced to give up some of its territory. The psychological damage done by the Russo-Japanese war to

²³ Vitus Bering, a Dane in the service of the tsar, had sailed from Kamchatka between 1725 and 1743 and plied the Pacific waters thoroughly from his namesake straits south to the Indonesian archipelago. Subsequent expeditions by A.J. Krusenstern during the first Russian circumnavigation of the globe produced the first extensive mapping of Japan, explorations of Polynesia and Hawaii, and a claim to the discovery of Antarctica. The eastern limit of Eurasia and northern extent of the Pacific had been found; Russia's strategic parameters were being shaped.

²⁴ Segal, p.18.

²⁵ Kirby, p.1016. This wholesale recovery of her territories was to a degree contravened by Lenin and his revolutionary Soviet government in 1919 repudiating the 'unequal treaties' and the tsarist seizure of alien territories.

Russia's sense of power in the Pacific continues to this day. The essential vulnerability of an overstretched empire that fails to modernize is still a powerful image for modern Soviet foreign policy in the Pacific.²⁶

Pursuant to American administration of the Treaty, Russia lost Liaodong, Port Arthur, the Southern Railways in China, and south Sakhalin. The effectiveness with which the emergent Japan was being used against both Russia and China was painfully clear. Throughout this historical episode, the lessons for Russia were to appreciate the weakness of its position in East Asia and also to recognize that Russian influence could be enhanced by the manipulations of the complex regional balance of power.²⁷

From the point of view of the new Soviet Union, Japan's ongoing campaigns represented the efforts of a rapacious neighbor willing to capitalize at all times on the Russian Far East's inherent vulnerability. The Soviets had established a Far Eastern Republic (FER) in response to Japanese regional aggression, but this was disbanded in 1922 when the Japanese retreated.²⁸

The Soviet Union was now attempting the fullscale development of Siberia. From the late 1920's the Soviet Union was making enormous efforts to develop Siberia and the Russian Far East by virtually every means possible including forced labor, colonization drives, and construction of the Vladivostok rail link. Communism was slow in coming to the Soviet Pacific though, and the politics of the region remained consistently less revolutionary than in the Soviet West. The perception in European Soviet Union was that

²⁶ Segal, p.23.

²⁷ Segal, p.23.

²⁸ The Japanese had attacked Russia in 1918 subsequent to the Bolshevik uprising; in order to counter the Japanese in the Russian Far East, exploit the growing international anti-Japanese sentiment, and primarily to play down the communist component of the new regime in Euro-Russia, the Soviet Union created the FER. Segal, p.24.

this new generation in the East was still too young to be either trusted or subjected to their radical campaigns. The Soviet Far East remained a "frontier outpost" wherein both her people, and the overall security could not be trusted.²⁹

Overall this was proving to be a period of extreme flux in the Pacific. The former colonial powers were fading while important new states were emerging. There was as yet no tangible system of international order, neither military, economic, nor cultural. While Europe was at least temporarily reprieved by the experiences of World War One, empires in the Pacific were only just sorting themselves out. Whereas Japan took an opportunistic approach, capitalizing on the inconsistent policies of the Pacific powers, the Soviet Union remained distracted by events European. America initially exercised a form of self-imposed isolation, while China recouped her losses from the extensive internal revolution and remained a ripe target for imperialist ambitions.

With Japan's attack on China (Manchuria Incident, 1931) the true state of Pacific international chaos became apparent. "The failure of international diplomacy, treaty obligations, or the League Of Nations to prevent the dismemberment of China was further evidence of the absence of international order in the Pacific. With Japan, the United States and the Soviet Union outside the League of Nations (until 1934), this already marginal body became a total irrelevance for Pacific politics."³⁰ With the Pacific thus in total disarray from a security standpoint, the direction of events there were easily dictated by Japan's aggressive imperialist agenda.

The lack of Soviet concern with the Pacific war is well documented, and her participation via the Yalta Conference seems at best a shrewd maneuver on Stalin's part towards regaining lost and forgotten territories. This strange alliance between the United

²⁹ Segal, p.25.

³⁰ Segal, p.26.

States and the Soviet Union was an attempt to deal a fatal blow to a staggering Japan.³¹ Thus, via Potsdam, Russia entered Korea ostensibly to accept the Japanese surrender there.

Subsequent to the Japanese defeat in the Second World War, cartographers were able to base their charts on a pattern of occupation in the Russian Far East which would be for the most part unchanged for the next fifty years. Soviet forces, at a cost of very few lives, quickly occupied Manchuria, Sakhalin, Northern Korea, and the Kurile Islands. While the physical borders have remained relatively stable, "diplomatic discussions" of territorial issues between the Soviet Union and China, and the Soviet Union and Japan have continued until today. Most importantly, in a grandiose representation of the classic zero-sum game, the Soviet Union gained by virtue of the decline of the other Pacific powers and by the expanded opportunities that came from Southeast Asian decolonization.

The most obvious change in the international terms was the emergence of the two superpowers and the cold war. Although most of the rhetoric of the iron curtain was Euro-centric and inapplicable to the Pacific, the superpower confrontation was at least more simple than the interwar diplomacy of confusion, even if it was less applicable to the Pacific than to Europe. From the Soviet point, their obvious gains were counterbalanced by the even greater gains made by their main rival, the United States.³²

With the stage thus set, and the dawning of the Cold War at hand, a "classical" era of Asian-Pacific multilateral security commenced. As the Korean war began, the respective camps gelled around the two superpowers, each with a decisive and relatively structured security network and agendas purveyed throughout their web of influence. What began as a strategically simple construction and maintenance of "defensive

³¹ Segal, p.28.

³² Segal, p.29.

perimeters"³³ within Northeast Asia became ultimately a perverse zero-sum ideological struggle of expansion and containment not just in Asia, but around the globe.

At the peak of her development in the region, the Soviet Union had cultivated clients in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos in Southeast Asia, and North Korea in the Northeast. She had maintained a (tenuous) alliance with China for period of ten years, and had developed a working trade relationship with Japan. Their hard won successes were however fleeting.

The expansion of Soviet military power and political influence generated parrying responses not only from the West, but from all the great powers. American containment policy checked and impeded the extension of Soviet power throughout the world. In what was perhaps was their greatest loss, the Sino-Soviet split became essentially irreversible by the late 1950s. Communist China resented the ventures of the Soviet Union into the Third World and jealously guarded against attempts by Moscow to interfere in Chinese internal affairs.³⁴

Bounded by the solidly pro-American Western Europe (and NATO) on the west and a rock-solid U.S.-Japan alliance on the east, the Soviet Union was faced with a virtually impenetrable coalition against their expansion. Not merely surrounded physically, the Soviets were soon faced with a losing battle versus the market economies of their opposition:

³³ John L. Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries Into The History Of The Cold War, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp.100f.

³⁴ Edward A. Kolodziej, "The Multilateralism of Regional Security in Southeast and Northeast Asia: The Role of the Soviet Union," prepared for: Changing East-West Relations: Implications for East and Southeast Asia. A Conference Sponsored by The Defense Academic Research Support Program (DARSP) and The United States Pacific Command, (April 1991).

By the early 1980s, the market oriented states of the West and Japan, associated in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), accounted for \$7.73 trillion of the world's productive wealth against \$2.46 trillion by the Warsaw Pact, a three to one ratio that was widening with each passing year.³⁵

Additionally, the Third World was resisting the onslaught of Soviet expansionism. Whether due to strong nationalist sentiment (Indonesia for one), or due to "better offers" from the Western coalition (Philippines), the Soviets were facing effective obstacles to their assembly of a multilateral bloc. Even within their own client states, Soviet control was undermined by tenacious historical imperatives such as ethnic rivalries (Indochina) and indigenous subversive activities (North Korea).

Perhaps most devastating to Soviet efforts around the Pacific Rim was the formation of the ASEAN organization. While the Soviet Union encountered success in Indochina via their ally Vietnam, those very actions galvanized the ASEAN member nations³⁶ into a loose-knit regional "security" forum. Despite their disparate political and social complexions these states aligned against any further encroachment from Vietnam and the Soviet Union. Plagued by doomsayers from the beginning, ASEAN has proved to be a remarkable regional institution with certain potential for the future.

Inevitably the ultimate downfall for the Soviet Union was their military spending in support of imperialist ambitions. Rather ironic in that those states most ripe for Communist conversion were not coincidentally those most needy for economic aid. At the peak, Soviet financial assistance to Cuba and Vietnam was estimated to be in excess of \$5 billion. When coupled with their extreme level of military spending (15 to 30 percent of

³⁵ Kolodziej, p.3.

³⁶ Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and ultimately Brunei.

GNP), this level of economic burden proved to be crippling in the end.³⁷ Even more damaging, in contrast to highly profitable U.S. relations with allies Japan and South Korea, was the fact that economic assistance to Soviet clients did not lead to economic development. Rather it weakened the Soviet Union even further with no tangible economic growth registered abroad.

In summary, the Soviet Union's Cold War attempts at orchestrating Asian-Pacific multilateral security alliances were hamstrung. Blocked by the countervailing military and economic power of the United States and its allies, undercut by terminal divisions within their own socialist camp, and ultimately broken by her over-committed economic and technological resources, Moscow lost its ability to project both Communist power and purpose around the globe and to even sustain it at home. The Soviet Union was stalemated in Asia, even before the Cold War came to its inauspicious end.

³⁷ Kolodziej, p.3.

E. KOREA

No other international "situation" today better typifies the essence of the Great Power Cold War than the lingering stand-off on the Korean Peninsula. This military and ideological confrontation continues to pit the allies of the United States against allies of the (former) Soviet Union and China at a profound and visceral level; the most heavily armed and vigilantly defended border in the world. But to what end? As Robert T. Oliver, a US political advisor to Rhee Syngman argued in 1952, a divided Korea serves no useful purpose for any tangible political ends, a unified Korea poses no threat to any other state:

It is increasingly evident that in Asia's long history, Korea has been a crucial area. Its primary role has been that of a buffer state. Never strong militarily and never ambitious for expansion, Korea has not in itself been a threat to anyone. Its significance lies now (as it has in the past) in the fact that it occupies the strategic heartland of north Asia, surrounded by China, Japan and Siberian Russia. So long as Korea is truly independent, these powers are kept apart and the peace of Asia is safe. As soon as Korea is dominated by one of them, the other two are endangered. This truism is impossible to avoid. It is the basis for Korean claims that (like Switzerland in Europe) it is to the fundamental advantage of the great powers to insure two things: 1) that Korea be protected against aggression; and 2) that this be accomplished without reducing it to a pawn or satellite of any one or any group of outside nations. If this contention seems self-contradictory, the answer is that it was once done for Belgium and is still being done for Switzerland; it must be done for Korea if the consequences of general war are to be avoided.³⁸

The consequences were to be enormously expensive, both in terms of casualties and material losses; the tremendous cost of rebuilding infrastructures on both sides of the DMZ; the undermining of an essentially autonomous state; and ultimately the fifty year

³⁸ B. Y. Choy, A History of the Korean Reunification Movement: Its Issues and Prospects, (Bradley University: Research Committee on Korean Unification Institute of International Studies, 1984), p.239; as cited in "Introduction," Two Koreas - One Future?, eds., John Sullivan and Roberta Foss, (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987; American Friends Service Committee), pp.1-2.

legacy of a security suzerainty.³⁹ The question addressed by this section is: has the bipolar system satisfied the needs and interests of the Korean state? In many cases the Cold War bipolar alignment system (and most instances of colonialism, for that matter) actually served to unify many ethnically and religiously factional regions. It imparted stability, a sense of national direction, and made available the amalgamated resources uniquely available to a great power. On the Korean Peninsula, however, a sovereign state was needlessly divided.⁴⁰ Unlike the common scenario in which colonialism is perceived as creating new nations where none existed previously, uniting diverse peoples together, drawing national boundaries, tutoring indigenes in self-government and preparing them for the day the imperial power grants independence, all of this had existed in Korea for centuries before 1910.

Although South Korea ultimately reaped economic and technological benefits from alliance with the United States, and North Korea approached bankruptcy under its failed communist system, there was a persistent feeling of intense nationalism. The spirit of nationalism was an outgrowth first of Korea's subordinate relationship with China, and later, and more importantly, the Japanese occupation. This nationalism, while disrupted in both states while under their respective sponsors, has proved durable in the extreme and exists today. Despite the current lack of political or economic congruity between North and South Korea, even a cursory historical glance reveals an inherent binding homogeneity, which time and great power competition cannot completely erase.

³⁹ Granted, throughout virtually all of Korean history the state has existed as a virtual *vassal* of China, paying a certain homage to the Middle Kingdom. Within a world view incorporating the Confucian sense of filial piety, Korean's have viewed their relationship to China as a younger brother to an older brother.

⁴⁰ Germany notwithstanding. As previously mentioned, Korea's heritage and relative autonomy traces back for millennia. Germany on the other hand had unity for little more than a century. Additionally, the territory of Germany was laced with ethnic and linguistic variations quite subject to divisive political stress.

This section will examine the foundations of political and cultural orientation on the Korean Peninsula at the turn of the twentieth century. Establishing the flavor of the national heritage it will analyze the fate of Korea's national interests. Tracing the effects of the Japanese occupation and the devastating division by the Cold War, this is the groundwork for considering the potentially utility of intra-regional multilateral security arrangements for the post-Cold war Korean Peninsula.

Located as it is at the strategic crossroads of the Northwest Pacific, the Korean Peninsula has sustained one of the world's most enduring political entities. Its people are highly literate, with a cultural homogeneity that has a lineage traceable for some fifteen-hundred years.⁴¹ "Indeed, Korea is one of the few nations in the world where ethnic and linguistic unity coincide exactly with national boundaries (Japan is another)...the period of national division since 1945 is not only a very small parenthesis within centuries of unity, but also a sharp wound to the pride of a people with a long and dignified history of self rule."⁴² Rather than an enduring *status quo*, a divided Peninsula must be seen as a profound political anomaly; one in which the fundamental national interest has always been reconciliation and reunion.

Beyond linguistic and ethnic heritage, Korea has retained significant legacies which bear some relevance in today's geo-political calculus. First and foremost is an inherent Confucian consciousness, a perpetual "residue" from the last Korean dynasty which permeates the culture today.⁴³ While Japanese occupation and the Cold War alliances have

⁴¹ Gregory Henderson, "The Politics of Korea," Two Koreas - One Future?, p.95.

⁴² Bruce Cumings, The Two Koreas, No. 269, Foreign Policy Association, (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1984), p.8.

⁴³ Other psychic and structural remnants include *yangbans* (aristocrats) and commoners, scholars and landlords, agrarian bureaucracy, stability and continuity in politics, and benign neglect within the Chinese world order. See Cumings, p.8.

left indelible imprints on the modern Korean "state", these pre-modern lasting legacies must also be considered when formulating the national interests.⁴⁴ This residual Confucianism is basic.

With origins in the Yi Dynasty (1393 - 1910), and the definitive influence on all state affairs since that time, the Confucian system marked Korea as profoundly as it did China. It remains a compelling influence today. A social and moral system based on the family, the model was extended to the state and ultimately to the international system. Its pervasive principle of hierarchy within a reciprocal web of duties and obligations permeates the Korean perception of the structure of the family, the state, and the world. By way of filial piety younger siblings honor and follow older siblings, children obey parents; the parents provide for and educate the children. Older adults enjoy superior prestige and privileges; longevity is a quintessential virtue. Transposed to politics, villages followed the leadership of revered elders, citizens dutifully subjugated themselves to an emperor or king who was considered the "father" of the state.

Examples of the Confucian legacy regarding government are clear in the modern era: whether in the lasting support given a succession of ruthlessly authoritarian, anti-democratic South Korean leaders, such as Park Chung Hee during the 1970s; or in the adamant public calls for a return to traditional values of filial piety and loyalty in the early 1990s.⁴⁵ North of the Thirty-Eighth parallel, fundamental Confucian values are even more apparent in "Cult of Kim" worship of the center, of the late Kim Il Sung. A statewide veneration of the ultimate father figure *cum* despot leader. The relevance of the Confucian heritage to the efficaciousness of the bipolar alignment system is seen in Korea's

⁴⁴ "Less changed than her economies or rapidly changing societies, Korea's ancient political culture thus transmits to both contemporary Koreas more powerful traditional influences than come to her from any other parts of her culture." Henderson, p.95.

⁴⁵ South Korea: A Country Study, (Washington, DC: United States Department of the Army, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), p.XXVII.

acquiescence to hierarchical international relationships. The Japanese colonial period notwithstanding, Korean international relationships with China, the United States, and the Soviet Union have to a large degree been embodiments of the Confucian ideology.

Japanese occupation brought about a significant social and infrastructure modernization to the Korean Peninsula. Following an agenda similar to that pursued on Taiwan fifteen years earlier, Japan established a centralized bureaucracy, a unified national police force and a national guard; it imparted a governmental structure. Japan developed the communications infrastructure by introducing modern railroads, roads, postal services and telecommunications. As a result of the Japanese instituting public health programs and effecting a general orderly peace, Korea's population effectively doubled during the colonial period.⁴⁶

Over the duration of the occupation, the Japanese contributed most to the economic development of Korea. First, in the context of the Oriental Development Company, Japan facilitated the development of huge industrial infrastructure. Whether establishing banks to promote agricultural and industrial development, harnessing rivers in the North to produce electrical power, or sponsoring the simultaneous development of myriad industries, Japan's positive and lasting contributions to every facet of a contemporary Korea are unrivaled in the annals of colonialism.⁴⁷ "The strong, highly centralized

⁴⁶ John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, Albert M. Craig, East Asia: Tradition and Transformation, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989), p.907.

⁴⁷ Indeed, beginning in the early 1920s Japan built then state-of-the-art fertilizer plants; in the decade from 1927 to 1937, the mining industry grew at *nineteen percent per year*. In 1929 chemicals, metals, and machinery accounted for twenty - six percent of total industrial output; by 1944 that figure was *forty - four percent*. During the 1920s the aggregate manufacturing industries grew at a rate of *ten percent per year*. While Japan of course gleaned the profits from this exploitation, unlike most other colonizers, it reinvested the larger sum back into the colony, benefitting Korea in the end. See Fairbank, *et al*, p. 912.

colonial state mimicked the role that the Japanese state had come to play in Japan--intervening in the economy, creating markets, spawning new industries, suppressing dissent."⁴⁸ Beyond the obvious industrial development, Japan imparted worldly education and bureaucratic training necessary for management of a modern society.

Recent researchers...have begun to point out that the post-1945 leadership in every area of South Korean life came from Koreans who had risen from middle or lower-middle positions during the colonial era, often from those who had obtained a higher education in Japan. That is to say, during the colonial era, a generation of Koreans gained training in modern skills that provided a platform for postwar development.⁴⁹

While the Japanese brand of colonialism might be seen as state-building or even as a precursor to autonomy, in some aspects the occupation had just the opposite effect. A curious departure from the sense one has of Japanese professional development of the Korean managerial class (or "bourgeoisie" as Fairbank terms them) is the perception of the occupation as a further re-enforcement of Korea's Confucian sense of the world hierarchy. Despite the advanced, worldly training and relatively newfound exposure to "Western" ideology, Korea's bourgeoisie was from these roots further "...accustomed to dependence on a development-oriented authoritarian government."⁵⁰

Although Korean middle managers and those with significant interest in the national industrial plant in a sense profited from their vassal status within the Japanese empire, the Korean people fanned the embers of a burning nationalism. While there had developed a strong nationalist sentiment earlier, during the troubled, waning years of the Yi dynasty, the occupation was an appalling assault on the Korean national identity. Japan, although

⁴⁸ Cumings, p.20.

⁴⁹ Fairbanks, *et al*, p.912.

⁵⁰ Fairbanks, *et al*, p.912.

singularly responsible for the explosive growth of the Korean economy, practiced a virtual cultural genocide on all things Korean. Japan required Koreans to adopt Japanese surnames, eliminated the Korean-language press, and by the late 1930s, even banned the Korean language itself. It was this oppressive pressure-cooker then that nurtured a militant nationalist sentiment. While older and more established Koreans (primarily the vestiges of the *yangban* aristocracy; enlightened and entrepreneurial landlords) responded to the opportunities spawned by Japanese colonialism, younger and more "left-leaning" Koreans formed the early communist and nationalist resistance groups. Although intense police repression and internal factionalism crippled these activities on the Peninsula, other regional states took more than a casual interest. In addition to the festering political activism on the Peninsula, Koreans launched an active independence movement in exile.

Consisting primarily of Rhee Syngman in the United States, Kim Koo in China, and Kim Il Sung in the Soviet Union, these exiles stridently sought sponsorship for an autonomous and sovereign Korea. Several established provisional governments in exile. Others, such as Kim Il Sung, became renowned leaders of embryonic independence campaigns. They cultivated allegiances of varying strength with their host governments in opposing the Japanese. Kim Koo in China gained sympathy and support from the nationalist government of Chiang Kai Shek. Rhee, with similar ambitions for an autonomous Korea, had worked hard to develop a similar response from Washington. He gained the sympathies of many Christian missionary communities but the Washington government largely turned a deaf ear to his appeals.

Marxist influence had been felt in the north since the late nineteenth century from both China and Russia. Indeed, a group of Korean expatriates had sprouted in the Tumen River border region and served as an embryo for the Korean Communist Party. Koreans were no strangers to the Russian Far East; emigrants and workers had settled along the trans-Siberian Railway, in the Tumen area, and ultimately were the first East Asians to

participate in the Soviet Revolution, both in the armed forces and in the Comintern.⁵¹ In time, the Soviets chose Kim Il Sung, a natural leader and profoundly influential in Korea's battle against occupation, to front the Korean communist organization.

While Rhee and the two Kims were at the helms of stridently nationalist organizations (whatever their pedigree) and shared a manifest desire to protect Korean national interests of unification and autonomy, they were rivals for leadership of their homeland.⁵² As World War II drew to a close ending the Japanese occupation, their destinies ultimately depended upon the decisions of the War's victors, the United States.

Faced initially in the aftermath of WWII with the unwanted burden of establishing a post-occupation government in Korea, having to reconcile diplomatic commitments

⁵¹ "As Lenin turned to the East, Koreans were the most readily available allies, and the most anti-Japanese. More Koreans than Chinese attended the Conference of Toilers of the East held in Moscow in 1922 to counter the Washington Conference...by World War II, Korean factions in the United States and Europe were seeking aid from non-Communist powers, but they were small and ineffective compared with the troops and cadets secretly prepared over the years by the Soviet Union." See Fairbanks, *et al*, pp.910-911.

⁵² Cumings points out an interesting accounting for the rabidity of these relationships, particularly between the Communists and Rhee's Nationalists. "The resistance to the Japanese is the main legitimating doctrine of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK); they trace the origin of the army, the leadership, and their ideology back to that period. Even today the top North Korean leadership is still dominated, as it has been since 1946, by a core group that fought the Japanese in Manchuria. Japan attacked China in 1937 and the United States in 1941, and as this war took on global proportions, Koreans for the first time had military careers opened to them. Although most were conscripted foot soldiers, a small number achieved officer status and a few even attained high rank. Virtually the entire officer corps of the ROK army during the Syngman Rhee period was from Koreans with experience in the Japanese army. Lower-ranking officers also were prominent during the Park Chung Hee period, including Park himself, who had been a lieutenant in the Japanese army. At least in part, the Korean War was a matter of Japanese-trained military officers fighting Japanese-spawned resistance leaders." See Cumings, pp.22-23. See also: Charles M. Dobbs, The Unwanted Symbol: American Foreign Policy, The Cold War, and Korea, 1945-1950, (Kent, Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 1981), p.2.

resulting from the Cairo, Potsdam, and Yalta Conferences, troop withdrawals, and above all politico-cultural ignorance, the U.S. intelligence and foreign policy operators were pulled in multiple directions. Not prepared in the aftermath of the Japanese surrender (15 August, 1945) to deal with the newly decolonized Korea, the US had prepared no contingencies for the suddenly independent state.⁵³ Complicating matters was Russian influence and presence in the state of Korea. The US, by accepting Russian participation in World War II against Japan at the 1945 Yalta and Potsdam Conferences, had invited communist occupation of the peninsula.

Following disagreements with the Soviets at Moscow and in the early stages of the occupation of Korea, the US turned the entire Korean morass over to the United Nations. The UN-formed Temporary Commission on Korea was designed to unite the country through conducting peninsula-wide general elections, thus creating a legitimate national government. This action was soundly rejected by both the Soviet occupation authority and the Korean communists in the North. The UN Commission went ahead, held the elections in the South, and established a National Assembly that would represent the whole of Korea. In the North, the Soviets had already begun to transfer power to their surrogates, the Supreme People's Party and the Central People's Committee. In the South, the National Assembly went ahead, established a democratic constitution and ultimately elected Rhee Syngman as the first president of the Republic of Korea (the ROK itself established 15 August 1948). Shortly thereafter (9 September 1948) the Communists to the north, bolstered by communist "refugees" from the south, held elections and established the Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK); the North/South division seemed permanent at this point.⁵⁴

⁵³ David I. Steinberg, The Republic of Korea, Economic Transformation and Social Change (Boulder and London: Westview, 1989), p.48.

⁵⁴ John Sargeant, "Physical and Social Geography," The Far East and Australasian, 24 th ed, (London: Europa, 1992), pp.422-423.

In that the era 1945-1950 as precursor to the Korean War is extremely well documented. Suffice it to say that ultimately the tensions between the divided states led to war. The US military had withdrawn from South Korea leaving only a small compliment behind. The official American policy stated that Korea lies outside the US Pacific defense perimeter and would be dependent upon its own resources and those of the UN umbrella for its security and development.⁵⁵ When the North crossed the 38th parallel on 25 June 1950, they met virtually no resistance as they proceeded south towards Seoul. "The immediate reaction in the United States was to treat it as a Soviet attempt to determine US resolve in the cold war. The confrontation was also considered the first major international test of whether a 'limited war' was possible in an age of atomic weapons."⁵⁶

Opinions differ considerably regarding the precise motivations of the major players as the war started: Steinberg suggests that the participants recognized the dire significance of their actions, that Kim Il Sung invaded the south only after clearing his actions through both economic Moscow and Beijing and that the US committed the bulk of its resources only after UN recommendation.⁵⁷ Possibly, as George Kennan suggests, an overly anxious Kim caught both Moscow and Beijing by surprise. In the interests of US prestige abroad and to lend substantive credibility to the Truman Doctrine, the Americans felt they had to counter the North Koreans.⁵⁸

Whatever the motivations of the Soviets and the United States, the Korean

⁵⁵ Steinberg, p.51.

⁵⁶ Steinberg, p.51.

⁵⁷ Steinberg, p.51.

⁵⁸ David Mayers, George Kennan and the Dilemmas of US Foreign Policy, (New York: Oxford, 1988), p.180.

Peninsula had ostensibly been one step closer to actualizing its national interests. Freed from the tyranny of Japanese occupation, the divided Peninsula was technologically and culturally ushered into the twentieth century. The gains of the Japanese occupation were ultimately destroyed however. Much of the industrial infrastructure had serviced the Japanese war machine, with that narrow market eliminated the Korean economy suffered. A moot point however: the subsequent Korean War caused horrible destruction to the Korean people and effectively eviscerated their resources.⁵⁹

Most fateful, though, was the seemingly permanent division itself. No matter the American interest in Korean self determination or thoughts of an international trusteeship for the Peninsula, the now entrenched and radically disparate political elements ultimately made unification all but impossible. A dream shared by both North and South certainly, but one to be prolonged by their irreconcilable political agendas. As evidenced by the Korean War itself, the developing bipolar system and its agents permeating the fabric of Korea had little to offer by way of satisfying the national interests of one Korea. Thus the *peninsular* quest of nationalism, the quest for global recognition, and the quest for sovereign autonomy were all hamstrung by the division of the Peninsula.

Categorizing the Northeast Asian alliance system, particularly regarding North Korea's ties, as purely bilateral is to grossly oversimplify the international dynamics of the trans-Korean War era. The Soviet Union built the communist infrastructure; was active in the extensive post-WWII negotiations to resolve the division of the Peninsula on their own terms; and was singularly responsible for the arming and training of the North Korean

⁵⁹ The United States suffered 142,000 casualties; South Korea: 300,000; North Korea: roughly 500,000; China: 800,000. Fairbanks, *et al*, p.916. "Had the Americans stayed out, the northern regime would have won easily; as it happened, however, Kim's regime was nearly extinguished. When the war finally ended, the North had been devastated by three years of bombing attacks that hardly left a modern building standing. Both Koreas watched as a virtual holocaust ravaged their country and turned the vibrant expectations of 1945 into a nightmare." Cumings, p.38.

military. However, as their enemies approached the Yalu River early in the War, the North Koreans were joined by Chinese Communist troops, committed to driving the UN/US Forces away from its borders. This Chinese participation thwarted an outright victory by the UN forces and effectively created a Northeast Asian *trilateral* alliance system.

All forced polarizations aside, the cumulative effects of Chinese suzerainty, Japanese colonization, the scramble for concessions by Japan, Russia, Britain, Germany, France, and the United States, and ultimately division and civil war at the hands of the US and the Soviets left Koreans (northerners and southerners alike) mistrustful of their neighbors. These historical patterns led to a common perception of the national destiny as limited by the whims of foreign powers, that control of the state was ultimately the outcome of greater geo-political constraints. The nationalists notwithstanding, the unfortunate result was (when coupled with the previously examined Confucian premise) an "...ingrained Korean habit of sycophantic compliance called *sadaejuui*, literally 'serve-the-great-ism' and variously described as flunkysim, toadyism, kowtowing, or simply national subservience."⁶⁰ As the *agent provocateur* for rallying nationalists it was this peninsular-wide sense of a second-tier, dependent international status which ultimately gave rise to the ideology of *chuch'e*.

Most prevalent in the post-Korean War ideological consciousness of Kim Il Sung and North Korea, *chuch'e* stresses a certain national strength drawn from within, an autonomy of ways, means, and character relatively unprecedented on the Peninsula. By way of exact definition *chuch'e* was nebulous and constantly evolving along with the changing nature of the Korean states, perhaps the words of Kim Il Sung himself define it best:

⁶⁰ *North Korea: A Country Study*, ed., Frederica M. Bunge, (Washington, D.C.: American University, 1981), p.194.

In a word, the idea of *chuch'e* means that the masters of revolution and construction are the masses of the people and that they are also the motive force of revolution and construction. (In other words, it is an idea that one is the master of one's own destiny and has the power to shape it oneself.) We are no by means the first to discover this idea. Anyone who is a Marxist-Leninist thinks this way. I have merely laid an emphasis on this idea.⁶¹

Stressing strength, the enforcement of independence, and revolution from within the state, *chuch'e* became a national obsession for North Korea. Although Kim cultivated *chuch'e* as his personal ideological "trademark", the term symbolizes a yearning for national pride, self-identity, and independence, values highly palatable for post war South Koreans as well. In the words of the state-builder Park Chung Hee:

(I deplore) our lack of national consciousness, an extreme deficiency in the national awareness of the fact that we live together; we die together...Now is the time to take a new view of Korean history. We must grasp the subjectivity (or self-identity, i.e., *chuch'e*) of the Korean nation, restore a spiritual pillar of Korean history and establish a critical but receptive posture for the introduction of foreign culture.⁶²

In a powerful testimonial to the congruent national interests of North and South Korea, within the context of *chuch'e*, Park's inaugural speech as newly elected president of South Korea, 17 December, 1963 makes clear some common ground:

In order to carry out a great renovation movement in search of political liberty, economic self-reliance, and a social harmony and stability, we must first wage a spiritual revolution on the individual level. Every citizen must inculcate in himself an independent *chuch'e* consciousness, firmly establish the spirit of self-reliance

⁶¹ From article, front page of "Mainichi shimbun," 19 September 1972, as cited in Byung Chul Koh, The Foreign Policy Systems of North and South Korea, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p.72.

⁶² Park Chung Hee, Our Nation's Path, (Seoul: Hollym Corporation, 1962), pp.20-21; p.119, as cited in Koh, pp.74-75.

and self-help whereby one becomes the master of one's own destiny, and achieve the correct spiritual posture of national self-identity.⁶³

While no references nor allusions to Marxist-Leninism or socialist dogma were made nor intended by Park, the fundamental similarities of national interest consistent throughout the peninsula are rather poignant. "The single most important ideological dimension for both Koreas is nationalism-the burning desire on the part of leaders and citizens alike to assert their national identity, to determine their own destiny, and to enhance their national prestige abroad in every conceivable way. The much vaunted chuch'e idea is but a manifestation of this desire."⁶⁴

The irony of both the particular national interests and their very peninsular consistency is the varying degrees to which they have been addressed by the Cold War alliance system. In the vigorous pursuit of containment on the one hand, and a steadfast dedication to building a model socialist state on the other, the "system" resulted in an ever widening chasm dividing North and South. The resultant Cold War end-game found the North and South locked in the grip of perpetual economic and military rivalry always bordering on a state of war. Thirty years after the Korean War ended, North and South Korea still faced each other across the Thirty-Eighth Parallel/Demilitarized Zone. In spite of the occasional foreign policy progression, from internationalism to containment to rollback and finally to containment again, the Korean Peninsula remained divided.

As the international fault lines divided the Peninsula, this heretofore inconsequential state moved from the periphery to the center of the Cold War world stage. The United States and fifteen allied nations fought side by side with South Koreans; China

⁶³ *Minju Konghwadang sanyon-sa* (Four-Year History of the Democratic-Republican Party), (Seoul: Minju Konghwadang Kihoek Chosabu, 1967), p.153, as cited in Koh, p.75.

⁶⁴ Koh, p.235.

fought with North Korea, and was backed by the USSR and its other allies. The North Koreans sought to push back the South Koreans, and the United States sought to push back the North Koreans, and the failure of both in 1953 has frozen the conflict at the point extant today.

Until the 1970s there was little momentum to change this situation. During the 1960s various American politicians called for major changes in US policy towards Korea (foremost was Senator Mansfield, Democrat, Montana; later to become US ambassador to Japan) including demilitarizing and neutralizing the Korean Peninsula. By way of response the ROK actively supported US foreign policy, to the point of dispatching as many as 300,000 troops in support of our efforts in Vietnam. The DPRK's actions covered the entire spectrum of foreign policy actions. Ranging from relatively accommodating calls for unification under a confederation plan (1960) to extreme and hostile acts along the DMZ and the execution of international terrorism against both South Korea and the United States, North Korea's activities were highly provocative on the international stage.

With the development of the Sino-Soviet split, not only did the global Cold War calculus change, but North Korea lost its joint backing. As US President Nixon embraced China, both Koreas watched helplessly as their heretofore steadfast alliance partners sent profoundly confusing messages about the future of Northeast Asian security. Would the United States or China again intervene if war were to flare up again on the Peninsula? As the war in Indochina drew to a close in 1975, there seemed less reason in Asia to perpetuate the Cold War standoff.

The reformulated strategic thinking in Northeast Asia in the 1970s had decided benefits for South Korea, and laid the groundwork for peace on its terms on the Peninsula. Presuming an abatement in the *regional* Cold War tension, the Nixon administration saw fit to withdraw a division of US soldiers. The North Koreans responded by virtually

halting their attempts at infiltration and by significantly reducing their defense budget in 1971. Further, both Koreas held diplomatic talks at the highest levels (between the director of the KCIA and Kim Il Sung's younger brother) in early 1972, resulting in the 4 July, 1972 proclamation that they would seek reunification peacefully, independent of outside forces, and with a cooperative effort to creating a semblance of unity between the disparate states.⁶⁵ Although this initiative was short-lived, it was never forgotten as a reminder of what could transpire through enlightened, even-handed diplomacy.⁶⁶ After 1973 and until 1983, tensions and armed skirmishes escalated and persisted along the DMZ for the duration of the period.

Although efforts were made by both North and South to reopen the inter-Korean dialogues following Park's assassination in 1979, no real headway was made until 1984. Reflecting a shifting of priorities on the part of the Great Powers, China and the Soviet Union both established significant trade relations with South Korea. China encouraged North Korea to reconcile with its former foes. Indeed, while "traditional" ties were none-the-worse-for-wear (Deng Xiaoping and associates visiting Pyongyang for a variety of state functions, including endorsements of Kim Jong Il as political successor to Kim Il Song and as leader of the Korean Worker's Party), trans-alliance contacts aspired to engineer peace:

Henry A. Kissinger, then national security advisor, revealed in his memoirs that Kim Il Sung was in Beijing during his famous 'secret visit' in July 1971; although it is not known if they met, it is likely that Nixon and Kissinger encouraged South Koreans to talk with North Koreans and indicated to them various benefits that might

⁶⁵ Ilpyuing J. Kim, "The Major Powers and the Korean Triangle," Two Koreas-One Future?, pp.119-134.

⁶⁶ In 1973, South Korea's Park Chung Hee, a dedicated militarist, instituted the so-called Yushin constitution, so as to assure himself of subsequent and lengthy terms in office, and absolute control of the composure of the National Assembly. Such changes, considering Park's personality, were not conducive to the type of compromise and accommodation required for peaceful unification. In addition, Park rejected any notion of effecting a inter-state confederation, perhaps the only realistic means of attaining unification.

come their way if they continued on the moderate path. Kissinger pursued a plan for four-power talks to resolve tensions on the Korea Peninsula, something the North Koreans had resisted because it suggested that once again outside powers would once again determine Korea's fate.⁶⁷

Although the North sought diplomatic relations and trade with America for the obvious benefits therein, the political baggage incumbent with such support from the West was unacceptable to exponents of *chuch'e*.

By the mid-1980s North Korea had improved relations with the Soviet Union, primarily in response to China's opening to the West and its Four Modernizations programs.⁶⁸ Additionally, North Korea had increased importation of industrial goods from Japan and the West (primarily Europe). Apparently, interpretations of the *chuch'e* ideology vary according to the type of external assistance received and obligations incurred!⁶⁹ In any case, by this point North Korea had also made considerable gestures

⁶⁷ Bruce Cumings, *The Two Koreas*, pp.71-72.

⁶⁸ "In 1984 Kim Il sung visited Moscow for the first time in 23 years, and also spent several weeks touring Eastern Europe. He returned to meet Gorbachev in 1986, in which year joint Soviet-North Korean naval exercises were undertaken. In addition, the North Korean government granted port facilities and overflying rights to the Soviet fleet and air force, reportedly in return for the supply of Soviet MiG-23 fighters and surface-to-air missiles. Soviet-North Korean trade grew rapidly, with North Korean imports more than quadrupling in the four years between 1984 and 1988." Aidan Foster-Carter, "North Korea-Foreign Relations," *The Far East and Australasian*, 25 th ed, (London: Europa, 1993), p.437.

⁶⁹ North Korea's stated interpretation was that international economic and technical collaboration would not contradict *chuch'e* if done "'on the basis of equal footing and mutual benefit.' In September 1973, for instance, Kim told a visiting Japanese leader: 'In my opinion, the proper learning of foreign techniques also conforms with self-reliance. It is wrong to keep the door shut...If we inspect technological branches in foreign countries and learn their techniques we will advance more quickly.'" Rinn-Sup Shinn, "North Korean Foreign Affairs," p.198.

towards establishing multilateral relations with the Non-Aligned Movement nations and the Third World. In an effort to counter global imperialism, obliquely a manifestation of Korean national interests, North Korea sought to align all the socialist states, the nonaligned states, and developing countries together to wage a common struggle against imperialism (that is, against the United States and the Soviet Union.).

However successful North Korea's burgeoning diplomatic efforts were initially, they were decidedly undermined during the latter 1980s. Inevitably, the attraction of South Korea's far greater economic prospects and the ROK's skillful 'nordpolitic' diplomacy challenged the effectiveness of the DPRK's alliances with both USSR and PRC.⁷⁰ As Pyongyang became increasingly bellicose in the international arena and thus a political and economic liability, both Gorbachev and Deng essentially turned their backs on the radical regime. Although China was the first to begin trading with Seoul, the USSR established full diplomatic relations with South Korea in September 1990. Starting in January 1991, the USSR announced its trade with North Korea would be conducted in *convertible* currencies at world market prices. The effects on North Korea were disastrous. Effectively cut off from their economic umbilical cord, Pyongyang's total trade volume declined by more than US \$1,100m., almost a quarter, in 1991. The coup attempt in Moscow in August 1991 further weakened USSR-DPRK relations because the perpetrators apparently included some of the DPRK's few remaining friends in Moscow. Just as North Korea's relative decline was in large part perpetrated by its isolation from key world players, so was close and continuous contact with the United States (and Japan) been instrumental in the growth and success of South Korea. Despite scandal ("Korea-gate") and repeated threats of significant US troop withdrawals (primarily the Carter

⁷⁰ As practiced by South Korea, 'nordpolitic' is the replacement of unqualified anti-communism by a more subtle solicitation of China and the USSR. This was highly successful in both its direct and indirect aims: to establish better ties with powerful neighbors, and thus to force their ally, North Korea into a more accommodating diplomatic attitude.

administration, 1977), the US and Korea remained lasting allies.

With the fall of international communism, North Korea was left standing alone with few friends and little to offer the world in the way of enticements. The DPRK was bereft of the traditional supports of its Cold War allies. The system created the state and ultimately it was the DPRK's attempted manipulations of thereof that led to it's current position. Certainly there were the occasional glimmers of hope such as Pyongyang's attempts to negotiate with South Korea and their efforts to establish multilateral arrangements among the disenfranchised. However, in their quest to fulfill the national interests, unification, autonomy, and prosperity, the DPRK and its place in the Cold War alliance system was an abysmal failure.

South Korea, while not entirely satisfied with its fate during the Cold War, was in a mood to consider new approaches to relations with the North. It had enjoyed phenomenal economic progress and had benefited from the protective military shield provided by the United States. It had emerged on the world stage as a viable player. However, during the entire period of the Cold War, the Korean Peninsula remained a divided state. The dream of unification was unfulfilled. Addressing only the perceived national interests of the great powers, the system divided the Peninsula in the interest of containment and persists to this day only as a means to excise a rogue, nationalist state.

...bilateral relations between the two Koreas remain essentially unchanged, for the appearance of detente on the Korean peninsula, generated by the initiation of a dialogue between Seoul and Pyongyang, has proved to be totally illusory. The level of mutual distrust and animosity between the two Koreas is so dangerously high that one begins to wonder if their political reintegration is even remotely possible, the putative strong bonds of common language and cultural heritage notwithstanding.⁷¹

⁷¹ Koh, p.32.

Both sides were ready to try anything which would hold the promise of a new road to unity. The system of purely bilateral agreements had been found wanting. The stage was thus set in both Koreas for probing into the possibilities of multilateralism. Whether contemporary multilateral security arrangements will mend these wounds and cater to the interests of the Peninsula remains to be seen. Perhaps unification is a foregone conclusion. Assuming that multilateralism avoids the onus of imperialism, the possibility exists that a new multilateral forum may facilitate cooperation between North and South. This question will be addressed in the next chapter.

III. UNITED STATES NATIONAL INTERESTS, ITS ALLIANCE SYSTEMS, AND THE COLD WAR IN NORTHEAST ASIA

Amidst the transformation taking place in international relations, it is useful to bear in mind that United States interests in Asia have been remarkably consistent over the past two centuries: Commercial access to the region; freedom of navigation; and the prevention of the rise of any hegemonic power or coalition.⁷²

A. PRECEDENT TO COLD WAR

Although the early history of American involvement in the East Asia/Pacific is well documented and has been examined in the greatest detail, it is important to recapitulate the milestones in the pursuit of the national interest. From 1844's "Treaty of Amity and Commerce" intended to open diplomatic relations between the United States and China, to the milieu of agreements settling World War II, America's interest in the East Asia/Pacific was driven by a combination of economic and philosophical concerns.⁷³ Throughout the nineteenth century, the United States was profoundly active in maritime exploitation, global exploration, and the pursuit of mercantile interests around the entire Pacific. The sheer range and impact of the American fleet (including a variety of military, commercial, scientific, and moral endeavors) had rendered the Pacific a virtual "American lake."⁷⁴ Although Japan and Korea remained insular and closed during the better part of the nineteenth century, America in time developed intricate trade and diplomatic liaisons with the rest of Northeast Asia.⁷⁵

⁷² Department of Defense. A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Report to Congress 1992. U.S. Government Printing Office, November 1992, p 2-9.

⁷³ This treaty was in response to the Treaty of Nanking (1842) between China and Great Britain. With the British establishing formal relations with the Chinese, the US' lack of a "China policy" was highlighted. More to the point, the traditional means of trade in the region were rendered obsolete. It was essential for the United States to reestablish commercial equity with the British and other countries active in China.

⁷⁴ William H. Goetzman, as cited in Arthur Power Dudden, The American Pacific, From the Old China Trade to the Present, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p.17.

⁷⁵ Relatively open relations were established by Commodores Biddle and Perry in the period 1846 to 1854; Korea forced into the world by imperialist Meiji Japan in 1895. Formal

The pursuit of American interests was evident primarily in three diplomatic ventures: the *Treaty of Wang Hsia*, the *Treaty of Portsmouth*, and the *Washington Naval Conference*; and two foreign policy philosophies: the "*Open Door*" and "*Dollar Diplomacy*" of the McKinley, Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson administrations. Through America's commercial trading and whaling interests, the Pacific had become a bridge to East Asia's wealth. Consequently, as American citizens ventured forth across the Pacific in search of opportunity, the government was obliged to begin practicing foreign policy-making in the region. The earliest important measures to protect US interests were the "Open Door" policies and "Dollar Diplomacy," relatively effective instruments for protecting the US commercial interests in the region.⁷⁶

In time, escalating territorial conflicts between China, Russia, and Japan simply overwhelmed the stabilizing influence of mere economic liaison. As Japan's most recent imperial period began to flourish, Roosevelt sought to protect America's interests in the region and seized the opportunity to balance the powers. Meeting with Japanese and Russian representatives in Portsmouth, New Hampshire on August 9, 1905, Roosevelt pushed to establish territorial compromise and peace in Liaodong, Manchuria, Korea, and Sakhalin.⁷⁷

relations with the Japanese were established via the Treaty of Kanagawa, (31 March, 1854).

⁷⁶ Although the Open Door Note of July, 1900, was ostensibly based on America's Monroe Doctrine premise of preserving states' administrative and political integrity, Secretary of State John Hay defined the three pedestals of American foreign policy (towards China) as 1) the preservation of China, 2) the *opportunity for open and impartial trading*, and 3) the *protection of American lives and property*. See Dudden, pp.112-135; and Thomas G. Paterson, J. Garry Clifford, and Kenneth J. Hagen, American Foreign Policy, A History/Since 1900 2nd ed, (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1983), p.239.

⁷⁷ Within the year the Russo-Japanese War had been terminated, Manchuria was reopened to foreign and American trade, and Roosevelt had been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize; it seems clear that his Portsmouth meetings be deemed a success. In that the agreement allowed Japan freedom of action on the Korean Peninsula however, it bore an ominous foreshadowing of further Japanese imperialism.

Two decades later, the combined challenges of Chinese nationalism, an independent foreign policy of *internationalism*, and a need for international arms controls prompted the Harding administration to summon the Washington Conference of 1921-1922. Strongly signalling international autonomy, the American government had again rejected European entanglements and the League of Nations, preferring other arrangements to ensure international security. Concerned with the ongoing difficulties with Japan over China, Secretary of State Hughes acted on a British suggestion to convene a conference of all nations with interests in the Western Pacific. The administration's goal was to halt any further naval buildup in the region before a real arms race developed.⁷⁸ For the Americans, the Washington Conference proved to be a success, establishing a favorable balance of power at relatively low cost and affirming previous administrations' Open Door Policies.⁷⁹ As admirable as these efforts were to thwart destructive competition among the powers, they failed to entirely appease Chinese nationalists. They had rebuffed China's efforts to end extraterritoriality and to regain control of her import duties. The Treaties however, in conjunction with the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928), had effectively insured peace in the region during this period.

With the onset of global depression in 1929, Japan suffered drastic economic hardships in the civilian sector, inciting a renewed support for the military leaders and right-wing political zealots. Perhaps the subsequent rise of the Kwantung Army and bloody

⁷⁸ All states that is except for the outcast Soviet Union. With the Communist scare over bolshevism, the Soviets were a distinct *persona non grata* in such an international forum.

⁷⁹ The Conference spawned three important treaties: the *Five-Power Treaty* of naval limitations which restricted total capital ship tonnage to ratios of 5:5:3:1.67:1.67 for Britain, the United States, Japan, France, and Italy. The *Four-Power Treaty* replaced the Anglo-Japanese Alliance with a mutual agreement to respect each other's possessions in the Pacific, maintain the status quo for fortifications, Japan relinquished control of Shantung to the Chinese, and Britain would restore Weihaiwei. The *Nine-Power Treaty* brought Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal, and China in with the five naval powers to assure China's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity, effectively enforcing the America's Open Door Policy.

incorporation of Manchuria best signalled the earliest stages of the Pacific War. The vehement disapproval of Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson and President Hoover certainly served to further arouse the officers in charge of the Japanese government.

As European states were sucked into the maelstrom of World War II, Japan found itself with a distinct strategic advantage in the EA/P. Germany's victories over Belgian, Dutch, French, and British forces had stretched those states' resources beyond their limits, providing Japan with the opportunity it had been waiting for. The beleaguered British, Dutch and French navies and their colonies faced certain seizure or destruction at the hands of the resource hungry Japanese. When President Roosevelt saw that the Europeans (Vichy France) were turning over airfields and seaports in Indochina to the Japanese, he responded by imposing an embargo on aviation fuel and scrap metals. When Japan allied itself with Germany and the Soviet Union, the United States found itself the only tangible opposition to the Asian hegemon. As the imperial power continued to spread throughout Southeast Asia, Roosevelt again responded by imposing a total economic blockade, freezing all Japanese assets in the United States and further cut all petroleum exports to the country. Nothing but war or a complete reversal of policy by both sides could break the blockade. It required the military victory over Japan to set the stage for the American Cold War policy of Containment.

B. THE COLD WAR

With the devastation of Europe and much of Asia during World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as the industrial and political superpowers. An expansionist USSR was on a global collision course with an America intent consolidating a stable East Asian political environment, and eventually, the containment of communism. The unfolding Cold War mandated that the United States determine who were its allies and friends around the world.

In a departure from the previous era's predominantly Sinic-centered Asian policies,

Secretary of State Dean Acheson declared that American vital interests in the EA/P were based on the islands off the Asian mainland (Japan, the Philippines, and Australia), and on the Korean Peninsula. Having done that, the United States tried to formulate the best policies possible (global, regional and bilateral) to protect and promote its own best interests and the best interests of those who committed themselves to common purposes. Thus the United States and its allies committed to the containment of their "common" enemy, communism.

Accordingly, the emerging strategic task in Asia was to assure that no serious counter-force could ever be deployed from Asian ports.⁸⁰ This strategy was given credence by MacArthur's declarations describing the United States' essential operations area as a fan-shaped sweep of the Pacific including the Midway islands, the former Japanese mandated islands, Clark Field in the Philippines, and above all Okinawa. As the foundation of the United States' image as the Pacific power, and the keystone to promoting and protecting its interests in Asia, forward presence in and bilateral relations with the Philippines, Japan, and South Korea became elemental to the United States' containment strategy in the Pacific. With the intensity surrounding the bipolar standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union rising, joint military planning and general development programs scrambled to meet the challenge.

Here lay the foundation for the establishment of United States overseas bases in a ring designed to contain the Soviet Union and its satellites. Two wars in the 20th century and the rapid development of explosive situations in the post-World War II era had convinced the United States that its first line of defense no longer lay in the Western Hemisphere. To insure its security, the support of strong allies with sufficient courage to permit the United States to establish advance bases on their soil was essential.⁸¹

⁸⁰ G.R. Sloan, Geopolitics in United States Strategic Policy: 1890-1987, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988).

⁸¹ Capt. Edward F. Disette, USN, "Overseas Bases - How Long for this World?," United States Naval Institute Proceedings Vol.86, No.7, (July 1960), pp.23-30.

Additionally, the United States most visible mechanism for promoting and protecting its interests was the placement of its forces abroad. The presence of United States troops, ready to fight and committed to the defense of foreign soil as part of the United States comprehensive system of alliances for mutual defense, was one of the most important contributions to the United States political posture during the Cold War.⁸² Even if these forces were only tokens of United States military power at the time, they illustrated the determination of the United States to maintain a military posture in support of friends and allies on the one hand, and containment on the other. These forces were to "serve as a trigger to release the full war potential of the United States" as needed.⁸³

The positioning of United States military forces overseas was consistent with the strategic thought of using a thin line of forward deployed combat-ready forces, scattered along the entire periphery of the Free World to contain the Soviet Union. The leaders of the United States had come to recognize that the United States could not go it alone in containing the Soviet Union, either in an isolationist sense or by assuming the entire military burden for the defense of the Free World. This posture, rather pretentiously, assumed that other nations of the free world accepted and were willing to fulfill their role as part of the mutual security system.⁸⁴

When the United States 'brokered' the end of the Second World War, it was compelled

⁸² Clinton E. Granger, Maj (USA), "Global Deployments," Military Review, (October 1964), p. 9-14.

⁸³ *ibid.*

⁸⁴ In support of the perimeter defense strategy, the United States deployed forces forward in the Pacific theater to South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam, along with deployed naval units. While the Pacific force manning level declined from 231,000 troops in FY1964 to 110,000 in FY1992, the percentage of United States troops committed to the Pacific theater has only declined from 31% in FY1964 to 28% in FY1992. In contrast, while United States troops committed to the Atlantic theater have declined from 436,000 in FY1964 to 243,000 in FY1992, the percentage of United States troops committed to this theater has risen from 58% in FY1964 to 62% in FY1992.

"to pick up the pieces" of the victims of repeated colonial occupation by European and Japanese forces. This support initially ranged from political backing for Indonesians fighting the Dutch for independence, to the maintenance of a neo-colonial grasp on the Philippines, to the military occupation and reconstruction Japan and Korea. Determined to suppress undue political dynamics in the region, the United States assumed the imperial burdens of maintaining peace and stability in large portions of both Northeast and Southeast Asia.⁸⁵

Following the embarrassing debacle of vacillating US support for vying regimes in China (alternately Mao's Communists and the Nationalist Chinese), the rise of the Communists forced Washington's hand. Torn by the uncertainties of the Chinese situation and by domestic "infighting," the US assumed a policy in 1949 of partial disengagement or Nonrecognition of the People's Republic due to the presumed Sino-Soviet alliance. Soon however, the outbreak of hostilities in Korea in June 1950 captured America's attention and all of East Asia became the main theater of Cold War operations.

After the Korean War broke out, the United States renewed its efforts to pursue security alliances on a world-wide bases. The United States needed more bases in the Pacific to protect the seaward fringes of Asia, namely Japan and the Philippines. The pattern of communist expansion in the EA/P was matched by the establishment and development of United States overseas bases in the Philippines, South Korea, Japan, Vietnam, Taiwan, and Thailand. These bases became the foundation for the Eisenhower-Dulles strategy of massive retaliation.⁸⁶

As the military confrontation escalated in Korea, Indochina was viewed as similarly

⁸⁵ Lea E. Williams, Southeast Asia-A History, (London: Oxford University Press, 1976).

⁸⁶ Massive retaliation required diversified, comprehensively equipped military bases for the deployment and logistical support of nuclear weapons or weapons equipped platforms.

vulnerable to Communist expansion.⁸⁷ When Chinese troops augmented the North Koreans, the scope of the communist agenda was finally clear to Washington; the US began funneling military equipment and supplies to the French in Vietnam. The French experience in 1954 (first Indochina War) prompted the US to attempt the construction of a new defense perimeter to block any further advance by the Communists.

C. COLD WAR ALLIANCE SYSTEMS

This so-called defense perimeter would be based on a web of security alliances and relationships around the globe. Designed to forestall and defeat the advance of predatory communism, this "containment" policy and series of security relationships was the major tool of American foreign policy from the close of the Second World War through the eventual fall of communism in 1989.⁸⁸

Although containment's founder never set forth in one place the full scope of his strategic vision, scholars maintain that George F. Kennan's view of the concept is internally cohesive and broadly consistent over time. The first stage of Kennan's containment strategy argued for an active U.S. policy to maintain the world balance of power in the special circumstances following World War II. Their goal was to prevent the Soviets from acquiring control of the remaining centers of world industrial capacity; the heart of Europe, Japan, and the United Kingdom, all which had been crippled by the war. Second, limit Soviet influence outside the areas currently under Soviet control. In other words, divide and weaken the Soviet power.⁸⁹ In time, Kennan hoped that the Soviet view of international politics could be modified to permit a negotiated settlement with the West, reducing Cold War tensions and

⁸⁷ Williams.

⁸⁸ Terry L. Diebel, "Alliances and Security Relationships," Containment: Concept and Policy Vol.1, eds. Terry L. Diebel and John Lewis Gaddis, (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1986), p.189-215.

⁸⁹ Diebel.

establishing a global balance which could ensue without constant and intensive American involvement.

Kennan's concern however, was that if the United States began amassing a system of anti-Soviet alliances, it would not stop until all states were accounted for; a virtual zero-sum game of international allegiance gathering. There would be: "no logical stopping point until that system has circled the globe and embraced all the non-communist countries of Europe, Asia, and Africa."⁹⁰ Perhaps more significantly, Kennan opposed anti-Soviet alliances due to the emphasis on uni-dimensional military containment. The use of alliances would militarize United States relationships with much of the world. Diverting allies energies from the tasks of political and economic development would effectively undermine their resistance to the real threats of ideological subversion and political infiltration.

In response to Kennan's containment theory, the National Security Council began working in early 1950 on the now-infamous NSC-68. NSC-68 became the blueprint for waging the Cold War for the next twenty years and grounded in two fundamental premises:

First, the global balance of power had been 'fundamentally altered' since the nineteenth century so that the Americans and Russians now dominated the world: 'What is new, what makes the continuing crisis, is the polarization of power which inescapably confronts the slave society with the free.' It was us against them. Second, 'the Soviet Union, unlike previous aspirants to hegemony, is animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute authority,' initially in 'the Soviet Union and second in the areas now under its control.' ... 'In the minds of the Soviet leaders, however, achievement of this design requires the dynamic extension of their authority and the ultimate elimination of any effective opposition to their authority. ... To that end Soviet efforts are now directed toward the domination of the Eurasian land mass.'⁹¹

⁹⁰ Diebel.

⁹¹ Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1991), pp.96-97.

NSC-68 moved to the inevitable conclusion that the United States:

...must lead in building a successfully functioning political and economic system in the free world,' for 'the absence of order among nations is becoming less and less tolerable.

The key to impose order around the globe and to deter an attack on the United States was to become more than merely militarily dominant, but lead the world towards socio-economic development. The emphasis shifted from a simple anti-Soviet stance to *anti-Communist*.

While always concerned that the United States might overextend itself, Kennan said that America needed allies to share the burdens of free world leadership, and that the United States needed a strong defense posture to sustain allied cooperation. Nevertheless, Kennan was against alliances as primary tools of American national security policy:

...I had little confidence in the value of written treaties of alliance generally. I had seen too many instances in which they had been forgotten, or disregarded, or found to be irrelevant, or distorted for ulterior purposes when the chips were down.⁹²

In the end, Kennan's concept of containment of the Soviet Union was overshadowed by the need to use all means to contain Communist ideology. Virtually all areas of the world were deemed vital to the overall balance of power. In that the USSR was building a system of communist allies, it was essential for the US to form its own web of states to contain spreading Communist power.

Therefore, under the Truman-Acheson administration, alliances were cultivated to provide the framework for defense relationships among the world's leading "free" countries. These alliances were intended to contain the aggression of any communist military force.

⁹² Diebel.

Under the Eisenhower-Dulles administration, alliances were expanded to include those nations who were not necessarily vital to maintaining a global balance of power, but who could be seen as vulnerable to a predatory USSR. They were the products of specific situations: Japan, South Korea, the Republic of China, and the states signatory to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty.

Detente with eastern communism blossomed during the Nixon administration as an era of enlightened negotiation began. Nixon and Kissinger visited Moscow and Beijing, removed the United States militarily from Vietnam, and reduced United States military commitments abroad (Nixon Doctrine⁹³). Brezhnev and Nixon established a detente policy, and trade relations were renewed with Beijing as a goodwill gesture to the Chinese (not to mention American business as well). In the Carter administration, the restoration of formal diplomatic relations between Beijing and Washington was announced in 1978. In return, the United States abandoned its treaty of mutual defense with Taiwan. Regarding East Asia at least, detente made containment (and NSC-68) temporarily irrelevant.

With the vitriolic rhetoric of the Reagan administration, the Cold War returned with unprecedented intensity. Traditional alliances were bolstered by unprecedented military escalation, and the Cold War focused on the developing/non-aligned world. The United

⁹³ Dr. Claude Buss offers the following analysis of the Nixon Doctrine: "By way of elaboration of the Nixon Doctrine, various spokesmen for the administration explained that the United States would remain strong in the Pacific as an encouragement to its friends and a deterrent to war, but would no longer immerse itself in the internal affairs of others. The United States would support nationalism, economic development and modernization in accordance with its interests and commitments. It would not turn its back on any nation of the region but would avoid the creation of situations in which there might be such dependency on the United States as to enmesh the United States inevitably in what were essentially Asian conflicts and problems. The United States wished to extend assistance to the greatest extent possible but in an orderly and judicious manner; it wished to participate as one Pacific nation among several in economic development and the maintenance of stability in Asia." See Claude A. Buss, The United States and the Philippines, (Stanford: AEI-Hoover Policy Studies, 1977), p.101.

States provided security assistance to any country which would remain anti-communist and support the United States, regardless of that state's own philosophies.

A third system of postwar security commitments was negotiated under the Reagan administration. Geographically, these commitments concentrated on the Third World. Involving no treaties, the new commitments were based on arms transfers and military training, economic aid, informal diplomatic contact, and facilities construction.⁹⁴ Not being treaty-bound allies in the traditional sense, these "friends" were subject to considerable "freedom of action" as far as inter-state interaction is concerned. These nations included Burma, Indonesia, and Malaysia in the Southeast Asia sub-region.

D. THE COLD WAR TREATIES

The United States' bulwark treaties with the EA/P were negotiated in 1951. Attempting to negotiate an early and lenient peace treaty with potential Cold War allies the Japanese, John Foster Dulles found that the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand demanded United States commitments as protection against a rearmed Japan. Those nations refused to enter into a multilateral pact with their recent enemy and required independent bilateral agreements with the United States. These three treaties, signed separately in 1951, remain in effect today.

The second set of treaties were negotiated under the Eisenhower-Dulles administration. Far more 'containment-oriented' than the earlier treaties, Dulles' alliance system is clearly seen as containing the Soviet Union and its Chinese ally at their extant perimeter.⁹⁵ The alliance with South Korea had been drafted to underwrite the armistice "ending" the Korean War. It made it evident that the United States was drawing the line

⁹⁴ Diebel.

⁹⁵ Diebel.

against Communist power at the Thirty-Eight Parallel.

The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, on the other hand, was an American scheme to hold the line against further communist gains in Indochina after the First Indochina War. Related was the United States' first ventures into multilateral security arrangements in the EA/P. By negotiating the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, and the establishing the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), the US was on one hand banding together states for mutual benefit, and on the other attempting to encircle aggressive communism.

SEATO was doomed to failure from the start. Loosely formed on the NATO model, membership of SEATO included Britain, New Zealand, Australia, France, Pakistan, the United States, and *only two* of the Southeast Asian states, Thailand and the Philippines. The collective responsibility of participants in the organization was essentially restricted to uniting to block an open invasion of the region by any communist power using conventional warfare and conventional tactics.⁹⁶ Suffering from wavering member support and a decided lack of unanimity, the organization proved ineffective and was eventually disbanded in 1977.⁹⁷ Differences in cultural foundations (indeed, the very spectrum of cultural diversity among member nations), and an essentially different kind of security confrontation undermined SEATO from the beginning.

Lastly, the mutual defense treaty with the Republic of China, was signed to give communist China second thoughts about invading the nationalist China island of Taiwan.

⁹⁶ For more on SEATO see chapter VI; also: Williams, Southeast Asia-A History, or David Joel Steinberg, In Search of Southeast Asia, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), pp.387-445.

⁹⁷ Steinberg, p.445. See also: Ulrich A. Straus, "Southeast Asia in Containment Strategies for the 1990s," Containment: Concept and Policy Vol.2, eds., Terry L. Diebel and John Lewis Gaddis, (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1986), pp.520-521.

These collective security arrangements (with the exception of the Taiwan Treaty which was terminated in 1974) to this day continue to be defined as the underpinnings of the United States national security strategy. As stated in the Secretary of Defense' 1992 Annual Report to Congress:

Our (extant) security alliances provide a clear demonstration of our commitments, help to deter potential aggressors, enhance regional stability by lowering the potential for conflict, reduce expenditures, and reassure allies that they do not have to rely solely on their own resources in order to protect themselves from external threats.⁹⁸

The following bilateral treaties represented the United States national interests in Northeast Asia during the Cold War era and continue to do so today:

1. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States and Japan

The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, currently in force, was signed at Washington, January 19, 1960.⁹⁹ While:

Desiring to strengthen the bonds of peace and friendship traditionally existing between them, and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law,

and

...desiring further to encourage closer economic cooperation between them and to promote conditions of economic stability and well-being in their countries,

and

...considering that they have a common concern in the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East,

the operative clause of the treaty in the event of armed attack is:

⁹⁸ Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and Congress, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1992), p.15-18.

⁹⁹ This treaty superseded the previous Security Treaty between the United States and Japan signed at San Francisco on September 8, 1951.

...each party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with constitutional provisions and processes.

In addition,

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security,

and

...for the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan,

and

...this treaty shall remain in force until in the opinion of the Governments of the United States of America and Japan there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Japan area...¹⁰⁰

2. The Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea

The Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and Republic of Korea was signed at Washington on October 1, 1953. This treaty was signed by the United States in exchange for the Republic of Korea's cooperation in arranging an armistice to end the Korean war. While:

Reaffirming their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the

¹⁰⁰ Department of State, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements Vol. 11, Pt. 2, (1960), (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 1632-1757.

Pacific area,

and

...desiring to declare publicly and formally their common determination to defend themselves against external armed attack so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the Pacific area,

and

...desiring further to strengthen their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive and effective system of regional security in the Pacific area,

the operative clause of the treaty in the event of armed attack is:

...each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties in territories not under their respective administrative control, or hereafter recognized by one of the parties as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

In addition,

...the Republic of Korea grants, and the United States of America accepts, the rights to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about the territory of the Republic of Korea as determined by mutual agreement.¹⁰¹

Beyond treaties and formal diplomatic liaison, other forms of "security" assistance have shaped the relationships between the United States and alliance partners in the EA/P. In the past, this assistance has been used to win friends and bind cooperative nations closer to the United States. According to the nature of shared interests, the United States supplemented friends and alliances with loans (FMF program) for industrial-base and weapons development cooperation, payments for overseas basing and access agreements, demonstrations of military capability to deter regional threats, training to enhance defense

¹⁰¹ Department of State, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements Vol.5, Pt.3, (1954), (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 2368-2376.

capabilities, and where necessary joint or combined deployment of military forces.¹⁰² Such assistance facilitated communications and inter-operability with allied military forces, enabled forward presence, supported crisis response capabilities, and defended mutual national interests.

The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program is a low-cost grant aid program that provides military education and training to some 5,000 foreign military and civilian defense personnel from over 100 countries each year. IMET exposes future leaders of many foreign defense establishments to American thought and culture. Indoctrinating them to US national security affairs and the relationship between the military establishment and civilian government.

With the end of the Cold War, IMET has been expanded to provide education for military and civilian officials from some former Warsaw Pact countries. The IMET program is one of the least costly and most effective programs for maintaining United States influence and assisting foreign countries with their development of self-defense capabilities.¹⁰³

IMET has facilitated the crucial understanding between the US and allied military personnel, enabling future inter-operability and cooperative security relations.

United States bilateral and multilateral economic assistance to developing countries traditionally has focused on both short-term national security goals and longer-term economic social development goals.¹⁰⁴ The development goals have rested largely on moral and humanitarian precepts, such as meeting the basic human needs of poor people, as well as on United States national interest needs, such as protecting and expanding markets for United

¹⁰² Secretary of Defense, Annual report to the President and Congress, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February, 1992), p.15-18.

¹⁰³ Secretary of Defense, Annual report to the President and Congress (1992), p.15-18.

¹⁰⁴ Richard L. Hough, Economic Assistance and Security, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1982).

States exports and securing access to strategic materials.

Strategic interaction is fostered at a less tangible level as well, through cultural exchange. Just as 'joint' military leadership training facilitates official cooperation, cultural exchange promotes sensitivity among nations, reducing the likelihood of misunderstandings. 'People to people' contacts, it has been assumed, make it possible for nations to 'know' one another better; the danger of war between them is, as a result, correspondingly reduced.¹⁰⁵ Cultural exchanges have been expanding between the United States and other nations. Cultural exchanges have been used to support the United States own purposes by bearing witness to its own great capabilities, ultimate good intentions, and sincerity in winning the hearts and minds of people. These exchanges range from exchange students and Fulbright scholars to prestigious non-governmental organizations (such as the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council, Asia Foundation, Asia Society, Ford Foundation), and official programs such as the United States Information Agency (USIA), and the Peace Corps.

Cultural exchanges between academia have been an effective tool in the pursuit of national security. Increased understanding between academia of different nations have provided an alternative, non-governmental, route towards the formulation of foreign policy. In addition, cultural exchanges provided by the Peace Corps (grass roots level), have enhanced international goodwill through providing volunteers for development assistance in education, agriculture, health, small-enterprise development, and natural resource programs.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵ John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System," The Cold War and After, ed. Sean M. Lynn-Jones. (Boston: The MIT Press, 1992), p.1-44.

¹⁰⁶ United States General Accounting Office, Peace Corps: Meeting the Challenges of the 1990s, Rpt.No.: GAO/NSIAD-90-122. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990).

E. SUMMARY

In the absence of indigenous international security structures to arbitrate the amorphous post-World War II Asian milieu, the United States, as victor, was in position to reaffirm its interests in "the American lake." In response to the aggressive specter of communism spreading throughout Asia, the US sought to maintain the Pacific as a firm buffer, both physically and figuratively. For the next forty-five years, throughout the Cold War, the United States pursued its national security interests in the EA/P on a variety of planes. At the highest level, the US cultivated a system of bilateral alliances - treaties - and relationships with 'like-minded' states in the region. Enforcing these treaties and interests through the maintenance of credible military presence (augmented in response to tension or actual conflict), US forces were forward-based throughout Asia: Guam, Japan, Korea, the Philippines, and the Indian Ocean. The United States' nuclear umbrella and conventional military operations provided a security blanket for the entire region. It implemented military assistance programs, supplied dual use technology, and infused civilian bureaucracies with technically trained and culturally sensitive ex-military personnel.

Although these alliances were purportedly based on common interests: democracy, free market economics, anti-communism, etc., it is elemental that definitions of these concepts vary markedly between the US and its allies. The fact that the greatest threat to the US and its allies during the Cold War was the nuclear power of the Soviet Union sublimated those incongruities and strengthened, to a degree, the bilateral alliances. While disputes have always existed regarding the correct amount of security assistance is required by an alliance partner, of more concern to the US alliance partners are the four-year fluctuations and vacillations in foreign policy. The American track-record this century is not quite enough to assure Asian friends and allies that someday the United States will not return to isolation.

The fact that the American bilateral alliances with Northeast Asian partners still exist speaks to their durability. In that the current geo-political and economic environment has

evolved to a degree unimaginable in 1945, however, gives cause to reconsider whether these arrangements provide the best possible security for the basic national interests of the United States.

IV. CONFLICTS OF NATIONAL INTEREST IN NORTHEAST ASIA, POST-COLD WAR

A. CHINA

China's emergence as a rising economic superpower and potential regional hegemon should not come as a surprise. Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms and modernizations in China's southern states have brought extra-ordinary success. However spectacular their successes have been, China must still confront political and military security issues arising from the passing of its former bilateral ally, the Soviet Union. The PRC is faced with the daunting task of shaping the Asia-Pacific Region into what it considers an acceptable new order. The end of the Soviet-United States global balancing act has left the region open for a new world order in which all the nations of the Pacific Rim will have a creative role.

The Chinese do not want a total withdrawal of the American military and economic presence in the Asia-Pacific region. Grounded in fears of domestic political unrest and the failure of economic reforms, the Chinese authorities are concerned lest a total American retreat from the region would leave the field open to a re-militarized, antagonized, and potentially hegemonic Japan. Uncertainty about the future is enough to account for the spate of Chinese diplomatic activity, and is sufficient for China to explore the possibilities of a greater degree of multilateralism in Northeast Asia. The Chinese are not entirely free from concern about a possible American or Russian hegemony.

This section addresses both contemporary China's response to the changing security environment and the means by which the country is better able to effect its modernization program. Through an increased participation in regional and multilateral organizations (economic, security, governmental and non-governmental), China hopes to be able to better satisfy the totality of its national interests.

The term "Fourth Revolution" refers loosely to China's response to the modern

Western world.¹⁰⁷ Faced with the dawning of the twenty-first century and inevitable integration with a world they largely cannot control, China is modernizing its social and economic infrastructure through moderate, step-by-step policy changes. Whereas previous steps to modernization were decidedly 'guided' from the top leadership, this current stage of transition is revolutionary. It represents a genuine mandate from the people; a mandate sanctioned wholeheartedly by the very top leadership. As Deng re-emerged in 1976, he established a new social contract. He underwrote continued CCP legitimacy and rule by promising a reversal of Cultural Revolution excesses and injustices, restoring order, reestablishing China's international prestige, jump starting productivity, and improving the overall quality of life.¹⁰⁸ His was a remarkably far-sighted and fundamentally radical strategy based on the cruel realities of China's status in the world.

This is systemic change brought about by China's increasing conformity, not to the self-proclaimed standards of the Middle Kingdom, but to the patterns of information flow, political and economic decision making, resource allocation, and distribution of authority judged necessary to compete in the modern world.¹⁰⁹

This Fourth Revolution has been characterized by multiple 'westernizations' of their social, political, and economic culture. These fundamental changes include: an increasing market orientation of economic potential, from ownership through production and investment down to demand; the decentralization of administrative responsibilities (decision-making

¹⁰⁷ This section draws significantly upon Gerrit W. Gong's, "China's Fourth Revolution," *The Washington Quarterly* Vol.17: No.1 (Winter 1994): pp.29-43. See also Wang Jisi, "New Momentums of China's Asia Connection," Prepared for the *Workshop on Links Between Economic and Security Relations*; Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC), San Diego, California; (13-15 May, 1993). China's previous revolutions (of the 'modern' era) were of course: Sun Yat-sen's 1911 structural modernization, establishing sustained contact between the West and China; Mao Zedong's 1949 revolution transforming China into a 'people's republic'; and Deng Xiaoping's 1978 modernization effort establishing 'socialism with Chinese characteristics'.

¹⁰⁸ Gong: p.32.

¹⁰⁹ Gong: p.30.

structures and processes); a shift from ideologically based cultural legitimacy to one of rising standards of living and nationalism; perhaps most significantly, an unprecedented opening of the world and China to each other.¹¹⁰

This last change is the most dramatic. Global contact has been established via cross-border and domestic flows of information, and has spread a new ideological ethos heretofore unimaginable. Whether by telephone, television (satellite broadcast), fax, or radio, whether by electronic stock quotes or through the beeping pagers at their sides, there is an intense awareness being ingested by the Chinese of their (potential) place in the modern world. The external/international standard is now **the domestic standard**, and the new openness both fuels and facilitates the competition to accede to the world political, economic, and social arenas.

This process now permeates China's coasts, cities, and their neighboring areas. It is increasingly penetrating China's interior villages and towns. This interaction of inside and outside is now two-way and irreversible. It recognizes the link between China's domestic social and political stability and its dependence on international trade to maintain current standards of living.¹¹¹

In order to facilitate international trade, to maximize the Fourth Revolution and fully actualize national interests, thus requires China's full and equal participation both in the global economy, and in the global polity.

¹¹⁰ China's dramatic economic expansion and the opening of her doors to the world are clearly interrelated and co-dependent. Close economic ties beyond China's borders have made the entire Fourth Revolution possible. For instance: from 1979 to 1982, China's foreign investment totalled \$1.17 billion USD; in 1992 alone, this figure reached \$11.2 billion. From 1979, when China had 36 contracts with 2 countries (\$51 million value) to 1991 with 8,438 contracts and 147 countries (\$36 billion) to 1992 with 48,746 new contracts worth \$57.5 billion. From 1978 to 1992, China's total the trade volume with world increased from \$20.66 billion to \$165.6 billion. Impressive growth; an even more impressive gesture towards global rapprochement. See Gong: p.31.

¹¹¹ Gong: p.34.

In stark contrast to China's need for an integral role in world political and economic sectors as a means to domestic development is their intractable fear of foreign intermeddling. Whereas China has traditionally seen multilateral security arrangements (MSA's) as tools for major powers to practice 'hegemonics', China's own participation until recently has been criticized as xenophobic.¹¹² While the potential for a unipolar international system has only been concerned in connection with a U.S. dominated Western-democratic-industrialized coalition, the current domestic focus and foreign policy inclinations of the Clinton administration would seem to indicate otherwise.¹¹³ With the disappearance of the Soviet Union and the restrained role of President Clinton, China finds its own politico-military security in no immediate danger for the time being.¹¹⁴ China is in the fortuitous position of being able to give top priority to domestic economic development. The obvious corollary follows that China's *diplomacy* can maximize its economic interests in this interdependent world.

The essence of security strategy is about how to relate means to end in pursuing national security. Beijing's new thinking has changed both the meaning of end and means and the means-end relation in the security strategy. Security is no longer defined in military terms alone. As Chinese defense analysts argue, the connotation of 'security' becomes broader and more inclusive. Aside from military security, threat should also be defined in economic, technological, and ideological dimensions.¹¹⁵

¹¹² Japan's 'Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere', the Soviet Union's 'Asia Collective Security System', and to a similar degree the United States' ties to NATO and the U.S. series of bi-lateral security alliances in the Asia-Pacific. See Wang Qi, "The Chinese Perspective on Multilateral Security Arrangements (MSA) in the Asia-Pacific Region--A Premature Time Schedule" (Draft), Prepared for the *Workshop on Links Between Economic and Security Relations*; Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC), San Diego, California; (13-15 May, 1993): pp.2-4.

¹¹³ Paul H.B. Godwin, "China's Asian Policy in the 1990s: Adjusting to the Post Cold-War Environment," *East Asian Security in the Post-Cold War Era*, ed. Sheldon W. Simon, (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), p.119.

¹¹⁴ Wang Jisi: p.4.

¹¹⁵ Peng Guangqian, et al, *Junshi Zhanlue Jianlun (A Concise Book of Military Strategy)*, Department of Strategic Studies of the People's Liberation Army Academy of Military

As they say in Beijing, only a prosperous socialist society can resist contamination from western democratic influence.¹¹⁶

It is no surprise then to see China linked, via its most prosperous regions, to regional economic organizations. In the South, the sub-region whose economic success has become the fodder of legends, interdependence via investment from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has made China virtually a full member of the latter organization.¹¹⁷ Indeed, given the region's shared interests, the overwhelmingly positive nature of their trade and investment, and the need to coordinate the effects of their shared explosive growth, it is hardly coincidental that the Chinese have become active participants in what is perhaps the most ambitious Pacific attempt at multilateral institution building to date, the seventeen member Asian- Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).

That these economic organizations can have substantive impact on international politics is clear. For instance, in the case of the PRC and Taiwanese (ROC) relations, a major friction generator since the late 1940's, geo-economic imperatives have begun to temper political conduct. In part due to an annual \$6 billion two-way trade between the PRC and the ROC, ROC's \$1 billion worth of investments in the mainland, and some 1.5 million annual Taiwanese visitors to the PRC, and in part due to their participation in multilateral arrangements such as APEC, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the ASEAN

Sciences, (Beijing: Jiefangjun Chubanshe, 1989): pp.35-36. As cited in Weixing Hu, "China's Security in a Changing World," *Pacific Focus* Vol.8, No.1, (Spring 1993), p.118.

¹¹⁶ Wang Jisi: p.4.

¹¹⁷ "Intra-Asian trade between China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand grew 58 percent from 1986 to 1992, and now accounts for 30 percent of those countries' total trade." See Robert A. Manning, "The Asian Paradox," *World Policy Journal* Vol.10, No.3, (Fall 1993)

Ministerial meetings, the old sibling rivalries and hostilities have eroded to some degree.¹¹⁸ While APEC and ASEAN's potential as security tools are addressed elsewhere in this paper and remain as yet in question, any organizations capable of assembling such diverse groups of nations such as China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong into multilateral forums have earned considerable credibility.

Indeed, China has shown dramatically improved foreign policy strategy through pursued membership in regional intergovernmental economic organizations. Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen attended both the November 1991 Seoul APEC ministerial meeting (with officials from Taiwan and Hong Kong) and the 1993 APEC 'Pacific Summit' in Seattle. Augmented by their regular ASEAN participation beginning in 1991, the Chinese appear to be taking regionalism and multilateral participation as seriously as their rhetoric would indicate.¹¹⁹

China's activities in the United Nations and associated organizations are clear examples of its vision for multilateral participation. After regaining its UN Security Council seat in 1971, China has maximized its access to developmental funds and services. Previously limited to the give-and-take of assistance within the global communist network, post-Mao China was now able to more adequately underwrite its modernization efforts. Through its implementation of the substantial resources of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP¹²⁰) China has since 1979 made the dramatic transition from the reformist stance of the Mao era to the fully participatory Deng regime bent on full blown Western-style economic development. Despite opposition from many Third World nations and the Soviet Empire, the

¹¹⁸ Manning, p.60.

¹¹⁹ Weixing Hu: p.121.

¹²⁰ Founded in 1966, UNDP is a voluntarily funded organization that administers most United Nations technical assistance. This assistance is in the form of loans and grants, advisory services, demonstration and training equipment, pre-investment planning, and management training for a variety of fields to the developing countries.

UNDP (along with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) distributed billions of dollars and credits to China for hundreds of projects and programs in the pursuit of development and modernization.¹²¹ Despite China's resultant, sustained economic success, the country's population size ensures a relatively low GDP and guarantees a continuing need for investment capital and technology transfer.¹²² In that the United Nations' resources are not unlimited, and China's eligibility as a 'developing' nation may be questionable, it is expected that the Asian Development Bank will increasingly fulfill China's funding requirements.¹²³ China's affiliation with the United Nations and affiliated organizations has facilitated its modernization in three distinct ways. First, China has been able to draw on the experience and 'corporate knowledge' of these organizations in order to more effectively analyze, plan, and train personnel for its extensive restructuring. Second, participation in these organizations brings China into contact with enormous pools of capital, enabling it to make the initially unprofitable and costly infrastructure and developmental changes, and weather the inevitable monetary and trade imbalances. Third, and perhaps most importantly, China's participation in these organizations brings it into an economic framework within which it can communicate, negotiate, and bargain with the advanced capitalist states.¹²⁴

¹²¹ Soviet dissatisfaction was of course an ideological issue. The Third World's questioned the degree of real need, contending that China had in the process of its metamorphosis engineered "a radical shift from overstating its role as a Third World aid donor to understating its actual economic strength and garnering large financial payoffs to a degree at Third World expense." Samuel S. Kim, "China, International organizations, and Multilateral Cooperation," unpublished paper presented at the Conference on Patterns of Cooperation in the Foreign Relations of Modern China, Wintergreen, Virginia, August 10-15, 1987, p.44. See also: William R. Feeney, "Chinese Policy Towards Multilateral Economic Institutions," *China and the World*, 2nd edition, ed. Samuel S. Kim, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), p.252.

¹²² Gerald Segal, "China's Changing Shape," *Foreign Affairs* Vol.73, No.3, (May/June 1994), p.45.

¹²³ Feeney, p.259.

¹²⁴ Feeney, p.258.

Beyond China's economic integration with the East Asian economic dynamos, the PRC has taken steps to initiate regional and multilateral cooperation with partners around its borders. A variety of "ambitious" plans are cited as to developing economic ties between northern China and adjacent foreign regions. These include a monolithic Northeast Asia Economic Cooperation region encompassing north China, Japan, the Korean Peninsula, Mongolia, and the Russian Far East. This huge zone of prospective prosperity includes some familiar names: the Tumen River Circle, the Vladivostok Circle, the Yellow Sea Circle, and the Chinese-Russian-Mongolian Borders Area.¹²⁵ These projects and developments are of course many years and billions of dollars away from completion; if the success of Shandong Province in its booming economic relations with South Korea are foretelling though, these other regional developments have unlimited potential.

Fundamental to any of this economic development between neighboring states are the prerequisites of a peaceful international environment and the easing of international tensions. China's interests obviously lie then in facilitating good regional, multilateral relations. For example, as previously mentioned, multiple tensions on the Korean Peninsula undermine multilateral efforts of all kinds. These impediments create roadblocks to progress on such developments as Tumen River. Any role that China assumes as an peaceful intermediary with the North Korean regime intuitively contributes to subsequent opportunities for economic development. Territorial disputes between Japan and Russia handicap Vladivostok developments as well (although China's role as an intermediary in this dispute remains a bit nebulous). More relevant are China's growing economic ties with the ASEAN nations. Contingent as they are on Beijing's relations with those governments, a negotiated settlement of the Spratlys territorial dispute would facilitate even greater cooperation.

This last area of simmering dispute raises the flag on China's ostensibly positive

¹²⁵ Luo Bengu, "The Northeast Asia Economic Cooperation Region: Its prospects, Pattern, and Process," *Dongbeiyu Yangiu* (Northeast Asian Studies) No.4, (1992), pp.7-13. As cited in Wang Jisi, p.14.

participation in region-wide multilateral security arrangements. China has proposed a solution for "Putting aside disputes, co-exploitation first." At international conferences on the Spratlys in Indonesia (January 1990, and July 1991), Beijing suggested attacking the easier problems first, and leaving the sovereignty issues for a later date. In the specific case of Vietnam, the two sides agreed to resolve their problems on a bilateral basis, not within the context of a regional forum.¹²⁶ More to the point, China has stated elsewhere that they care not to negotiate the Spratlys within any other than a bilateral context. They chose only to deal with one country at a time; albeit from a peaceful stance. Perhaps China still experiences a certain insecurity with the multilateral format; the possibility of diluted security strength would certainly weaken their position. The positions they have assumed in Southeast Asia will more likely be replicated should similar situations arise in Northeast Asia.

China has emerged from the post-Cold War global milieu as the region's rising star. This is not so surprising as we witness the PRC's economic adventurism and amicable liaisons with virtually all the Asian-Pacific Rim states. With the Soviet threat eliminated,¹²⁷ and Western security alliances either static or subject to an uncertain ambivalence due to a perceived obsolescence, China is virtually free to develop their economic interests and international ties. Phenomenal economic growth in the South, and fledgling development in the north have encouraged international economic forays throughout the Asia-Pacific. Through constructive participation in existing multilateral arrangements such as ASEAN, APEC, the PECC, and the ADB, the PRC has facilitated and contributed both to regional economic growth, and vicariously to Asian-Pacific security stability.

¹²⁶ Weixing Hu, p.121.

¹²⁷ Residual Russian threat is a *concern*; the former Soviet states in Central Asia pose a real threat with regards to ethnic and religious conflict. Additionally, the still-proliferated nuclear weapons technology deployed in these states represent a genuine danger. However, in terms of China's modernizations in the Asia-Pacific, the Russian Far East more significantly represents a potential trade and co-development partner.

Questions remain concerning the depth of commitment the PRC is willing to make to the growth of multilateral security arrangements; are they playing merely to facilitate trade and development, limiting security discussions to one-on-one bilateral forums? Or are they willing to negotiate binding security agreements within the multilateral context as well? The proof will be in the resolution of watershed issues like the Spratlys (ASEAN nations), and their level of participation in resolving North Korea's nuclear weapons problem.

China's foreign policy regarding the Asia-Pacific revolves around transforming their economy and maximizing development; only by achieving a certain economic and 'lifestyle' parity with the West can they hope to preserve the PRC. Through peaceful, cooperative relations with their regional neighbors, including participation in regional multilateral economic and security arrangements, they may attain these goals.

B. JAPAN

This section explores the potential for contemporary Japanese participation in Asian-Pacific multilateral security arrangements. Within the relatively stable security framework of the Cold War era, Japan found itself freed from overwhelming military self-defense expenditures through the support of their superpower alliances. Rather than crippling their economies attempting to compete in escalating geo-political confrontation, the Cold War alliances allowed Japan the opportunity to develop its economic sectors. It is clear that new strategies for integrated security must be found if the spectacular economic progress of Japan is to be continued.¹²⁸

Japan is the now-classic example of a nation making a dramatic postwar ascent as an economic superpower. However, its success is decidedly uni-dimensional; there has been little comparable growth as either an international political or strategic leader. This self imposed phenomenon is the result of the Yoshida Doctrine, Article Nine of the Constitution, Japan's 1% GNP defense budget limitations, its Comprehensive Security Doctrine, and its Three Non-Nuclear Principles. Tremendous debate rages both within Japan and internationally regarding its future global security role and its *obligations* as a powerful economic state.¹²⁹

Japan finds itself tugged in two distinct directions. Its security ties to the United States, specifically the *Peace Treaty of 1952* and its successor the *1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security*, persist beyond the end of the Cold War. The military element of

¹²⁸ Hajime Izumi, "Japan's Role in the New Asia-Pacific," *Korea and World Affairs*, Vol. XII, No.3, (Fall, 1993), p.498.

¹²⁹ See Eugene Brown, "The Debate Over Japan's Strategic Future: Bilateralism Versus Regionalism," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXIII, No.6, (June, 1993), for a comprehensive analysis of the domestic political dynamics within Japan regarding the country's international role.

the bilateral relationship between the two countries is decidedly one-sided; the United States has cultivated a strategic partnership cum dependency which Japan has been all too willing to facilitate. Additionally, Japanese "bilateralists" continue to emphasize the centrality of the U.S. - Japanese relationship in Asian security dynamics; indeed:

...the U.S. must stay in the Pacific. Nobody can replace it. Japan must educate its people and support the U.S. and the basic structure in Asia, whose main pillar is the U.S. presence.¹³⁰

A sentiment echoed throughout the EA/P, a continued American presence is doubly reiterated by those Japanese mindful of their own vulnerable security.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, the threats to Japan remain as tangible as ever. The continuous turmoil within the former Soviet Union, the still-lethal military vestiges hauntingly vulnerable to the whims of political uprising (and the source of widespread regional proliferation), and the frightening potential of its past dependencies (North Korea) remain imposing threats. China, although a tremendous beneficiary of extensive Japanese investment, is unstable and ripe for political and military adventurism. Traditionally an element of concern for Japan, Sea Lines Of Communication (SLOCs) disruptions can potentially cripple virtually every sector of Japan's economy, particularly disruption in the South China Sea.¹³¹ Finally, from the perspective of geographical proximity to potential military adversaries, Japan remains a virtually indefensible nation. For Japan to wholeheartedly reject bilateral security relationships with the U.S. would be tantamount to strategic suicide.

¹³⁰ Toshinori Shigeie, former director of the National Security Affairs Division in the Foreign Ministry, as interviewed by Eugene Brown. Brown, p.554.

¹³¹ The straits and passages of Southeast Asia grow increasingly critical for the movement of Japan's raw materials and manufactured goods. Some 60 percent of Japan's oil imports and easily 40 percent of foreign trade make their way through the Straits of Malacca and the Lombok Straits. Chaiwat Khamchoo, "Japan's Role in Southeast Asian Security: 'Plus ca change...'," *Pacific Affairs* Vol.64, No.1, (Spring 1991), p.7.

Thus for Japan to reject military ties to the U.S. and assume responsibility for its own military security needs requires Japan to address at least two key considerations. First is the constitutional and political limitations inherent in the Japanese system. Despite the occasional "rallying" of conservative extremists to rearm, establish national autonomy, and to build a Japan - centered strategic bloc, this idea remains extremely unpalatable to the nation as a whole. Additionally, with the internal turmoil currently bedeviling Japanese politics, any change as significant as constitutional revision seems all but impossible.

Second is the future of the Japanese political party system. The political demise of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has resulted in the empowerment of a succession of weaker and weaker coalition parties, each less able to effect lasting change than the last. For these politicians to consider a bold gesture such as rearmament and military/strategic autonomy when even relatively minor SDF participation in United Nations peace-keeping operations creates domestic shockwaves suggests a level of competence in the leadership which is simply not there. Those Japanese calling for an end to the reliance on the U.S. must realize that going 'alone' will leave their country largely defenseless.

The Northeast Asian security scenario and the demise of the Cold War is complicated by the perceived international "floundering" of the United States. The foundations of Japan's long-stable security paradigm are perceived to have cracked and fallen asunder.¹³² It is all well and good to ally with the United States - but against whom and for what reason? With the United States international credibility and multidimensional strategic superiority coming into question, the Japanese must ask: is this heretofore bedrock alliance really a prudent avenue to follow for Japan's future? With on-going tensions between Japan and Russia over the Northern Territories issue, China's build-up of her military capabilities, sea-lanes disputes in the South China Sea, prolonged difficulties in Indochina, and of course the always volatile Korean Peninsula problem, the question really becomes: What choice does Japan have? It

¹³² Brown, p.543.

would be far better for Japan to build upon the extant bilateral ties with the United States, adding to them whatever additional resources, unilateral or multilateral, might be available.

Relevant long term alternatives for Japanese security requirements are provided by other multilateral combinations created elsewhere in Asia. Spawned by the recognition of the inherent value of intra-Asian economic cooperation and a direct response to the need for effective communications between nations of the region, a variety of specialized regional economic forums have arisen. Designed to foster economic cooperation and mutual growth, these forums have the very real potential to develop into the cornerstones of multilateral security arrangements. "At the very least, comprehensive regional organizations of a primarily economic nature, such as the institutions of the European Community (EC) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), provide a venue for the exchange of views and tentative understandings among top-ranking officials of member's countries."¹³³ Whatever the motivations, peaceful and constructive cooperation is an effective foundation for any security arrangement. Ironically, "prior to 1992, Japan's leaders had maintained that the geopolitical diversity of the Asia-Pacific region militated against the creation of a multilateral security architecture for the region."¹³⁴ Subsequently however, Prime Minister Miyazawa and Foreign Minister Nakayama Taro indicated that perhaps the time had come to take a new look at some type of multilateral arrangement.¹³⁵

The Japanese factor in Asian-Pacific security forums can be explored from a variety of perspectives. In plotting Japan's future security engagements it is essential to recall the history of the state's concerted involvement in "multilateralism" in the Asia-Pacific. Call it multilateralism or call it imperialism, the vital precedents of the Greater East Asia Co-

¹³³ Norman D. Palmer, The New Regionalism and the Pacific, (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1991), p.3

¹³⁴ Brown, p.551.

¹³⁵ The Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), August 1, 1991, p.11.

Prosperity Sphere cannot be ignored. Past history would seem to confirm that Japan would not be averse to a multilateral Pacific security arrangement in the future.

While the Japanese interest in regional economic and security forums seems a noble and constructive departure from the limited parameters of its "sub-hegemonic" alliance with the United States, the Japanese legacy bears heavily on the collective consciousness of the region. The dynamic and powerful expansionist heritage that Japan established during the first forty years of this century has not disappeared. Leaving permanent scars wherever they went, Japan's past continually haunts relations with regional neighbors.¹³⁶ Despite the powerful lessons learned as a result of World War II, and the effective, permanent end to Japanese hegemony brought about by that war, the "myth"¹³⁷ persists to this day:

When presented as a policy option, this myth is distinctive because it finds virtually unanimous support from all the parties involved - Asians, Americans, Russians, and Japanese. What makes this unanimity astonishing is that the myth itself rests on two radical and extremely questionable assumptions about international reality in East Asia: (1) that Japan is an incorrigible 'military-holic' nation, incapable of behaving in a responsible manner as part of a collective security arrangement, and (2) that the United States will continue to operate to maintain security in the Western Pacific within the framework of the last four decades despite the enormous shifts in economic and political power that have occurred. To assert that Japan cannot share the burden of maintaining international order in the same manner as other world powers is *prima facie* untenable.¹³⁸

Japan's earliest post-war attempts to overcome the imperialist legacy correspond with its initial membership in mainstream multilateral organizations. In 1956 Japan joined the

¹³⁶ R. Mark Bean, Cooperative Security in Northeast Asia, (Washington: National Defense University, 1990), p.40.

¹³⁷ Donald C. Hellman, "Contemporary United States-Japan Security Relations: Old Myths, New Realities," Asian-Pacific Regional Security, ed. June Teufel Dreyer, (Washington D.C.: The Washington Institute Press, 1990).

¹³⁸ Hellman, p.56.

United Nations, a popular move which to many Japanese symbolized the pacifist state's dreams for a peaceful world order. U.N. membership was perceived as guaranteeing a permanent unarmed neutrality for Japan. Additionally, membership in the multilateral arrangement was seen by some as an effective means to soften the total dependence on the U.S. for military security. While the United Nations effectiveness as arbiter of world peace has tarnished some in the interim, Japan continues to regard it as an important forum for arms control, specifically nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Japan has since 1969 been a member of the U.N. Disarmament Committee (Geneva) and has been a persistent proponent of global arms reductions, consistently pushing for the prohibition of nuclear weapons testing, the cessation of the nuclear arms race, and positive cooperation in the international efforts to achieve nonproliferation.¹³⁹

Beyond its efforts to use the United Nations as a tool to effect a smooth international military playing field, Japan has been an active participant in the range of social, cultural, and economic development agencies. Including memberships in the United Nations Economic and Social Council, the U.N. Environmental Program Council, the Industrial Development Council, the World Food Council, the United Nations Development Council, the U.N. Children's Fund, and the Economic and Social Commission for Asia (ESCAP), Japan has been able to effect change and lead regional development under the auspices of the multilateral arrangement.

As post-war Japan has grown economically, its participation in both regional and global economic organizations has grown accordingly. In addition to the essential Asian developmental organizations such as the Colombo Plan and the Asian Development Bank, Japan has become involved integrally in the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Throughout the

¹³⁹ Japan: A Country Study, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), pp.338 - 339.

Cold War era then, Japan may be seen as having participated on a global level in fostering international stability and development, and that the country maximized its security interests (primarily economic) in a politically palatable, domestically acceptable manner. Japan sought to make an international contribution by addressing issues of concern to the industrialized nations, but more vividly by orchestrating cooperation and policies with the developing nations.

With the effective decline of the Cold War security paradigm and the potential withdrawal of American military assets from the region, the security premise permitting Japan's international activities requires another look. Japan's regional "backyard" has become a potential free-for-all of myriad economic and security interests. The Pacific Rim is an intensely dynamic environment wherein even the smallest players have tangible economic interests and resources enough to obtain the most powerful tools of war. If the need for stabilizing influences is apparent, then the need for a unifying forum should be numbingly obvious. In Japan's case:

The conventional policy of relying *solely* on the Japan - U.S. security system will not suffice in the post-Cold War era, when it has become important to build mutual trust and suppress regional conflicts.¹⁴⁰

Japan's best interests lie then in expanding benignly in the region and to continue contributing constructively to regional stability, albeit at a more local level. Already involved economically throughout the EA/P with extensive investment and manufacturing interests in virtually every Asian state, Japan has more recently taken an active and visible role in regional security and regional organizations. But Japan is not willing to go as far as European states in building a multilateral institution. As recently as 1991, then Prime Minister Kaifu rejected suggestions for a European model (CSCE) based Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia (CSCA) emphasizing the need to resolve each regional issue within its specific

¹⁴⁰ Unnamed Japanese Defense Agency Official, as cited in Gwen Robinson, "Leading Role Planned in Regional Security," Asia-Pacific Defense Reporter 1994 Annual Reference Edition, p.39.

context.¹⁴¹ Together with Japan's Foreign Minister Nakayama, the two leaders confirmed the Japanese position that the EA/P differs geographically and strategically from Europe, and that CSCE - style multilateral security arrangements, while appropriate for Europe, will not produce stability in the EA/P region.

The emphasis on the need to develop some type of indigenous organization was underscored at the ASEAN Post - Ministerial Conference (PMC) in 1992 when Nakayama "stated that making comprehensive use of existing international forums for discussion would guarantee long - term regional stability" and that "the countries concerned are working towards a comprehensive settlement of the Cambodian conflict and that a framework for international cooperation focussing on the Korean dialogue was emerging."¹⁴²

Acknowledging the need for regional security networks as a *complement* to existing ties with the U.S., Prime Minister Miyazawa in 1992 in Washington D.C. pointed to APEC as a suitable forum for pursuit of regional economic issues, and to the ASEAN PMC as the relevant forum for regional security issues. Since 1991 when Japan first endorsed the PMC format for regional security discussions, the idea has received strong support from the rest of the participants. Japan's interest in both the ASEAN format and the member nations is quite apparent in its level of participation. Japanese aid to the ASEAN countries totaled about US\$1.9 billion in Japanese fiscal year 1988 vice US\$333 million for the United States. Japan was the number one foreign investor in the ASEAN countries as of 1989.¹⁴³ Despite Japan's acceptance and apparent enthusiastic support, ASEAN endorsements are not universal:

¹⁴¹ Makoto Kawanago, "Regional Security and Japan," paper presented at the 1st Northeast Asia Defense Forum, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, Research Institute for Peace and Security, 3 - 5 November 1993, p.5.

¹⁴² Foreign Minister Nakayama, at the ASEAN Post - Ministerial Conference, Kuala Lumpur, July, 1991, as cited in Makoto Kawanago, p.5.

¹⁴³ Japan: A Country Study.

The kind of security issues that a regional forum is meant to address would be more productively and appropriately handled in a wider multi-lateral body...China refuses to discuss the South China Sea issue in any international conference and has instead proposed a Sino-ASEAN dialogue that would place ASEAN at a disadvantage. China's refusal points directly to the inadequacy of the PMC mechanism.¹⁴⁴

Chinese recalcitrance notwithstanding, Japan's increasing participation in ASEAN and expanding investment in the member nations represents a tremendous vote of confidence for the multilateral arrangement, and in fact reiterates the basic philosophies of the Fukuda Doctrine (1977). It is a basic recognition of the susceptibility of Japanese economic interests in these states to internal disturbances and external conflict. By bolstering regional economies (development, expanded assistance, technical cooperation) Japan is better able effect stability and protect its interests.¹⁴⁵

Increased multilateralism of security discussions in the EA/P will by necessity involve Japan in an ever-increasing role. In light of Japan's tremendous foreign investments, developmental assistance, and previous cooperative efforts in the EA/P region, the country is a pivotal "player" for any discussions of international security affairs:

No nation can do more to foster economic development and integration in the region than Japan. It has become an economic role model for the most rapidly developing economies of the region, and

¹⁴⁴ Leszek Buszynski, "ASEAN Security Dilemmas," *Survival* Vol.34, No.4, (Winter 1992-93), p.103.

¹⁴⁵ Under the Fukuda Doctrine Japan pledged to: 1) never again become a major military power, 2) promote constructive nonmilitary ties with the members of ASEAN, and 3) act to promote cooperative relations between ASEAN and the nations of communist Indochina. See Brown, p.552 and Khamchoo, p.10. In addition, Taketsugu Tsurutani's *Japanese Policy and East Asian Security*, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981), p.129, explores the ties between the Fukuda Doctrine and Japanese economic security.

will remain, by virtue of its capital and eventually its domestic market, a key source of regional growth.¹⁴⁶

An essential caveat to note, however: any acceptance of Japan as a regional leader will depend upon its close linkage with the United States. The American alliance is generally regarded as a brake on Japan's ambitions. If that brake were to be removed, a more expansive security role for Japan would by no means be acceptable. Assuming that further participation in any regional multilateral security arrangements would be complementary to extant U.S.-Japanese security alliances, and that Japan's participation would be in accordance with constitutional limitations, it is clear that Japan's security interests intermesh with those of its Asian neighbors, and that the attainment of these interests may be found in multilateral arrangements.

¹⁴⁶ Hajime Izumi, "Japan's Role in the New Asia - Pacific Era," *Korea and World Affairs* Vol.XVII, No.3, (Fall 1993), p.502.

C. THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST

Russia in the post Cold War environment appears to be taking a more constructive and potentially cooperative approach in its involvement with the Pacific Rim nations. Arising from Mikhail Gorbachev's reformist policies of *glasnost* and *perestroika* in 1986 and 1987, these philosophical and structural changes in the Soviet Union have had critical domestic and international implications. Implications which have fundamentally altered the methods by which Soviet foreign policy is effected and by which national interests are pursued.

While the *glasnost* philosophy of "openness" has in some cases permitted the overt voicing of Russian nationalism to surface (vociferous clamor for a more closed or insular Russian/Soviet Union state¹⁴⁷), it also embraced a recognition of certain limitations of the Soviet state and the need for cooperative relationships with neighbor states. The regional implications were dramatically illustrated in Gorbachev's 1986 Vladivostok and 1988 Krasnoyarsk speeches which in effect announced the opening of the Soviet Far East to economic development and the integration of this segment of the Soviet economy with the entire Pacific Basin.¹⁴⁸

While there was certainly a lag between the articulation of new foreign policy

¹⁴⁷ With particular regard to territorial issues, Nationalists and Ultra-nationalists see concessions of "traditionally" Russian territories as further debasing of the "...great Russian nation. For example, Sergei Baburin, a conservative member of the Russian Parliament, has denounced negotiations with Japan as constituting a 'path to the destruction of the Russian state.'," Interfax June 11, 1992, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), June 12, 1992, p.23; as cited in Paul Marantz, "Moscow and East Asia: New Realities and New Policies," East Asian Security in the Post-Cold War Era, ed. Sheldon W. Simon, (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), p.37.

¹⁴⁸ Two critical documents for examining revised Soviet intentions in Asia are Gorbachev's 1986 Vladivostok speech and his 1988 Krasnoyarsk address. See The Current Digest of The Soviet Press, XXXVIII, No.30 (27 August 1986), pp.1-8,32; and XI, No.38 (19 October 1988), pp.1-7; as cited in Kolodziej, p.19.

perspectives and their manifestation as concrete policy initiatives, Gorbachev's contributions to the normalization of relations between the Soviet Union and Northeast Asia can not be overstated.

Gorbachev was the first Soviet leader to understand and acknowledge East Asia's emerging importance in the larger international setting. He was the first to recognize that the economic dynamism of this region made it no less important to the Soviet Union than Europe... Thus he realized that if his country were to rectify the fundamental deformations in its foreign policy and to find sustenance for *perestroika* in the outside world, the Soviet approach to East Asia would have to change.¹⁴⁹

Gorbachev normalized relations with China, easing the pressures of that thorn in the side of Soviet international relations. Second, he dramatically narrowed or suppressed the heretofore dominant East-West dichotomy. Third, and the most dramatic from the perspective of Soviet/Russian regionalization, was the beginning of demilitarization of its satellites in East Asia. Additionally, the establishment of Soviet-South Korean diplomatic relations in September of 1990 was indicative of the priority of economics in Gorbachev's Asia-Pacific policy, and sent ample message regarding the status of relations with former "socialist allies."¹⁵⁰

What emerged was a struggling giant seeking cooperative and equitable solutions to joint problems with its Asian neighbors; a country ready to base national security on regional ties and alliances; a country ready to participate in a multilateral context rather than via a heavy-handed imperialist unilateral paradigm.

¹⁴⁹ Robert Legvold, "The Collapse of the Soviet Union and the New Asian Order," *NBR Analysis*, Vol.3, No.4, (September, 1992), p.9.

¹⁵⁰ "In 1991, Moscow continued to supply oil and gave a moratorium on payment in hard currency in view of the North's severe financial difficulties. In return the two sides agreed on a list of goods and services North Korea will supply to pay its debt. According to preliminary estimates, the trade turnover between the two countries in 1991 decreased to a mere 25-30 percent of its 1989 volume." Vladimir I. Ivanov, "From the USSR to Russia on the Pacific," *Southeast Asian Affairs*, 1992, p.75.

Although the means had changed dramatically, the desired ends had not. Gorbachev's efforts assumed the continuation of the Soviet Union's superpower status and its network of alliance relationships. The inherent incongruities of this position ultimately resulted in the Soviet collapse.¹⁵¹ As dramatic and as unprecedented as this historic change was, the transition of 19 August 1991 has left the Asia-Pacific rim community with a remarkable opportunity. While Gorbachev failed miserably in his domestic policies, wrecking the Soviet economy and ultimately destroying the communist system he was bent on restoring, his foreign policy was considerably more productive.

In part through constructive initiatives and vision, and in part by accepting the inexorable decline of Soviet power with good grace, he succeeded in breaking the fetters of earlier policies, improving Moscow's ties with its Asian neighbors, and opening up unprecedented opportunities for even better economic and political relations in the future. Russian diplomacy now has the opportunity to build upon these past successes and to take advantage of the new fluidity that has replaced the frozen positions of the past.¹⁵²

This transformation of Russia from hegemonic adversary to potential partner of the United States provides the best hope for the future of regional relationships based on multilateral cooperation.¹⁵³

The heartbreak of widespread internal dissension and the fall of the communist state prompted an in-depth review of the national interests. The international threats to Russian state security and the well-being of communism are inconsequential when assessed in the light of domestic sources of instability. During the bulk of the Cold War era the needs of the population and the basic national interests of the Soviet Union counted for very little in the formulation of foreign policy. More frequently Soviet foreign policy was shaped by

¹⁵¹ Leszek Buszynski, "Russia and the Asia-Pacific Region," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol.65, No.4, (Winter 1992-1993), p.486.

¹⁵² Marantz, p.31.

¹⁵³ Ivanov, p.84.

ideological preoccupation (or competition), by the never-ending quest for empire, by super-power rivalries, by the pursuit of influence in the Third World, and by the parochial interests of Party elite and the military-industrial complex. Domestic economic requirements were decidedly second to the ideological needs of the "state."

The long-term results of this interpretation of the national interests are now becoming clear--political paralysis, hyperinflation, economic collapse, civil disorder, civil war, and potentially the breakup of the Russian Federation. For the Russian state to survive the post-Cold War minefield, its foreign policy must target not so much the expansion of foreign power but rather to create external conditions conducive to domestic transformation. Emphasizing the primacy of domestic needs, the the state's foreign policy must facilitate a transition to a successful free market economy.¹⁵⁴

In regard to the Asia-Pacific region, this orientation translates into the following goals: the sharp expansion of trade; the obtaining of credits, technology, and investment, especially from South Korea and Japan; the use of trade and foreign investment to develop the Russian Far East so that separatist tendencies will not grow in this key region and so that the Russian Far East will contribute to the process of economic rebirth throughout the country; the elimination of perceptions in the region that Russian military might is a threat to other states; the establishment of stable, cordial relations so that Russia will not become the target of hostile coalitions (e.g., a Sino-Japanese alliance); and the preventing of North Korea from obtaining nuclear weapons, since this would encourage nuclear proliferation and might lead to Japanese militarization.¹⁵⁵

Despite his "Atlanticist" perspective, Boris Yeltsin has in the post-Soviet era managed to sustain a fair degree of policy continuity with Gorbachev's Northeast Asian normalization trends.¹⁵⁶ Far from neglecting Asia, the current leaders have made major efforts to improve

¹⁵⁴ Marantz, p.32.

¹⁵⁵ Marantz, p.32.

¹⁵⁶ Marantz, pp.39-41.

relations with China, South Korea, and Japan. Economic revitalization and a search for a positive strategic role in the region remain the core of Russian policy in the Pacific. Indeed, in Yeltsin's November 1992 speech to the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea he, offered this bit of diplomatic fodder: "Nowadays, our policy is being transferred from West European and American lines to the Asia-Pacific region, and my visit here is the first move in this process."¹⁵⁷ Like Gorbachev, Yeltsin's priorities in the region are found in domestic economic survival, reduced defense potential, and the search for new partnerships.

What drives Russian policy now is maintaining a willingness to build a stable wealthy nation on a foundation of markets, individual freedom and initiative, private property, political pluralism and liberal democracy. The country's foremost (challenge) is to maintain its national identity and preserve territorial integrity - neither more nor less. Economic revitalization in the Far East is the critical condition for realization of both goals. This will make Moscow responsive to international influences to the extent that cooperation rather than rivalry with the United States and its East Asian partners, will be viewed as matching Russian national interests.¹⁵⁸

Thus the possibility of transitioning regional relations to a framework of multilateral cooperation is very real. Russia may have retreated from its imperialist forward boundaries to its traditional national territories, but it remains a Pacific nation whose principal objective is to be engaged constructively with regional systems.

Whereas Russia remains strong enough to defend the traditional Soviet national interests through the use of force and military assets (however waning), the state's true interests are better served by shared responsibilities. In that reduced global threats have revised the strategic thinking of Northeast Asian nations, cooperative multilateralism for the sake of peace and stability has emerged as a tangible paradigm for Russians in the region.

¹⁵⁷ Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 1992, November, 1993; as cited in Alexei D. Bogaturov, "Russia in Northeast Asia: Setting a New Agenda," *Korea and World Affairs: A Quarterly Review*, Vol.XVII, No.2, (Summer 1993), p.300.

¹⁵⁸ Bogaturov, p.302.

Transitional regional relationships are no longer based on post-World War II premises, but rather on democratic values, economic might, and *collaboration*.¹⁵⁹

While the growth of true Asia-Pacific multilateral security efforts is still an infant enterprise, the broad-minded inclusion of the spectrum of Pacific "players" as seen at the Association of South East Asian Nations - Post Ministerial Conference (ASEAN-PMC) in July, 1994 bodes extremely well for this potential. Russia's participation indicates a high level of confidence, and expectation, from its Pacific neighbors.

The issue of Russian participation in an Asian-Pacific security framework seems all but a certainty. However, there remain many relevant questions concerning the Russian Far East's future. Among these are the volatile issue of the break-up of the CIS. An independent Russian Far East would still be a significant player in the quest for a balance of power in the EA/P. While a far-detched notion to some observers, the concept of a politically autonomous and resource-rich state actualizing years of Euro-Russian ambivalent neglect has tantalizing potential.

Another issue of essential import to any Russian participation in **economic multilateralism** is the development of the Russian Far Eastern market. What do Russians in Asia have to offer as a member of an Asian economic forum? Do they have the means to be a cooperative member? If the Russians cannot participate constructively within the realm of economics, any consideration of security cooperation is moot. At this juncture their primary economic activity is the rather indiscriminate sales of military resources. What will they have to offer the world tomorrow? Will they be able to affect a productive defense conversion? Will they then have any security relevance? Does the fact that the Soviet-type

¹⁵⁹ Bogaturov, p.315.

socialist economy is entirely incompatible with the rest of the regional trends automatically sound a death knoll for economic integration?¹⁶⁰ Only the keepers of the deep Asian pockets know for certain. Again, Russia is welcome into the fold of multilateral security arrangements, provided it measures up to economic standards for membership.

¹⁶⁰ Ivanov, p.74.

D. THE KOREAN PENINSULA

At this juncture the division of the Korean Peninsula has never been more stark, the polarity of socio-economic conditions between North and South never greater. The two Koreas are a study in contrasts. The South is a relatively free and democratic society in which the vast majority enthusiastically support an elected civilian regime. In the North, a dictatorial regime maintains itself through military and police control of an apathetic people. South Korea's rapidly expanding and dramatically successful economy is contrasted by the North slipping ever deeper into a mire of debt and depression.

Most importantly, the South has expanded its prestige in the international community. By cultivating trade relationships, international financial investment, and establishing diplomatic inroads on a global scale, South Korea has been most successful in protecting and promoting its national interests. North Korea on the other hand, has by way of *chuch'e* fanaticism and a disregard for the sensibilities the global community finds itself effectively isolated. Its former ties to China and the Soviet Union have suffered with the fall of communism. Whereas South Korea's security relationships have brought it a high degree of national security and prosperity, North Korea's relationships have led to isolation and bankruptcy. Additionally, the Cold War system has made the ultimate national interest, reunification, all but impossible. In the light of the severity of the schism between North and South, and the failure of previous bilateral arrangements to bridge the gap between them, the time has come to explore the possibility for multilateral security arrangements to bring about peace, stability, and prosperity for the entire Korean peninsula.

South Korea's interest in multilateralism has its roots in the early development of its Nordpolitik approach to foreign relations. Not entirely comfortable within the constraints and limitations of the bilateral security agreement with the United States, the South sought to supplement this traditional relationship by broadening its contacts with its Asian neighbors. The traditional relationship with the United States was increasingly perceived in some sectors

as excessive, anachronous and even mendicant. By seeking its own self-reliant global posture, and expanding its multilateral potentialities, the South could reduce its sense of dependency as well as effect a more independent role in the increasingly complex international structure of the region.

As time distanced Northeast Asia from the hostilities of the Korean War, the vintage alliances faded in favor of new dynamics. The United States was establishing varying degrees of detente and/or rapprochement with Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and China. South Korea, reading the "writing on the wall," was prompted to diversify both security and economic interests. During these early stages, North Korea maintained an apparent military superiority, making any withdrawal of UN/US forces from the South unthinkable. It was this continued security assurance which allowed the second aspect of Nordpolitik: the expansion and diversification of South Korea's trade relations on a global scale. At the same time that Seoul was broadening its economic horizons, it pursued improved diplomatic relations with former socialist rivals the Soviet Union and China and broached negotiations with P'yongyang.¹⁶¹

South Korea's growth on the world scene as a viable player was recognized in 1988 during the first year of President Roh Tae Woo's tenure. This was a heady period for South

¹⁶¹ Of the total direct investment in South Korea from 1962 to 1986 (US\$3.631 billion), Japan accounted for 52.2% and the United States for 29.6%. The South Koreans themselves began investing overseas in the 1980s. By 1987, out of a total overseas investment of US\$1,195 million (745 projects), US\$574 million was invested in developed countries and US\$621 was invested in developing countries. Trade relations during this period are a direct reflection of South Korea's stated policy of expansion, liberalization, and diversification. In the years following the 1988 Seoul Olympics, South Korea's trade surplus exceeded US\$11 billion and foreign exchange revenue had increased sharply. Seoul's trade with communist countries exploded in 1988. Its trade with Eastern Europe was US\$215 million, trade with China nearly US\$1.8 billion, and trade with the Soviet Union US\$204 million. By 1988 South Korea's annual trade pushed past US\$100 billion, making it the world's tenth largest trading nation. See Daniel Metraux, "The Economy," *South Korea: A Country Study*, (Washington, DC: United States Department of the Army, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), pp.137-195.

Korea. Its economy was blossoming, as was evidenced by its sponsorship of the Summer Olympics. Fundamental principles of democracy were put into practice. President Roh made his diplomatic debut as the first South Korean executive to address the United Nations General Assembly (18 October, 1988). In that speech, Roh made the first of many South Korean proposals for multilateral security arrangements in Northeast Asia. Roh's address called for a six-nation conference to discuss ranging issues including peace, stability, progress, and prosperity in the region. A dramatic gesture symbolizing Korea's pursuit of "internationalization," it bespoke of Korea's desires to broaden the field of international diplomacy.

Other examples abound attesting to South Korea's interest in multilateral arrangements. Even before United Nations membership in 1991, the South actively participated in various subsidiary UN organizations and agencies. It maintained permanent missions to the UN, the UN Economic and Social Council, the UN economic and Social Council for Asia and the Pacific, and the European Community. Particularly noteworthy was the South's participation in the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC). As a founding member, Seoul adhered to the program of liberalizing trade relations throughout the entire Asia-Pacific region. The South Korean contingent to the PECC presented a workable model for the representation of national interests. Its national committee brought together academic, business, and government representatives into a single national contingent able to comprehensively communicate Korean interests from the variety of perspectives. In this forum the Koreans attracted a goodly amount of favorable attention.¹⁶²

From those early beginnings South Korea went on to be an active participant in other regional organizations, notably the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). It is currently a dialog partner in the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and a

¹⁶² The PECC and other multilateral organizations are discussed in greater detail in Chapter V.

participant in the ASEAN-PMC and ARF processes. It now looks forward to some sort of CSCE-type arrangements specifically oriented to Northeast Asia.

South Korea's activism in developing a multilateral arrangement to address Northeast Asian security issues is fortuitous. Consider the primary security concerns of the region: North Korean nuclear development; the DPRK's economic development; and reunification of the Peninsula. Although the major players will certainly play important roles in these issues, the keystone states remain the two segments of Korea. Actions towards resolution of security problems on the Peninsula (specifically the nuclear dilemma) may well serve as a major precipitant for regional conflict unless they are restrained by diplomatic control. Success in negotiating these disputes has the potential to produce a viable diplomatic framework for future agenda. As Korean Institute for Defense Analyses Fellow Young-Sun Song has written:

...if any country who has been or is likely to be engaged in a power rivalry in the region were to initiate this kind of forum, its intention and credibility would be in question. The initiator in the region must be least threatening to the member states. Among the nations in the region, including the United States, South Korea best meets this criterion. Historically Korea has never been an aggressor against any of the four states. Militarily, South Korea is also the least offensive. Further, South Korea has not been and is not in the conflict with any of the four states. All the other four are far more likely to get involved in conflicts pertinent to economy, territory, and even power rivalry. Again, South Korea's middle-power leadership role does not undermine anyone else's roles or functions. Nor does it imply South Korea to assume or wield all or most of the influence. It simply means that among all the states involved, South Korea is in the most favorable position to be a facilitator and arbiter at best.¹⁶³

The pivotable role must be taken by South Korea. A potential drawback though is that North Korea may refuse to negotiate in any such forum. South Korea as nexus to a regional

¹⁶³ Young-Sun Song, "The Architecture of Multilateral Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia: ROK's Perspectives," paper presented at The 1st Northeast Asia Defense Forum, Korean Institute for Defense Analyses, Seoul, South Korea, November 3-5, 1993. pp.12-13.

security arrangement may sound wonderful under Young's thesis, but do not expect North Korean participation.

Whereas the perceived drawbacks and dynamics of the Cold War system prompted South Korea to diversify and answer its national needs through internationalization, North Korea has become insular and defensive. It is a country with little means and few friends to help meet its needs. As recently as 1990 there appeared to be diplomatic progress when Kim Il Sung appeared to be ready to permit limited investment from South Korea. Inter-Korean trade grew by 1992 to a rate US\$200 million annually. South Korea was by this point the North's fourth largest trading partner. As economic liaison grew, so did political contact. The first ever talks between the Koreas' heads of state took place in September, 1990. In 1991 both Koreans states joined the United Nations as separate entities.¹⁶⁴

Although North Korea had previously fostered multilateral relations in the Third World through its participation in the Non-Aligned Movement, its contacts were lukewarm at best and of limited utility. A genuine change of heart seemed imminent in North Korea's membership and participation in the United Nations and its specialized agencies (i.e.: FAO, WHO, UNESCO, etc.). This new attitude was strengthened by the 'Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation' pact ratified with South Korea (February 1992), and the Joint Nuclear Control Committee (also with the South, December 1991). There appeared to be solid reason for confidence in improved North Korean relations.¹⁶⁵ Simultaneously, peaceable forms of economic interaction were seen in

¹⁶⁴ Lest North Korea's cooperation be interpreted as overt diplomatic altruism, it should be mentioned that the South's newly amiable relations with China and the Soviet Union played a role. They would no longer veto South Korea's unilateral application for membership. Thus both Korea's joined the UN in September 1991.

¹⁶⁵ On December 13, 1991, the two Koreas adopted a comprehensive nonaggression accord that, similar to CSCE agreements in Europe, stipulated a number of confidence building measures designed to prevent the sudden outbreak of armed hostilities. Although the divided Peninsula is perhaps the Asian scenario most suited to "European-styled" solutions

the Tumen River Development Project, a cooperative international border development with Russia, China, and North Korea. Other evidence of North Korea's opening to the outside world were in some one-hundred joint ventures designed to bring in Western capital and technology. Approximately 70% of these companies were owned by Korean residents of Japan still loyal to North Korea.¹⁶⁶ While slow in starting and modest in extent, cooperative arrangements such as these are basic to North Korea's receptivity to multilateral relationships in Northeast Asia. However, with North Korea's withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in March of 1993, receptivity for expanded trade, investment, aid and international goodwill took a turn for the worse.

Committing in apparent good faith to the NPT in 1985, North Korea rendered little real cooperation until concerted concessions were made by the United States and South Korea in 1991 and 1992. Once the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections were agreed to and were underway in 1992, North Korea displayed its traditional reticence and proved difficult to deal with. In March, 1993, the North gave notice that they were withdrawing from the NPT.

While the West has employed traditional power rhetoric and bully tactics to resolve the North Korean nuclear intransigence to little effect, the real solution may come from Asia itself. At the peak of the diplomatic crisis over North Korea's violations of the NPT, the Clinton administration enlisted the expertise of former president Jimmy Carter. President Carter travelled to P'yongyang ostensibly as a concerned citizen on 15 June, 1994, two days after the North withdrew from the IAEA. Despite bipartisan skepticism from Washington, the former president seems to have served as an "honest broker" in this dangerous standoff.

(the Helsinki Process, CSCE), the agreements ultimately were doomed. See Hideya Kurata, "Progress Toward a System of Confidence-Building Measures on the Korean Peninsula," *Japan Review of International Affairs* Spring 1992, pp.92-93.

¹⁶⁶ Aidan Foster-Carter, pp.427-428.

Indeed, Carter's four-day singular effort was more productive than any international posturing or sabre-rattling. Kim Il Sung indicated to President Carter a willingness to shut down his nuclear plant; not a solution in itself, but as President indicated, it marked "a new opportunity to find a solution." Carter's liaison with Kim opened the door for further negotiations under Assistant Secretary of State Robert Gallucci. These continuing talks not only addressed the NPT situation, but also the gamut of security, political, and economic issues which have isolated North Korea in the past. Perhaps most importantly from the Peninsular point-of-view, the Carter meetings led to Kim Il Sung and Kim Young Sam agreeing to meet *together* in an inter-Korean summit. Had Kim Il-Sung not died, this would be the first time that heads-of-state from the two Koreas met, marking a potential turning-point in Korean relations.¹⁶⁷ This meeting may yet occur between Kim Young-Sam and Kim Jong-Il.

The fragile accord reached between the United States and North Korea appears to be a long-term solution to diffusing the DPRK's nuclear ambitions. While awaiting tangible results will demand patience among the US and its allies, chief negotiator Robert Gallucci's solution is a remarkable departure from hostile policies of the past. Although not based on trust, it is designed to produce trust. Agreeing to IAEA monitors, discontinued production, and ultimately the dismantling of its existing reactors, the North will be *rewarded* with replacement (albeit incompatible with weapons production) light-water reactors from the US and its allies. Combined with other confidence building measures, including South Korea's mopening its borders for much broader economic relations with the North, these recent events provoke a glimmer of hope for the future.

This agreement notwithstanding, there is still no historical basis for expecting any

¹⁶⁷ See "War or Peace For Korea?" *The Economist*, June 18, 1994, pp.39-40; "Korea's Bomb Stops Ticking," *The Economist*, June 25th, 1994, p.31. For a synopsis of President Carter's role as international negotiator, see: Maureen Dowd, "Despite Role as Negotiator, Carter Feels Unappreciated," *New York Times*, 21 September 1994, A4.

lasting North Korean cooperation under any circumstances. However, recent overtures from ASEAN indicate a certain regional confidence and are perhaps reason for hope:

ASEAN (with all pride and humility) has played its part by inviting North Korea to its inaugural ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum). It was not the nuclear issue that comes into hand but the mere fact that a nation of a million strong force must have the respect and compromising tolerance from others. The acclaimed August 13 breakthrough on nuclear talks between North Korea and the US in Geneva may appease most. But it has not resolved other major issues such as conventional military threats, spillover of any internal revolution and reunification by force or peaceful means. This is where Asia, or closer still, China, Japan, South Korea, East Russia and even Taiwan, ROC, should bilaterally or in multilateral approach, offer assistance and soothe their troubled neighbor. This is in effect *juche* (chuch'e) in its wider (non-North Korean) context playing a part. Relying totally on Asia's own resources and millenniums of oriental diplomacy (the non-belligerent aspect naturally) to solve an Asian problem.¹⁶⁸

Although South Korea has endorsed the suitability of the ASEAN/ARF forum as a possible framework for developing trust, transparency, and ultimately preventative diplomacy, cautious goals would seem to be in order regarding involvement of the North.¹⁶⁹

North Korea's record in other arrangements indicates that it will contest the provisions of membership and interpretations of the rules. It has not earned the trust of other members.¹⁷⁰ In light of this record, ASEAN officials are contemplating general guidelines for

¹⁶⁸ "The King Is Dead...Kim Is Dead...", editorial, *Asian Defence Journal*, 9/94, p.4.

¹⁶⁹ Any endorsement of regional security arrangements by South Korea are inherently suspect in North Korea's eyes. However, in that Pyongyang has in the past sought membership in the ARF, it remains a viable possibility. See Zain Amri, "ASEAN Regional Forum: Towards Cooperative Or Collective Security In The Asia-Pacific?," *Asian Defence Journal* (ADJ), 9/94, pp.6-7 and Zain Amri, "The ASEAN Regional Forum: Hope For Success But Tread With Care," (ADJ), 8/94, pp.22-26.

¹⁷⁰ There has been considerable speculation regarding the potential for continuity of North Korean policies in the wake of Kim Il Sung's death (2 July 1994). While it is

ARF membership stating, among other things, that members must be in good standing with the NPT.¹⁷¹ A forlorn hope for the ARF arrangement to work in Northeast Asia lies in its structure. A true multilateral forum wherein all members are roughly at parity, North Korea may perceive the organization as non-threatening to individual state sovereignty. As the ARF has no binding decision making power, it is without any true power. It is primarily intended to promote security dialog and to increase mutual reassurances, not to enforce decisions. As members develop the habits of open discussion and mutual consultation, the idea is for peaceful relations to follow.

As in the past, South Korea will continue to perceive benefit from multilateral arrangements, both for security and economic ends. Therefore its participation and continued contributions are assured. The fundamental attitudes of the North have been uncooperative and historically unreliable. However, despite the continued antagonism between the two halves of the divided Peninsula, it is an improbable but worthy goal to attempt to facilitate multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific. It seems the sole alternative. Whether these forums or processes can fulfill the final national interest, reunification, remains to be seen.

acknowledged that Kim Jung Il will accede to head-of-state, little is known of his political inclinations. Statements from P'yongyang in the weeks following Kim Il Sung's death indicated that "...all revolutionary tasks set forth from the late Kim would be carried on by his son...that North Korea's unification and foreign policy lines would not change..." The younger Kim's legacy of propagating international terrorism implies the perpetuity of North Korea's dark heritage. Others suggest that Kim will be too busy consolidating his regime domestically to risk disruptive relations. His primary concern will be to first infuse domestic stability as a means to prove to the international community that his is not merely a transient regime. See "DPRK To Continue To Follow 'Policy Lines'," Seoul, *The Korea Times* (English), 19 July 94, p.2, (SK1907050194, East Asia FBIS, 19 July 1994, pp.37-38); Seoul, KBS-1 Radio Network (Korean), 1100 (GMT) 19 July 1994, (SK1507033694, East Asia FBIS, 19 July 1994, p.38).

¹⁷¹ Zain Amri, ADI, 8/94, p.26.

V. PROTECTING THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES: THE TREND TOWARDS MULTILATERALISM

As the United States navigates the turbid ocean of post-Cold War international relations, it is essential to remember that this nation's guiding light must be its elemental values and fundamental national interests. During the Cold War, the national interests presumed containment of global communism and maintenance of the bilateral alliance system. With the tangible threat of communism all but eliminated today, new strategies must be pursued.

A. CONSTITUTIONAL TASKING; INTERPRETATIONS

To define the most basic and enduring national interests, we must return to the Preamble of the Constitution, the keystone of the American value system. Specifically:

We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.¹⁷²

Thus, the United States' fundamental, long-term national interests may be literally summed up as follows:

- Unity of the nation;
- Domestic justice;
- Domestic tranquility;
- Defense of Americans;
- Economic prosperity;
- Liberty.

While the pursuit and application of these interests is the domestic responsibility of

¹⁷² The Constitution of the United States.

the courts and the legislators, the latter three are of particular relevance to US interests abroad. The security of the United States as a free and independent nation, and the protection of its fundamental values and institutions internationally is the responsibility of the American government acting on behalf of the American people. The diplomatic burden then is to pursue these interests by the most efficacious means possible, while still respecting the sovereign interests of foreign states.

In the post-Cold War era, the Clinton administration has been faced with (whether welcome or not) the singular responsibility of redefining America's international role. Although this presidency was driven by a professed domestic agenda, the urgency of global demands has in fact elicited generally useful statements (if not operational guidance). The 1993 National Security Strategy (NSS) defined United States global interests and objectives as follows:

- The security of the United States as a free and independent nation, and the protection of its fundamental values, institutions and people;
- Global and regional stability which encourages peaceful change and progress;
- Open, democratic and representative political systems worldwide;
- An open international trading and economic system which benefits all participants;
- An enduring global faith in America - that it can and will lead in a collective response to the world's crisis.¹⁷³

The 1993 NSS goes on to specifically define US national interests in the EA/P region as follows:

- Maintenance of a strategic framework which reflects the United States status as a Pacific power and promotes its engagement in Asia. The key to the United States' strategic framework has been, and will continue to be, *its alliance with Japan*;

¹⁷³ The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States, (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, November, 1993), pp.2-9.

- Expansion of markets through *bilateral, regional, and multilateral arrangements*;
- Support, contain, or balance the emergence of China* onto the world stage to protect United States national interests;
- Through constructive engagement, foster the peaceful *unification process on the Korean peninsula*;
- Encourage the *normalization of Indochina* and the *expansion and development of the Association of East Asian Nations*.¹⁷⁴

These may be distilled into the following key concepts:

- maintenance of the US/Pacific alliance system, particularly with Japan;
- greater investment in multilateral arrangements;
- watch China carefully, react accordingly to protect and promote US national interests;
- unify Korea through peaceful means; and,
- participate in ASEAN as a means to invest in Southeast Asia.

A slightly more tangible and goal-oriented framework was suitably elaborated by Winston Lord during confirmation hearings as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs on March 31, 1993. He designated the following ten major goals for American policy in Asia and the Pacific:

- Forging a fresh global partnership with Japan that reflects a more mature balance of responsibilities;
- Erasing the nuclear threat and moving toward peaceful reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula;
- Restoring firm foundations for cooperation with a China where political openness catches up with economic reform;

¹⁷⁴ The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States*, 1993.

- Deepening our ties with ASEAN as it broadens its membership and scope;
- Obtaining the fullest possible accounting of our missing in action as we normalize our relations with Vietnam;
- Securing a peaceful, independent and democratic Cambodia;
- Strengthening APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) as the cornerstone of international economic cooperation around the Pacific Rim;
- Developing multilateral forums for security consultations while maintaining the solid foundations of our alliances;
- Spurring regional cooperation on global challenges like the environment, refugees, health, narcotics, non-proliferation, and arms sales; and,
- Promoting democracy and human rights where freedom has yet to flower.¹⁷⁵

Based on these official statements and the Preamble of the Constitution, fundamental, long-term national interests of the United States in the EA/P region are summarized as the protection of American lives and property, promoting economic prosperity, and fostering international goodwill. Ultimately it is the challenge of diplomacy to devise strategies to protect and promote these interests. Here is where the trend towards multilateralism becomes so apparent.

B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ASIAN MULTILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS

During the Cold War era, many countries of the East Asia/Pacific were able to capitalize on the relative stability of the alliance system, taking the opportunity to develop explosively their economic sectors. With traditional security concerns largely accounted for by Great Power alliances, these states were enabled considerable freedom for domestic development (to say nothing of the virtually assured markets of their alliance partners). The

¹⁷⁵ Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, "Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, 31 March, 1993," US Department of State Dispatch, Vol.4, No.14 (5 April, 1993), pp.216-221.

results have been nothing short of spectacular in Japan, South Korea, and the ASEAN states. The United States was clearly the leader in determining the direction of international relations; in the post-Cold War era, its influence will be paramount in shaping the growing multilateralism.

Spawned by the recognition of the inherent value of intra-Asian economic cooperation and effective communications between nations of the region, a variety of specialized economic forums have arisen. Originally designed to foster mutual economic growth, these forums have the very real potential to develop into multilateral security arrangements. "At the very least, comprehensive regional organizations of a primarily economic nature, such as the institutions of the European Community and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), provide a venue for the exchange of views and tentative understandings among top-ranking officials of member's countries."¹⁷⁶ Whatever the motivations, peaceful and constructive cooperation is an effective foundation for any security alliance.

Definitions of multilateral security vary as widely as there are observers. The dawning of the global community gave rise to the "granddaddy" of the multilateral security organizations, the United Nations. In his interpretation of the U.N.'s charter, Michael Doyle succinctly translates the essence of multilateral security:

a noble effort to preserve 'succeeding generations from the scourge of war, to unite our strength to maintain international peace, to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest.' According to tradition, a workable system that makes the security of all into a collective responsibility requires commitment on the part of states to protect all states ('peace is indivisible') and a distribution of power

¹⁷⁶ Norman D. Palmer, The New Regionalism and the Pacific, (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1991), p.3.

among states such that no state is capable of effectively resisting the collective enforcement of peace.¹⁷⁷

This definition obviously represents the ideal. The international system has since 1945 been shaped by three global challenges: the advent of nuclear weapons and the subsequent transformation of security capabilities and strategies of the major powers from defense to deterrence; the transition from a multipolar world into a United States-Soviet Union bipolarity; and the post-colonial movement for self determination. These all served to undermine efforts towards collective or multilateral security.¹⁷⁸

Unfortunately these undermining factors reduced the United Nations to a mere facade, while real power concentrated primarily with the United States and the Soviet Union. Rather than fostering a cooperative world, the United Nations facilitated a global degeneration into "spheres of influence"; an uncertain balance between an absolute Soviet bloc and the tenuous threads of Western democratic alliances.¹⁷⁹ The UN's role as arbiter of security was reduced to the limited, albeit valuable role of diplomatic mediation, and to the thankless task of providing peacekeeping forces for disputes where both parties agreed to introduce them.¹⁸⁰ Ironically, with the passage of the Cold War, we have come to appreciate the element of stability inherent in the late "unlamented" bipolar system.

Throughout the Cold War, the dominant "multilateral" security organizations were the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (Warsaw Pact) nations. These were collectives of bilateral security relationships, each massed around

¹⁷⁷ United Nations Charter, quoted in Michael W. Doyle, introduction to Escalation and Intervention: Multilateralism and Its Alternatives, eds. Arthur R. Day and Michael W. Doyle, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986), p.2.

¹⁷⁸ Doyle, p.3.

¹⁷⁹ John L Gaddis, The Long Peace; Inquires Into The History Of The Cold War, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p.52.

¹⁸⁰ Doyle, p.7.

a Soviet or U.S. nexus with a singular purpose of resistance to their ideological opposites. With the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Communist Bloc, there is no unity; there is less reason for these organizations to exist.

It is interesting to note that when the NATO format was detached from the North Atlantic/European scenario and applied to a fundamentally different region, it ceases to be viable. The Manila Pact's Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was founded in 1954 based on the NATO model with the dual ambitions of opposing further Communist gains in Southeast Asia, and ultimately of sanctioning a U.S. presence in Vietnam. Suffering from wavering member support and a decided lack of unanimity, the organization proved ineffective and was eventually disbanded in 1977.¹⁸¹ Differences in cultural foundations (indeed, the very spectrum of cultural diversity among member nations), and an essentially different kind of security confrontation undermined SEATO from the beginning.

Other proposals for East Asia looked to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) as their model. This was particularly true in the wake of the disintegration of the Eastern European bloc in 1989. Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans argued most enthusiastically for the conceptual Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia (CSCA). This support is based on the Palme Commission¹⁸² thesis that security is achieved in concert with other countries, rather than in opposition. Although receiving an element of academic

¹⁸¹ In Search of Southeast Asia, ed. David Joel Steinberg, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), p.445. See also: Ulrich A. Straus, "Southeast Asia in Containment Strategies for the 1990s," Containment: Concept and Policy Vol.2, ed., Terry L. Diebel and John Lewis Gaddis, (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1986), pp.520-521.

¹⁸² Palme Commission, "Common Security: A Program For Disarmament," The Report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security issues, chairman Olof Palme, (London: Pan Books, 1982). See also: Stuart Harris, "Architecture for a New Era in Asia-Pacific," Pacific Research, (May 1990), pp.8f. and John Fry, The Helsinki Process; Negotiating Security and Cooperation in Europe, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1993).

support, it failed to work for the Asia-Pacific region. The Euro-model based proposal were all undercut by Asia's diversity.¹⁸³

Although Northeast Asia is even less fertile ground than Southeast Asia,¹⁸⁴ subsequent suggestions for security arrangements based on the CSCE model also surfaced with some regularity. Notably these included proposals from the Soviet Union's Mikhail Gorbachev in July 1986 during his noted Vladivostok speech.¹⁸⁵ The main elements of Gorbachev's proposals were for economic cooperation, but he suggested a Helsinki-style forum, naval arms control, and confidence building measures. While any Soviet proposal for regional security structures was sure to be interpreted as a hegemonic gesture around the Asia-Pacific rim, some Soviet actions may have been actual attempts at reconciling common East-West interests.¹⁸⁶ The former Soviet foreign minister Shevardnadze called for an "All Asian Forum" as a multilateral negotiating mechanism in the Asia-Pacific.¹⁸⁷ Whatever their intent, the fact that Soviet suggestions met with little international acceptance indicates that it is unlikely that any Russian-based security conception will succeed. The economic and political dilemma in Russia limits any influence it might have in terms of building security arrangements in the Asia-Pacific region.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸³ "Asia Unleashed," *The Economist*, (3 April, 1993), p.15.

¹⁸⁴ Whereas Southeast Asia is home to myriad cultures and ethnic backgrounds making it unsuited to European-modeled common security arrangements, Northeast Asia would seem a relatively homogenous host with ancient and common Sinic cultural links throughout the region. However, sociological permutations and intense historical baggage have in part rendered similar gestures at security structures futile.

¹⁸⁵ Other profferings include an interview with the Indonesian journal *Merdeka* in 1987 and a speech in Krasnoyarsk in September 1988. Geoffrey Wiseman, "Common Security in the Asia-Pacific Region," *The Pacific Review* Vol.5, No.1, (1992): p.43.

¹⁸⁶ Wiseman, p.100.

¹⁸⁷ Kook-Chin Kim, p.103.

¹⁸⁸ Wang Qi, p.4.

On yet another occasion, Foreign Minister Evans advocated the use of the United Nations security apparatus as the supporting mechanism for common security. Of particular interest in Northeast Asia, Evans' countryman Prime Minister Bob Hawke once postulated a security system based on "...a set of arrangements and relationships which together maintain regional security...some of these arrangements will be formal, others informal. Some will be bilateral, others trilateral or multilateral."¹⁸⁹

A thoughtful proposal for a CSCE type arrangement in Northeast Asia came recently from Canada. The Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark proposed the a *North Pacific Security Cooperation Dialogue (NPSCD)* at a conference in Victoria, British Columbia in April 1991.¹⁹⁰ This proposal for a sub-regional multilateral security dialogue offered a focused and unique option. The NPSCD would represent *both* official governmental representatives and non-governmental organizations (see next section) within a 'dual-track' format:

On the non-governmental track a group of academics discussed what kind of security framework might be constructed. On another track, officials from the policy planning staffs from the seven states in the North Pacific...discussed similar matters, albeit on an 'unofficial' basis. The two tracks often crisscrossed during the meetings, and at the end plans were laid for further workshops on specific issues, leading to another general meeting.¹⁹¹

To avoid any prejudice by association with previous Soviet proposals, the Canadians avoided the language of the CSCE, yet the collection of security issues for consideration contained

¹⁸⁹ Bob Hawke, "Australia's Security in Asia," Lecture to the Asia-Australia Institute, University of New South Wales, Sydney, 24 May 1991. News release, p.3 and speech by Senator Evans, "Australia's Regional Security Environment," Conference on Strategic Studies, 31 July 1991, pp.10-12. As cited in Wiseman, p.44.

¹⁹⁰ United States, China, Japan, (at the time) Soviet Union, North and South Korea, and of course Canada.

¹⁹¹ Gerald Segal, "North-East Asia: Common Security or a la carte?" *International Affairs* Vol.67, No.4, (1991), p.764.

'hot' topics similar to the Soviet suggestions: the environment, confidence-building measures such as the exchange of military information and officials, and ultimately discussions of arms control and deployment limitations.¹⁹² Segal regards the NPSCD as somewhat of a minimalist tangent with its sub-regional focus and specific issue-by-issue approach. Perhaps; however, given the limited success of "grand schemes of multilateral cooperation," this more specific approach may hold greater potential.

For all the clamor for myriad security arrangements for the entire Asia-Pacific rim, repeated meetings of government officials rarely accomplish any more than rhetorical banter calling for more meetings, *ad infinitum*. The limited NPSCD concept promises to be more productive.

The precedent for Asia-specific regional organizations and formalized interactions is well established. Including economic associations, professional/technical organizations, and international organizations particularly active in Asia and the Pacific, most of these are relatively restricted either by geographic (i.e.: sub-regional) or topical scope.¹⁹³ Three economic organizations stand out: these are ASEAN, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and the South Pacific Forum (SPF). Some other organizations have attempted to meet their needs in an all-regional context. These include the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC), the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), the Colombo Plan, the Asia Pacific Economic Co-Operation (APEC), and the Asian Development Bank (ADB).

It is important to note that the preponderance of regional international liaisons are within a network of bilateral ties. They constitute, as Palmer quotes Secretary of State George Shultz, a "web of cooperative realities" between governments of the region, and a

¹⁹² Segal, p.764.

¹⁹³ Palmer, p.22.

growing number of contacts among private businesses, professional groups, and individuals.¹⁹⁴ Less visible than the large international/regional organizations, these limited bilateral ties are inevitably forming the networks upon which the "regionals" will depend for their success. Robert Scalapino has termed this process "Asianization" and states that this congealing process "has been under way for several decades and has not yet reached its full momentum." It is, as he goes on to say:

...a widening and deepening network of ties between and among Asian states of diverse political and cultural nature. Although this process has not eliminated the importance of peripheral powers, notably the United States...to the region, it has introduced a major new, and partly independent dimension into the scene. Whether in conflict or in concert, the Asian states are creating or recreating relations between and among themselves, both hierarchial and equal. Interdependence within Asia as well as with external parties is growing.¹⁹⁵

To organize and direct these economic interdependencies has been the challenge. As previously suggested, early attempts at orchestrated co-operation in Asia have generally been in terms of emulating the trading bloc of the European Community. Including Kojima and Kurimoto's proposal for a "Pacific Free Trade Area" and Drysdale and Patrick's conceptual "Organization for Pacific Trade and Development," these attempts made it clear that organizational models developed elsewhere would not easily work in the Pacific Region.¹⁹⁶ The crux of the problem has been in accommodating the tremendous socio-economic and political diversity of the Pacific Rim. "These differences and complicated political factors mean that region-wide economic co-operation cannot be built on formal inter-governmental

¹⁹⁴ Palmer, p.22.

¹⁹⁵ Robert A. Scalapino, "Regionalism in the Pacific: Prospects and Problems for the Pacific Basin," *The Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Vol.26, No.2, (Summer 1988), p.178; as cited in Palmer, p.24.

¹⁹⁶ Andrew Elek, "Asia Pacific Economic Co-Operation (APEC)," *Southeast Asian Affairs*, (1991), p.35.

structures (alone), something more imaginative was needed to commence the process and continues to be needed to advance it."¹⁹⁷

Accordingly this need was fulfilled first by conferences of academics in the Pacific Trade and Development (PAFTAD) series, and then by preeminent businessmen at the region-wide Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC). A crucial step was made towards true regional planning by involving policy makers during the Pacific Economic Co-operation Council (PECC) meetings in Canberra in 1980. Although many countries from the region were apprehensive about entangling themselves in any kind of international "authority" (given their recent emergence from under the colonial veil), the PECC seemed to offer hope without formal commitments to an economic co-operation process.¹⁹⁸

A tripartite made up of businessmen, academics, and public officials, PECC's diverse composition was able to highlight regional interests in trade, agriculture, fisheries, minerals and energy, investment, transportation, and tourism. Combining the macroeconomic perspective with information exchange and access to policy makers, PECC theoretically benefitted all the region's economies.¹⁹⁹ Whereas PECC was highly successful at building local consensus and outward looking economic co-operation at the functional level, to effect true change an additional tool was needed at the political level.

An outgrowth of the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) and MAPHILINDO, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was formed in 1967, ostensibly in response to the perceived threat of regional communism. Residing primarily in Indochina (Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam) this threat to internal security included revolutionary insurgents who

¹⁹⁷ Elek, p.35.

¹⁹⁸ Stuart Harris, "Varieties of Pacific Economic Cooperation," *The Pacific Review*, Vol.4, No.4, (London: Oxford University Press, 1991), p.303.

¹⁹⁹ Elek.

looked primarily to Maoist-China for inspiration and material support.²⁰⁰ This founding in security issues is a curious paradox, as Rolls points out, in that ASEAN's founding charter (the Bangkok Declaration) emphasizes the promotion of economic growth, social progress, and cultural development.²⁰¹ ASEAN membership includes the non-communist countries of Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Brunei.

All security interests aside, ASEAN has served primarily to foster economic cooperation among its members.²⁰² Out of deference to nationalism and sovereignty interests, ASEAN for the most part remained uninvolved until recently in security issues. However it "has forged a unity out of countries that were once suspicious of each other. Its meetings are warm, consensus emerges through sophisticated diplomacy, and its statements have clout. ASEAN nations vote together as a bloc in almost every international forum."²⁰³ Antolik proposes that ASEAN is at once an "amalgam" and, more importantly, a political process. It is "...a non-aggression pact resting on adherence by its members to the principles of restraint...respect...and responsibility."²⁰⁴

This process has gone well past the realm of a mere non-aggression pact, ASEAN now encompasses cooperative agreements in politics, economics, and has begun to venture

²⁰⁰ Donald E. Weatherbee, "Security as a 'Condition' in Southeast Asia," from *Change, Interdependence and Security in the Pacific Basin; The 1990 Pacific Symposium*, ed. Dora Alves, (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1991), p.283.

²⁰¹ Mark G. Rolls, "ASEAN: Where from or Where to?," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol.13, No.3, (December 1991), p.317.

²⁰² Clark D. Neher, *Southeast Asia in the new International Era*, (Boulder: Westview, 1991), p.6.

²⁰³ Michael Haas, *The Asian Way to Peace: A Story of Regional Cooperation*, (New York: Praeger, 1989), p.146.

²⁰⁴ Michael Antolik, *ASEAN and the Diplomacy of Accommodation*, (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1990), p.10; as cited in Rolls, p.316.

into realm of security discussions. Its early list of accomplishments is impressive, yet surprisingly limited. ASEAN suggested a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in an attempt to contain the aggression of any outside power. It failed to materialize. Economically, ASEAN has coordinated inputs of technical assistance to the region, resulting in a substantial increase in foreign funding. Additionally, ASEAN has been influential in negotiating access to overseas markets and in initiating economic self-help programs.²⁰⁵ This regional cooperation has resulted in explosive intra-ASEAN trade where previously complex negotiations had failed.²⁰⁶

Internally ASEAN must foster further economic solidarity through reduction or elimination of intra-regional tariffs. Despite excessive tariff barriers between ASEAN nations, the recent Singapore Summit produced a glimmer of hope. Known as common effective preferential tariffs (CEPTs), the CEPT "...requires ASEAN states to standardize and progressively reduce intra-ASEAN tariffs on a wide range of manufactures, processed and semi-processed products. By the year 2000, no tariffs on the agreed categories will exceed five percent."²⁰⁷

Such housekeeping measures will be essential if ASEAN is to perform well as a regional political arbiter and become more influential in matters of security.

Latter day Cobdenites seek to encourage a stable and more cohesive political environment by increasing economic interaction on the often...accurate presumption that political conflict is less likely among countries with close economic relations. In such circumstances, economic cooperation is an instrument to a further objective, and such

²⁰⁵ Haas, p.146.

²⁰⁶ Haas, p.147.

²⁰⁷ Haas, p.23.

motivations are not absent from regional economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.²⁰⁸

These economic imperatives prompted ASEAN to expand its efforts in the security field, initiating the Post Ministerial Conferences (PMCs). The PMC is an annual forum between the foreign ministers of the ASEAN nations and their counterparts from outside nations, generally those with which ASEAN has close economic relations. Their "dialogue partners" are Japan, the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the European Community and South Korea. Recently the PMCs have added as "observers": Russia, China, Vietnam, Laos, and Papua New Guinea. These meetings of the vast majority of the Pacific Rim strategic players have the potential of becoming a tremendously important forum for exchange of views on a variety of regional and global issues.²⁰⁹ While this forum works well for projecting ASEAN concerns and interests to the developed world, it also forces the participants to address such perennial Western as democracy, human rights and the opening of local markets to Western trade.²¹⁰

The rest of Asia has taken an active interest in ASEAN. In 1991, following the signing of the October Paris Peace Accord which ended (theoretically) the conflict in Cambodia, many observers thought that ASEAN had lost, in the same manner as NATO, its fundamental mandate for existence. Quite to the contrary, ASEAN's now durable and established structure is seen as a potential forum for broader, region-wide security discussions. Perhaps most importantly, it has also received substantial support from the United States.

²⁰⁸ Harris, p.305. Note: Richard Cobden was a nineteenth century English statesman who advocated free trade and international peace. He believed that economic cooperation between nations would beget peaceful political relations.

²⁰⁹ Palmer, p.37.

²¹⁰ Rodney Tasker, "Facing up to Security," Far Eastern Economic Review, (6 August 1992), pp.8f.

Japan first proposed that regional security be a primary issue of discussion at subsequent PMCs. This idea was been taken on enthusiastically by the rest of the participants who were all concerned about security and perceived a need for this type of forum. As Sarasin Viraphol of the Thai Foreign ministry notes: "The security situation in Asia is now more complex (and) the need for a multilateral forum stems from the need to address a much wider array of issues."²¹¹ The ASEAN-PMC meeting in July, 1993 was the first time that the security issues were actually placed on the agenda. Foreign Minister Gareth Evans went so far as to call this episode a "historic milestone."²¹²

Foremost among the current regional security topics and of special interest to the United States are China's increased military strength and outspoken territorial claims in the South China Sea, growing concerns regarding the unification of the Korean Peninsula and North Korean violation of the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty; debates over the power vacuum left by reduction of U.S. bases in the Philippines; the future role of Japan in contributing to regional security; and finally, concerns over Indian Naval activities in the Andaman and Nicobar island groups.²¹³ These issues, even though in Northeast Asia, are of tangible concern to the ASEAN nations. Additionally, with ASEAN states crucial to sea-lines-of-communication (SLOC) and Spratly Islands disputes, the ASEAN-PMC represents a very viable apparatus for regional security dialogues.²¹⁴

Detractors of the ASEAN-PMC treat the PMCs with a certain cynicism. At first even Japan and the United States participated only out of diplomatic

²¹¹ Sarasin Viraphol as quoted in Michael Vatikiotis' "Forging Stronger Links," FEER, (29 April 1993), p.26.

²¹² Raphael Pura, "ASEAN, Allies Hope to Head Off Asian Crises By Devising Strategy Of 'Preventative Diplomacy'," Asian Wall Street Journal, (02 August 1993), p.4.

²¹³ Viraphol, p.26; see also: Weatherbee, p.296.

²¹⁴ Leszek Buszynski, "ASEAN Security Dilemmas," Survival, Vol.34, No.4,(Winter 1992-93), pp.92-96.

courtesy. It was felt that:

The kind of security issues that a regional forum is meant to address would be more productively and appropriately handled in a wider multi-lateral body that would engage the United States and Japan directly. China refuses to discuss the South China Sea issue in any international conference and has instead proposed a Sino-ASEAN dialogue that would place ASEAN at a disadvantage. China's refusal points directly to the inadequacy of the PMC mechanism.²¹⁵

Challenges to ASEAN'S role in the region arose originally with the fading of its original *raison d'etre*, anti-Communism. Later tests came from economic regionalism in other parts of the world, primarily the European Communities "borderless" market and North America's fledgling Free Trade Agreement. From these the ASEAN states still face the threat of protectionism excluding their vital export markets. Although instituting their own counter-protectionism via a Japan-led economic bloc may prove beneficial in the short run, the preferable procedure for ASEAN interests is to compete in the free global market for trade and foreign investment.²¹⁶

By no means an ASEAN redundancy, APEC was launched from the valid concerns with the floundering Uruguay Round of the GATT process. Designed to supplement GATT regarding the more intangible forms of international trade restrictions, APEC's purpose was to stem the trend towards protectionism and to avoid a fragmentation of the world market into regional trading blocs.²¹⁷ From its origins in Australia, APEC initially included the ASEAN nations, New Zealand, Japan and Korea and was rapidly expanded to include the People's Republic of China (PRC), Hong Kong, Taiwan, the United States, and Canada.

Although APEC has focused exclusively on issues of economics and trade, there has

²¹⁵ Buszynski, p.103.

²¹⁶ Buszynski, p.103.

²¹⁷ Those not specifically addressed by GATT's charter, such as the series of Multi-Fiber Arrangements.

been a recent push for its role to be expanded in the world security arena. Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating has suggested that APEC should be an international security forum. Although this proposal has received limited support from within Asia, the Clinton administration appears to view APEC as a potential cure-all for any issue, including security, coming out of the Pacific Rim. There is virtually no support from the ASEAN sector nations, witness Mahathir's outspoken absence from the recent APEC meeting in Seattle. They fear encroachment upon their economic "territory."²¹⁸ Perhaps APEC's limiting element in becoming a regional security forum is its own immaturity as an institution. Still evolving, APEC is primarily a single issue forum without the central organization, support, or mandate (as yet) to orchestrate a regional security program.²¹⁹ In spite of the United States' enthusiastic yet seemingly inappropriate support, the recent "Pacific Summit" proved singularly ineffective.²²⁰

With the decline of the Soviet Empire and the potential threat of declining American assets in the region, the Asia-Pacific is a potential free-for-all of myriad economic and security interests. Even the smallest players have tangible economic interests and resources to potentially obtain the most powerful tools of war. If the need for a peaceful, stabilizing influence is apparent, then the need for a unifying forum should be all the more so.

The efforts to establish a multilateral regional security forum so far have been unsuccessful. Most established "organizations" were not designed to deal with **security** issues at an **international** level (i.e: PECC). SAARC, on the other hand, failed because it addressed the interests of only one country, India. Some efforts were handicapped by misdirected orientation (i.e: CSCE/A: designed for the relative homogeneity of Europe vice

²¹⁸ Buszynski, p.102; see also Suhaini Aznam, "The Shadow of Dili," FEER, (7 May 1992).

²¹⁹ Elek, p.44.

²²⁰ David Arase, "US Attendance in Seattle Scored Few Points With Asian Leaders," Christian Science Monitor, (29 November 1993), p.22.

diverse Asia-Pacific). Still lacked the necessary infrastructure and support to hold ongoing security discussions (i.e. APEC).

Eventually the members of ASEAN formalized an 18 nation group known as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) for the sole purpose of addressing regional security issues. With the inclusion of the **Russians**, the Chinese, and most importantly for the local sponsors of the conference, the Vietnamese, a dramatic and mature step forward was made in the search for an adequate security venue. However, its first meeting in (July 1994) in Bangkok revealed its weaknesses. The whole meeting lasted only three hours, during which limited time nothing serious could be accomplished. The long term viability of the Forum certainly remains a question.

Despite blithe official pronouncements of the conviviality of the three hour meeting, it was obvious that the dialogue had exposed irreconcilable differences, especially on territorial issues. Participants reported that four conflict areas were repeatedly referred to in the discussions -- the overlapping territorial claims in the South China Sea, Cambodia, Burma and North Korea. But ARF chose to bury these issues, its final statement referring only to North Korea.²²¹

The limited functional utility of the ASEAN "multilogue" process was once again highlighted by China's refusal to be drawn into any discussion of Spratly territorial issues, instead using the forum to reiterate the PRC's sovereignty over their claimed islands. While some analysts suggest that it is just such intractable conflicts that will ensure ARF's remaining merely a "talk shop". On the other hand, "With so many conflicting interests, a forum that stresses the processes of dialogue and consultation and aims for transparency and confidence-building would seem more realistic than one that strives for specifics on issues of conflict."²²² While the initial criticisms are wide-ranging and many following this the initial ARF meeting, the attending ministers at the very least agreed to investigate other concrete ways to facilitate

²²¹ "Better ARF than War," IPS News Service, 08/01/94 (1530), America On-Line.

²²² Kusuma Snitwongse, (Director of the Institute of Security and International Studies, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok) cited in "Better ARF than War."

security cooperation prior to next year's meeting in Brunei.²²³ Standing alone as it does, the ARF seems a logical sounding board for those pursuing Asian-Pacific Rim security in the near future.

Embracing Russia, China, Vietnam, Laos, Papua New Guinea, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the European Union as it has indicates a willingness to address/confront both sub-regional and at least regional issues. With the inclusion of former communist states a variety of crucial stumbling blocks are apparently overcome. The regional Communist history and its tenacious legacy have traditionally had the potential to undermine any ASEAN-based organization. Their inclusion indicates both an appreciation for the tremendous economic potential in these states and an understanding of their import in addressing regional security issues.

The American perception of the need for a dedicated Northeast Asian security forum should not be understated. In that most of Asia's hot spots are either in the Northeast or involve Northeast Asian states, the need for a collaboration of security interests is clear. The logic is compelling. All of the regional players (if not the world) have an intense desire to peacefully resolve the North Korean nuclear weapons issue. All would prefer a 'soft landing' for North Korea, and virtually all have an interest in a reunified peninsula.²²⁴

Crucial issues include: 'risk management', what to do with the refugees when the North Korean regime collapses; possible coordinated military scenarios if the Kim regime 'goes over the edge'; military transparency issues, defense spending, doctrinal discussions,

²²³ These include, among others, nuclear non-proliferation, peace-keeping cooperation, exchanges of non-classified military information, maritime security issues and preventative diplomacy.

²²⁴ Despite the economic powerhouse (read: opportunities) that a unified Peninsula would represent, pundits point out that a one-state Korean Peninsula would cease to be an adequate buffer on the east for the Chinese, and that the potential economic dynamo is in fact an intimidating competitor for the Japanese.

maritime safety, arms sales, missile proliferation, nuclear safety; Japanese plutonium processing; and lastly, cross-border environmental concerns, everything from fisheries rights to the devastating issue of acid rain.²²⁵

Clearly the need for a Northeast Asian subregional forum exists. The question is: how to shape it? Obviously the possibilities are many. Established economic organizations (ASEAN, APEC, PECC, etc.) have already garnered active participation from all the regional actors, but can their forums diversify to incorporate hard-edged military/security issues? More importantly, by what means can these multilateral economic forums *enforce* agreements made within their context? ASEAN has shown that economic and security issues can be discussed together, but can their decisions be enforced?

Another set of regional organizations which have shown promise in moving nations to cooperate--if only at an academic and advisory level, are the *Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's)*.²²⁶ Also known as *Track II* or *Second Track* economic and security processes, these extra-governmental forums have developed roughly parallel to and by design in support of traditional governmental organizations (U.N., ASEAN, APEC, etc.). These must not be rejected out of hand by American decision-makers.

The seminal forerunners of today's NGOs regarding economic cooperation are found in the *Pan-Pacific Union* of 1907 and the *Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR)* of 1925. Cutting the mold for today's NGOs, these organizations (particularly the IPR) brought together a diverse yet complementary mix of academics, businessmen, labor officials,

²²⁵ See Robert A. Manning, "The Asian Paradox," World Policy Journal, Vol. 10, No. 3, (Fall 1993): pp. 55-64.

²²⁶ See Desmond Ball, "CSCAP: A Milestone in Institutionalized Dialog," Asia-Pacific Defense Reporter Vol. 20, No. 6/7, (December 1993/January 1994) and Lawrence T. Woods, "Non-governmental Organizations and Pacific Cooperation: Back to the Future?" The Pacific Review Vol. 4, No. 4.

journalists, politicians, bureaucrats, and statesmen for the purpose of discussing and researching regional issues. After falling victim to McCarthyism and a U.S. cold war mentality, the IPR was soon replaced by PAFTAD and PBEC which stressed the same three modes of utility: representation, information, and communication.²²⁷

Developing in the early 1970s, the *PBEC*, *PAFTAD*, and *PECC* organizations were primarily committed to regional economic cooperation. By developing and disseminating cooperation schemes, conducting extensive economic studies and analyses, and by working closely with governmental officials they have been able to facilitate cooperation. By taking their independent work directly to officials and to full blown "First Track" governmental organizations, they have stimulated international discussion and convincingly demonstrated the benefits of trade liberalization. Most importantly, these NGO's made clear that "meaningful and productive dialog on complex and important policy matters is possible notwithstanding the extraordinary disparity in the sizes and interests of the numerous parties involved."²²⁸

From these roots have sprung a plethora of NGO's filling out the Second Track process, to the point where some estimates suggest as many as three NGO conferences per month meeting to discuss Asian-Pacific security and economic issues.²²⁹ From tiny seminars fielding but a few dozen participants discussing specific issues to major academic conferences with hundreds of participants and a spectral range of topics. Notable among the NGOs are

²²⁷ Woods, p.313.

²²⁸ Ball, pp.21-22.

²²⁹ "Regional Security Dialog: A Calendar of Asia Pacific Events," (Prepared jointly by the Regional Security Section, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, and the Strategic and Defense Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, July 1993), as referred to in Ball: p.21.

the *Asia Pacific Roundtable*,²³⁰ the *ASEAN ISIS* (see previous footnote), the *Pacific Forum* (Honolulu), the *Seoul Forum for International Affairs*, and the *Japan Institute of International Affairs* (JIIA). Together this core group has been joined in research by institutes from Japan, South Korea, China, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Australia, and the United States into a consortium known as the *Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific* (CSCAP).

The fundamental purpose of CSCAP is to provide "...a more structured regional process of a non-governmental nature...to contribute to the efforts towards regional confidence building and enhancing regional security through dialogues, consultation, and cooperation."²³¹ CSCAP may be seen as a clearing house for the collective work of the member NGOs. Guiding themes are two-fold: First, the Council must be a non-governmental institution, yet that it may include government officials, but in a non-official capacity. While political autonomy is essential in order to take "full advantage of the extraordinary vitality and fecundity of the (NGOs) engaged in the 'second track' process,"²³² official involvement at a personal level is considered useful both for credibility and for access to official resources. The second purpose is to facilitate dialog, coordinate and support research, and contribute to resolution of differences between states and peoples.

While CSCAP and its member organizations have "attracted some state recognition of their roles as unofficial agents of diplomacy" and economic cooperation, their challenges are many.²³³ First is to retain professional credibility. As in U.S. political circles, the line

²³⁰ Now a offshoot of the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN ISIS).

²³¹ Desmond Ball, Richard L. Grant, and Jusuf Wanandi, Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region, (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1993), as quoted in Ball: p.21.

²³² Ball, p.21.

²³³ Woods, p.319.

between an objective non-governmental economic research group and an agenda-bound professional lobbying organization can be a thin and fuzzy one indeed. The injection of tainted and skewed counsel will threaten the reliability of the entire Second Track process. Furthermore, it is difficult to satisfy "the need to attract and maintain state interest, state support, and state involvement while at the same time discouraging state control."²³⁴ The Second Track, or Track II process is no stand-alone answer to Asia-Pacific security needs. However, it can go a long ways in supporting mainstream governmental forums such as ASEAN and APEC.

Despite the apparent potential for ASEAN and APEC to perform as regional security arbiters, their limited foundations as purely Southeast Asian economic forums reveals a weakness in trying to become an effective forum for the Northeast Asian security environment. Whereas Southeast Asia has moved on gracefully into the post-cold war era by putting economic development first (economic security versus politico-military escalation; the purported Southeast Asian "arms race" notwithstanding), the Northeast appears to be trapped for the time being by long standing political hatreds. Torn by a variety of critical issues including the still volatile memories of Japanese colonialism throughout the region, widespread territorial disputes, the omnipresent fears of Chinese hegemony, the dangerously unstable North Korea and post-communist Russian Far East, efforts to establish true multilateral security arrangements in Northeast Asia have heretofore been entirely futile. While the continuity of the U.S. bilateral security links with regional nations is desired, a changing world demands the effort to add a multilateral dimension to international relations.

Thus with the profound exception of the heritage of the Cold War on the Korean Peninsula, Northeast Asia has been relatively stable. Anchored by the US alliances with Japan and South Korea, Northeast Asia has been peaceful and prosperous. However, with these ties potentially threatened by an American administration intent on military downsizing and

²³⁴ Woods, p.319.

focused on domestic issues, the Northeast Asian field is fertile for the sowing of insecurity. Additionally, "given the lack of an appropriate security regime in Northeast Asia like (that) in Europe, it is observed that greater independence from old restraints could lead to a precarious regional power vacuum."²³⁵ Factors to consider as we 'cultivate the field': Northeast Asia represents the convergence of interests for four of the world's most powerful nations--the U.S., Russia, China, and Japan. The former three are nuclear weapons equipped (accompanied of course by the dangerously unpredictable North Korea). Equally crucial is Northeast Asia's collective status as the world's most dangerous vortex of economic rivalry.

While no state in the region wants to risk nuclear confrontation, the slow but steady regional escalation in arms procurement suggests regional players may risk conflict involving conventional weapons. What is the outlook for peace and stability in the region? However grim the present may appear, if a new common international multilateral factor is added to the security establishment, peaceful solutions may be found for everybody's mutual benefit. The key is to agree upon common interests great enough to rise above deeply ingrained historical legacies, to overcome disabling nationalism, to dispel dangerous threat perceptions, and to allow the reasonable concessions of certain sovereign prerogatives for the sake of common interest.²³⁶

²³⁵ William T. Tow, "Northeast Asia and International Security; Transforming Competition to Collaboration," Austral Journal of International Affairs Vol.46, No.1 (May 1992), p.2. As cited in Kook-Chin Kim, p.99.

²³⁶ Tow, p.100.

VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Throughout the Cold War era the United States' objectives included the containment of international communism, the reconstruction of Western Europe, Japan, and Korea, and the development of global economic institutions to promote free trade. To this end the US participated in a multitude of international arrangements: NATO, the European Community, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the GAIT. In addition, America negotiated cornerstone security treaties with Japan and South Korea. While these measures were effective against global communism, their adequacy in the post-Cold War era has come into question. Although the threat of communism is largely eliminated, there is cause to re-assess the Cold War activities and to find new methods to cope with a 'new generation' of political, economic, and security challenges.

While the United States has security relationships with Japan and Korea, the evolution of Northeast Asian economic and political dynamics has precipitated a clamor for more 'mature' and 'mutually beneficial' relationships with these states. The expansion of Asia-wide economic prosperity and cross-border economic integration have fostered an awareness of common interests with all Northeast Asian states that will be fundamental in defining the new era. America's interests in the region are obvious, well documented, and continually growing. For the more effective protection and promotion of its national interests in East Asia and the Pacific regions however, it is necessary to participate in and support the emerging multilateral arrangements.

The Clinton administration has 'climbed on board' with the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group as a means to effect multilateral economic discussion around the Pacific Rim. Although this organization is still embryonic, with continued support from all sectors it has great potential to enhance economic integration in the region. APEC has little chance of developing into a traditional security alliance. More importantly however, it will

promote American awareness of their interests rooted in the region, and cultivate an indelible sense of purpose in the US role of contributing to regional stability. Additionally, through the 'multilogue' process, APEC can help the Asian community develop a greater sense of mutual responsibility and ultimately foster regional collective security arrangements and higher levels of support for US forces.²³⁷

In the pursuit of regional security, the United States has no better forum than the rapidly evolving Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). The trans-regional forum ASEAN (specifically the ASEAN Regional Forum, ARF) provides a context wherein potential antagonists can meet together without overt hostility. With the shared interests of economic development and desires for a tranquil, predictable environment, ASEAN is well suited for the negotiation of regional security initiatives. Unencumbered by the pitfalls of the global milieu, the ARF may well serve as an expeditious supplement both to the United Nations and to America's extant bilateral ties in the region. ASEAN's leaders have been visionary in soliciting a wide-spread and varied membership, recognizing the verity of shared national interests and thus the greater probability of meaningful dialogue. Fortunately, the Clinton administration has recognized that multilateral security arrangements can provide benefits that no single security arrangement can achieve.²³⁸

²³⁷ Promoting a sense of fortuitous integration with crucial Northeast Asian economies is essential. Although the US was ostensibly promoting national interests through NAFTA, such a device can be interpreted as an economic bloc; not beneficial to common interests with Asian alliances. Corresponding alliances with EA/P states are required. Recent Japanese and Chinese support for Malaysian PM Mahathir's East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC; a proposed economic arrangement which *excludes* the United States) suggests a potential divisiveness in the region. See Rodney Tasker, "Signs of Life: Japan Warms Towards East Asian caucus," Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 September, 1994.

²³⁸ Bill Clinton, Speech delivered to the Korean National Assembly, Seoul, 10 July, 1993, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Vol.29, No.28, (19 July, 1993), pp.1310-1314.

A plethora of multilateral arrangements have been discussed, many of which deserve increased official United States participation. Full participation must be forthcoming only if it contributes to the national interests of the United States. Any internationalization of American interests in EA/P must be as 'building blocks' added-on to the existing bilateral ties to its traditional trading partners. Further, "the key to future stability in Asia is a continued American military presence...the keys to assuring this presence are the long-standing US alliances and America's old and new friendships throughout the region. As Secretary Christopher has noted, maintaining 'our solemn treaty obligations' remains the United States first foreign policy priority."²³⁹ That bilateral ties can overlap with multilateral arrangements is implicit; that they must be flexible and renewed to suit changing national interests is essential to maintaining economic and political stability.

In the push to build a concerted Pacific Community (whether the current policy is referred to as 'enlargement' or as '*cooperative engagement*'), the bottom-line is the same: that is, to strengthen and facilitate the growth of the world's community of free-market democracies.²⁴⁰ Whether or not the United States participates is academic: US economic integration throughout the region requires it. Even without US involvement, the synergy of the congealing East Asian economic bloc is enough to ensure the durability of these

²³⁹ Ralph A. Cossa, "Good News For Asia: The Bottom-Up Review," Asia-Pacific Defense Forum (Spring 1994), pp.16-17.

²⁴⁰ 'Enlargement' is comprised of the following four strategies: 1) Strengthen the community of major market democracies; 2) Consolidate new democracies and market economies; 3) Counter the aggression, and support the liberalization of states hostile to democracy and free markets; and, 4) Pursue our humanitarian mission. 'Cooperative Engagement', the security incarnation of American foreign policy, is grounded in three areas of strategic emphasis: 1) Economic growth; 2) Military strength; and 3) Support for democracy. It capitalizes on an *adaptive* forward presence, strong alliances, and a multitude of evolving bilateral and multilateral alliances. See Anthony Lake, "From Containment to Enlargement: Current Foreign Policy Debates in Perspective," speech delivered at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Relations, Washington, DC, 21 September 1993; and Admiral Charles R. Larson, USN, (CINCPAC), "Cooperative Engagement," Asia-Pacific Defense Forum (Summer, 1993), pp.2-6.

arrangements (witness the smoldering EAEC). That these arrangements are primarily Asian-led is symptomatic of a traditional American reserve in its relations towards East Asia. Whatever the future, whatever the mechanism, American leadership will emerge through full-scale, meaningful participation. At the very least, American participation in these arrangements is mandatory to ensure a 'place at the table'.

The affirmation of American interest in the region must not be understated, nor should the active pursuit of the national interests by whatever means be underplayed. The United States has the military and economic strength upon which the future of the East Asia/Pacific depends. East Asian multilateral arrangements, with US support, will serve our interests as well as those of the regional states. While threats to states' sovereignty and bids for hegemonic power will ultimately be addressed at the United Nations, these regional 'discussion groups' can go a long ways towards diffusing incipient tensions. The value of coordinated national interests via multilateral forums is clear. It is the United States alone, through its substantial support, which can provide the underpinnings for the search for a new world order in which all nations--whatever their political and social system--can enjoy the benefits of peace and prosperity.

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